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Foreword
My research interests are Monetary Economics, Fiscal Policy, Learning Theory
and Macroeconometrics. During my PhD studies I got fascinated by the role of
(non-)rational expectations in monetary and fiscal policy. How do individuals
make economic forecasts, choices and coordinate on equilibria? Therefore, the
research papers that form this dissertation examine analytically and numerically
the dynamic implications of simple and optimal monetary policy, monetary and
fiscal policy interactions and anticipated fiscal policy, both in homogeneous and
heterogeneous expectations models.
With regard to Monetary Economics, I am especially interested in the central
bank’s policy problem. Usually, a central bank has a mandate to ensure price
stability and in many countries also to stabilize output. The central bank’s main
policy instrument is typically the nominal interest rate. It uses this instrument
to react to aggregate shocks that hit the economy. The aim is to safeguard
the economy against arbitrary large fluctuations that may be driven solely by
expectations or against deflationary and inflationary spirals.
Recently, a popular economic framework to study such issues has been the New
Keynesian model. In this model prices are sticky and individuals care about the
future evolution of the economy. In consequence, individuals form expectations
about the future. Frequently, the central bank’s role is to set its nominal interest
rate according to a simple rule or to a so-called reaction function derived from
optimal policy. These rules and reaction functions are usually linear in inflation
and output gap. A central finding of this literature is that in most cases the
central bank is able to secure price stability and non-volatile output evolution
when shocks hit the economy. The result is usually true, when the central bank
reacts more than one-for-one to inflation (i.e. the so-called Taylor-principle) and
modestly to deviations in the output gap.
Foreword
Most of the results in this literature are derived under the assumption of ra-
tional expectations. That is when individuals act as homo oeconomicus while
they form expectations about the future evolution of prices and other variables.
Although I personally consider this assumption to be a useful benchmark case,
ever since the beginning of my studies I have been critical about this concept,
especially to what extent it reflects actual economic behaviour of individuals.
In particular, it requires individuals to have perfect knowledge of all systematic
characteristics of an economy. One approach that has relaxed the rational expec-
tations assumption by a less restrictive one is the Learning Theory. In this strand
of the literature it is assumed that individuals form their expectations adaptively.
This means, that individuals are thought to behave like econometricians, when
they forecast the future development of prices and other variables. Up to now, in
most of the studies in Monetary Economics, the concept of learning served as a
robustness-check. By robustness-check I mean that authors usually ask whether a
unique stationary equilibrium, which the central bank is able to implement under
rational expectations, remains stable if agents are non-rational but learn. If so,
the equilibrium is denoted expectational stable and learning agents can coordinate
on this equilibrium.
From my perspective, this might somehow be a comparison of two extreme
types of behaviour, whereas the intermediate cases are also a relevant subject to
study, as empirical evidence suggests. In consequence, one may ask, whether the
central bank is able to implement a unique stationary equilibrium, if individuals
with different types of expectations populate the economy. Based on recent ad-
vancements in modeling heterogeneous expectations in the New Keynesian model,
I have taken up this question in two out of three papers of my PhD thesis. These
papers combine analytical derivations with numerical methods. In particular, I
examine an economy in which individuals with rational and adaptive expectations
coexist.
In my job market paper “Heterogeneous Expectations and the Merit of Mone-
tary Policy Inertia”, which forms the first chapter, the central bank is assumed to
conduct policy by simple linear interest rate rules or reaction functions based on
optimal policy. My results suggest that simple rules have (dis-)advantages simi-
lar to the standard New Keynesian model, but optimal policy is quite hazardous
given the central bank ignores heterogeneous expectations and interest rate sta-
xii
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bilization. Therefore, I provide an argument in favour of the inertial responses of
central banks to aggregate shocks.
The second chapter is the related paper “Monetary and Fiscal Policy Inter-
action in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations” in which I extend the New
Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations and examine interactions be-
tween simple monetary and fiscal policy. The related literature has focused on
how fiscal policies can limit the central bank’s ability to ensure price stability.
A central finding in homogeneous expectations New Keynesian models is that
the combination of so-called active monetary and passive fiscal policy or passive
monetary and active fiscal policy yield determinacy and expectational stability.
With regard to determinacy, I find that such clear-cut insights do not prevail in
a model of heterogeneous expectations, when the central bank conducts policy
according to a simple rule. I also observe that the danger to trigger explosive
paths of the price level increases, although determinacy remains feasible.
The third paper of my PhD thesis “Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the
Case of Distortionary Taxation” is a collaboration with my fellow student Shou-
jian Zhang. It emerged from our discussion of my interest in the learning liter-
ature. In particular, we became aware of the low number of contributions that
treat anticipated fiscal policy issues under the assumption of learning agents.
After reading through the existing literature we listed possible issues for further
research in this area and started our joint project. Most of the work was done
in face-to-face work. Sometimes one of us conducted an analytical derivation
alone and the other one double-checked or vice-versa. The same is true for the
scripts we coded in order to present numerical results. Thus, Shoujian Zhang
and me equally contributed to this project. Our paper deals with a Fiscal Policy
problem, which is very practical, but nevertheless expectations play an important
role. In particular, fiscal policy changes are usually accompanied by implemen-
tation and/or legislation lags. Therefore, the date when a fiscal policy change is
announced and the date when it becomes effective do not coincide. This opens
the door to anticipation effects in the dynamic responses of individuals to a policy
change. By anticipation effects we mean that agents might change their economic
behaviour in response to the policy change before it becomes effective. These an-
ticipation effects have already been studied under rational expectations, but until
recently have been neglected in the learning literature. We are currently aware
xiii
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of only two other studies in this new field. Both of them employ a basic Ramsey
growth model. One major insight is that the assumption of rational expectations
is not necessary for the classic Ricardian equivalence result to hold. Another
important finding is that under learning the dynamic effects of anticipated lump-
sum tax changes remain smooth, but are strikingly different compared to their
perfect foresight counterparts. We examine the latter issue in a more elaborate
version of the Ramsey model with distortionary taxation and elastic labour sup-
ply. We detect oscillatory dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes. We
also compare the welfare consequences of anticipated tax changes under perfect
foresight and learning and find that the magnitude of consequences of reforms is
much lower under learning.
In sum, with this dissertation I attempt to provide some new insights into
the role of expectations in monetary and fiscal policy and to contribute to im-
provements in these fields of political decision-making. Likewise, I hope that
this dissertation forms the first step in establishing my place in the economic
literature and qualifies me to become a good university teacher.
xiv
Chapter 1
Heterogeneous Expectations and
the Merit of Monetary Policy
Inertia
1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, central banks in the industrialized economies usually have a mandate
to ensure price stability and in most countries to stabilize economic output. Their
preferred policy instrument in many cases is the nominal interest rate. In the the-
oretical monetary literature it is often recommended that monetary policy should
be rule-based, i.e. that the central bank sets its policy instrument according to
some specific code of conduct. Therefore, monetary policy rules still appear to
be a popular subject to study. Advocates of rule-based monetary policy such as
Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı (2008) among others provide the-
oretical justification for the use of rules in the conduct of monetary policy. The
core argument is that such rules may provide a nominal anchor for the economy.
This means that the central bank can control nominal variables such as inflation
in a way that is beneficial for individual welfare. Controlling nominal variables
is important as the common transversality conditions in macroeconomic models
solely rule out explosions of real variables but not of nominal variables. This
issue has been reemphasized by Cochrane (2007).1
1Note that the main point of Cochrane (2007) is a serious criticism of the theories
that make the case for rule-based monetary policies in general. He has initialized
Heterogeneous Expectations and the Merit of Monetary Policy Inertia
In the common rules discussed in monetary economics, the policy instrument
of the central bank is usually a linear function of (expected) inflation and (ex-
pected) output gap. The policy coefficients, which premultiply these two variables
of interest, express the magnitude of response to deviations in the two variables
from a certain policy target. Such rules offer additional advantages. They allow
the central bank to apparently relate its mandate to its policy instrument, which
increases policy transparency. In addition, monetary policy can become more
coherent, credible, accountable and easier to communicate.
Numerous monetary policy rules have been proposed and their dynamic prop-
erties have been assessed. In recent years, most of these studies embed the rules
into a New Keynesian (NK) model, where it is usually assumed that agents have
rational expectations (RE). Then authors ask, whether or not a specific rule can
yield local determinacy, i.e. there exists a unique stationary rational expectations
equilibrium (REE).2 Some authors also conduct a robustness-check and assume
that agents may not be fully rational but learn. In particular, it is assumed that
agents act as econometricians and forecast the future development of prices and
other endogenous variables. It is then asked, whether or not a unique station-
ary equilibrium, which the central bank is able to implement under RE, remains
stable if agents learn. If so, the equilibrium is denoted expectational stable and
learning agents can coordinate on this equilibrium.
A classical and widely-cited analysis of monetary policy rules is Bullard and
Mitra (2002), who examine monetary policy rules with regard to determinacy and
E-stability.3 They apply two widely-used methodologies to assess the dynamic
properties of monetary policy rules. First, they provide analytical conditions un-
der which a certain rule yields determinacy. Second, they numerically illustrate
so-called regions of local determinacy, local indeterminacy and local explosive-
ness.4 In addition, studies also label regions of E-stability. The different regions
a vivid debate on the benefit of conducting monetary policy by the help of rules in
forward-looking economies that has been joined by McCallum (2009b). This debate is
still in progress and is not the focus of this study.
2Determinacy most importantly rules out undesirable evolutions of endogenous vari-
ables such as large fluctuations, see for example Woodford (1999, p.69).
3When an equilibrium is denoted expectational stable it is also often denoted learn-
able or it is said to have the property of E-stability. These concepts are all closely
related. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a rigorous discussion of this strand of
the literature.
4We consider a situation to be locally determinate, when there is a unique bounded
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are usually plotted in a plane where the axes measure the monetary policy coef-
ficients of the specific rule. From our point of view, the former method is only
sensible for low dimensional economic systems, whereas the latter method may
in any case be a useful method of assessment.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) find that some monetary policy rules that condition
interest rates on current values of endogenous variables (output gap and infla-
tion) are relatively good tools to enforce determinacy. In addition, such rules
appear to yield E-stability for a large fraction of the considered monetary policy
parameter space on top. Most important, they find that a rule featuring con-
temporaneous expectations instead of current values yields the same results. A
rule with contemporaneous expectations requires the central bank to have less
information about contemporaneous economic conditions and therefore this rule
is highly operational.5 In consequence, Bullard and Mitra (2002) conclude that
such rules are the most desirable ones. In addition, Bullard and Mitra (2002)
investigate the dynamic properties of rules which depend on lagged values of
endogenous variables or expected future values of the same. They find that the
dynamic properties of these rules are less desirable in the sense that there is much
more danger to render the economy in a situation of local indeterminacy or local
explosiveness.
The results of Bullard and Mitra (2002) suggest that responding more than
one-for-one to inflation, i.e. sticking to the Taylor-principle6, and responding
modestly to output gap deviations is a rather good policy independent of the
particular rule.
Other noteworthy studies in the tradition of Bullard and Mitra (2002) are
Bullard and Mitra (2007), Preston (2005) and Duffy and Xiao (2009). Bullard and
solution, to be locally indeterminate when there are multiple bounded solutions and to
be locally explosive, when there exists no locally bounded solution.
5Expectations in a monetary policy rule can be thought of as the central bank’s
forecast of a variable. It is obviously easier to use a forecast of a contemporaneous
aggregate variable than to correctly observe it, as mentioned by Bullard and Mitra
(2002, p.1112) and emphasized by McCallum (1999a).
6Taylor (1993) suggests such a simple interest rate rule and assumes an inflation
coefficient of 1.5, i.e. if inflation deviates from its target level, then the central bank
should react with the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one, in this case one-
and-a-half-for-one. In Taylor (1999) he denotes this suggestion from 1993 (with regard
to the functional form) a ”normative recommendation”. In Taylor (1999) he explicitly
advocates an inflation coefficient larger than one in such a policy rule. This policy
stance towards inflation is denoted the “Taylor-principle” in the literature.
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Mitra (2007) study similar monetary policy rules as Bullard and Mitra (2002), but
the rules have the additional feature of policy inertia.7 Bullard and Mitra (2007)
demonstrate that the additional feature of policy inertia can make determinacy
even more likely and in turn reduce the threats of local indeterminacy or local
explosiveness. In addition, Preston (2005) analyzes rules in a situation, where the
entire forecast horizon of agents is explicitly considered. Preston (2005) confirms
most of the results of Bullard and Mitra (2002). Duffy and Xiao (2009) examine
similar rules as Bullard and Mitra (2002) in two versions of a NK economy with
capital accumulation with regard to determinacy and E-stability. One version
of the model is without and the other with firm-specific capital. They find that
some, though not all conclusions of Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Bullard and
Mitra (2007) carry over to a NK economy with capital accumulation.
A potential shortcoming of these analyses is the fact that all assume homo-
geneity of agents in the economy, despite the fact that heterogeneity is a universal
feature in reality. Heterogeneity can have an impact on the dynamics an economy
and affect the dynamic properties of monetary policy rules if structural parame-
ters capture it. We aim to focus on heterogeneity of expectations in the economy.
Agents form either RE or adaptive expectations. In particular, we focus on het-
erogeneous expectations in a NK model as elaborated in Branch and McGough
(2009). We examine the consequences for local stability when the central bank
conducts monetary policy by several simple rules or rules derived from optimal
policy. Thus, the analysis herein may be viewed as a kind of robustness-check
for the performance of monetary policy rules with regard to local stability when
expectations are heterogeneous. We follow the numerical method by Bullard and
Mitra (2002) mentioned above.
It may be of interest that we are not the first to conduct that kind of analysis.
Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.) did so before. They find that the presence of
agents with purely adaptive expectations next to fully rational agents turns poli-
cies, which used to yield indeterminacy in the case of RE, into policies that yield
determinacy (“Result 3”). Furthermore, the opposite is true if the non-rational
agents have extrapolative expectations (“Result 4”).8 These results emerge in a
7Policy inertia denotes the modern central banks’ practice to alter their policy
instrument with remarkable inertia in response to economic shocks.
8Be aware that in our context non-rational expectations are always adaptive in the
sense that agents use past observations of an endogenous variable to forecast its future
4
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situation in which the central bank sticks to a forward-looking monetary policy
rule. In consequence, they conclude that purely adaptive expectations may have
a stabilizing effect, whereas extrapolative expectations may have a destabilizing
effect.9 Please be aware that Branch and McGough (2009, p.10) themselves claim
that they considered other rules: “... we also checked for robustness when mone-
tary policy adopts rules that depend on lagged and contemporaneous data. The
qualitative results presented below are robust to the particular form of the pol-
icy rule”. Unfortunately, no further reference is made to those alternative rules
therein.
Overall, we think that a more detailed study of alternative simple rules and,
in addition of optimal rules in an economy with heterogeneous expectations is
necessary and interesting, especially when one slightly increases the level of het-
erogeneity compared to Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.). This can serve as
a more detailed robustness-check for the rules. Moreover, it allows us to shed
new light on the question, how important it is, that the central bank is aware of
the expectational heterogeneity when it makes its interest rate decisions.
We start our analysis by studying the rules considered in Bullard and Mitra
(2002) without or with policy inertia (as in Bullard and Mitra (2007)). Our results
confirm their results for some monetary policy rules, but not for all. We detect
new regions of local explosiveness. In consequence, purely adaptive expectations
do not yield larger regions of determinacy in general, whereas extrapolative ex-
pectations yield larger regions of indeterminacy in general. With regard to other
types of simple monetary policy rules we find that contemporaneous expecta-
tions in the policy rule remains the most desirable policy specification. There
are three reasons for that. First, it does not require to measure current period
aggregate variables and therefore is operational. This is a well-known argument.
Second, given that the central bank sticks to the Taylor-principle and moderately
feeds back to contemporaneous expectations about the output gap, such a rule
renders the economy determinate for the whole parameter space under consider-
value. We distinguish “purely adaptive” and “extrapolative” expectations to make
clear that the weight on the past observations is smaller than one in the former case
and larger than one in the latter case.
9We suggest to stick to a different wording with regard to stability. More precisely,
we suggest to stick to the mathematical perspective, where local explosiveness means
instability, local determinacy means stability and local indeterminacy means too much
stability and opens the door to extrinsic uncertainty.
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ation. Finally, this result holds, no matter if the central bank is actually aware
of the heterogeneity of expectations in the economy or not. We also find that
our conclusions obtained without policy inertia remain valid in the presence of
policy inertia for most rules. It is also noteworthy that policy inertia increases
the regions of determinacy remarkably. This confirms the results of Bullard and
Mitra (2007). Thus, policy inertia remains a highly desirable ingredient of a sim-
ple monetary policy rule even in the case of expectational heterogeneity. This is
one aspect of the merit of policy inertia.
In the second building block of our analysis, we assume that the central bank’s
model of the economy is incorrectly based on the assumption of homogeneous ra-
tional agents. The central bank minimizes a given quadratic loss function that
punishes inflation and output gap deviations. We let the central bank solve its
RE model for the optimal paths under commitment. Subsequently, we exam-
ine the implementation of this policy by either a so-called fundamentals-based
or expectations-based reaction function10, whereas the true model of the econ-
omy still features heterogeneous expectations. This part of the analysis therefore
focuses on a case in which the central banks assumption about expectation forma-
tion process of agents and the actual expectation formation process of agents do
not coincide. This may therefore be regarded as a kind of a robustness-check for
the central bank’s model of the economy. This assumption might appear naive,
but may have important consequences for economic modelling. It is desirable to
find an implementation for the optimal policy stance that renders the economy
with heterogeneous expectations determinate although the central bank is not
aware of this fact. In this case, central bankers may be able to elaborate other
aspects of policy analysis in a RE version of the model and be sure to guaran-
tee price stability given its possible structural and parameter uncertainty about
adaptive expectations. The advantage of the RE version is that it is usually much
easier to handle and to analyze.11
We find that optimal monetary policy conducted in that particular fashion
is not a guarantee for determinacy in general, when the actual economy exhibits
10For an excellent discussion of these issues see Evans and Honkapohja (2006) and
Evans and Honkapohja (2010). Their main interest is E-stability.
11Note that from our perspective a central bank is not necessarily required to have a
model of the economy when it implements a simple rule. In contrast, for the conduct of
optimal policy it usually needs to have a model of the economy including an assumption
about the nature of private sector expectations.
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heterogeneous expectations. It is fair to say that the central bank is quite lucky
when its optimal policy yields determinacy once expectational heterogeneity is
in place. Therefore, we consider conventional optimal policies implemented by
reaction functions to be hazardous.
Finally, we augment the central bank’s quadratic objective by a term that
makes interest rate stabilization (i.e. policy inertia) a desirable target for the
central bank. Similar to the case before, the central bank solves its problem
under RE and is considered to implement its optimal policy via an implicit in-
strument rule12 into the actual economy with heterogeneous expectations. We
find that in the presence of expectational heterogeneity the implicit instrument
rule appears to be a desirable way of conducting optimal policy as the outcomes
are determinate for the whole parameter space considered. This is another aspect
of the merit of policy inertia.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we briefly
describe the economic model that is the subject of our study. We also explain
how we numerically analyze the dynamic properties of rules and make some com-
ments on our calibration. Section 1.3 contains the basic analysis of the dynamic
properties of four simple monetary policy rules without and with policy inertia
in a NK model with heterogeneous expectations. Section 1.4 studies the dynamic
properties of optimal policy implemented either by a fundamentals-based or an
expectations-based reaction function. It also contains the analysis for an im-
plicit instrument rule. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes and points out directions
for further research.
1.2 The Set-Up of the Analysis
The set-up of our analysis contains the economic environment, the methodology
of numerical analysis and the calibration of the economy.
12See Woodford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2005) for detailed analyses
under fully RE.
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1.2.1 The Economic Environment
We assume a heterogeneous expectations reduced form NK economy as derived
by Branch and McGough (2009). Aggregate demand evolves according to
xt = Êt{xt+1} − σ−1
(
it − Êt{pit+1}
)
(1.1)
and aggregate supply evolves according to
pit = βÊt{pit+1}+ λxt. (1.2)
The variable xt denotes period t aggregate output gap, it is the nominal interest
rate controlled by the central bank and pit is the rate of inflation. The parameter
σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which in this setting equals
the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of private consump-
tion. The parameter β is the common discount factor and λ is a combination of
structural parameters. Êt{zt+1} is the heterogeneous expectations operator for
any aggregate variable zt+1 as specified in Branch and McGough (2009, p.3).
13
Following the latter, we assume that the heterogeneous expectations operator for
any aggregate variable zt is given by
Êt{zt+1} = αE1t {zt+1}+ (1− α)E2t {zt+1}.
Here α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of agents that are rational and E1t {zt+1} = Et{zt+1} is
the RE operator. The fraction (1−α) is not fully rational in the sense that they
form expectations by the forecasting model E2t {zt+1} = θE2t {zt} = θ2zt−1, where
the parameter θ governs the nature of the forecast that can either be purely
adaptive (θ < 1) or extrapolative (θ > 1). As a consequence, the aggregate
13Please note that Branch and McGough (2009) make use of an “axiomatic approach”
and impose some assumptions that may appear restrictive to other scholars, but are a
necessity to achieve the aggregate equations (1.1) and (1.2). Briefly, the assumptions
that may be regarded as critical are the specification of higher order beliefs and the
assumption that wealth dynamics do not matter for the evolution of aggregate variables.
For a detailed discussion of these issues we refer the reader to Branch and McGough
(2009).
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expectations for endogenous variables are given by
Êt{xt+1} = αEt{xt+1}+ (1− α)θ2xt−1, (1.3)
Êt{pit+1} = αEt{pit+1}+ (1− α)θ2pit−1. (1.4)
In what follows, we will close the model in each subsection with a different mon-
etary policy rule and inspect its dynamic properties in the resulting system.
From (1.3) and (1.4) it should become clear that past values of aggregate
endogenous variables can affect the aggregate demand and supply when RE and
adaptive expectations coexist. In consequence, monetary policy rules that per-
form well in pure RE models may not necessarily do so under heterogeneous
expectations.
1.2.2 The Numerical Approach to the Analysis
Given a reduced form model as sketched out above and a policy rule, we will
usually end up with a second-order stochastic difference system of the form
yt = A Et{yt+1}+ C yt−1, (1.5)
where yt is am×1 vector of endogenous variables and matrices A and C arem×m
matrices. In order to assess the dynamic properties of such a system, one may
choose a solution procedure that, as a by-product, yields the eigenvalues of the
system matrix. Exactly these eigenvalues characterize the system dynamics. We
may either apply the solution method outlined in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or
the more general and robust purely numerical method proposed by Klein (2000).
A practical advantage of the latter method is that it allows matrices A and C
to be singular. Therefore, we follow this approach in the analyses below. Our
particular guide is McCallum (2009a, p.13ff.). We consider solutions to a system
(1.5) of the type
yt = Λyt−1, (1.6)
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where Λ is a m×m matrix. One can also think of (1.6) as the Perceived Law of
Motion (PLM). In Period t+ 1 (1.6) is given by
Et{yt+1} = Λyt
= Λ2yt−1. (1.7)
If we plug (1.7) into the original model (1.5) we get the Actual Law of motion
(ALM) in the economy
yt = A[Λ
2yt−1] + Cyt−1
= [AΛ2 + C]yt−1. (1.8)
In a REE, the PLM has to coincide with the ALM, which is
Λ
!
= [AΛ2 + C]. (1.9)
We can augment condition (1.9) by the matrix identity Λ = Λ and write the two
of them as [
A 0
0 I
][
Λ2
Λ
]
=
[
I −C
I 0
][
Λ
I
]
, (1.10)
or more compact as
A¯
[
Λ2
Λ
]
= C¯
[
Λ
I
]
. (1.11)
Matrices A¯ and C¯ are of dimension 2m × 2m. Now, we look for the so-called
generalized eigenvalues (GEVs) of C¯ with respect to A¯ or equivalently for the
GEVs of the matrix pencil [C¯−λA¯]. According to the Schur generalized decom-
position theorem there exist some unitary 2m× 2m matrices Q and Z such that
we can decompose matrices A¯, C¯ into the upper triangular 2m× 2m matrices T
and S respectively, which is QC¯Z = T and QA¯Z = S respectively. The GEVs
of the matrix pencil [C¯ − λA¯] are defined as the ratio of the elements of the
main diagonal of T to the main diagonal of S, i.e. λi = tii/sii. We can calculate
these GEVs for any combination of the monetary policy parameters. We can
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count the number of GEVs, whose moduli is inside or outside the unit circle for
any combination of the monetary policy coefficients. We use this information to
visualize regions of local determinacy, local indeterminacy or local explosiveness
in the policy space as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). In particular, at any point the
policy space, where the number of GEVs whose moduli lie outside the unit circle
matches the number of free variables, there is local determinacy. Next, when
the number of GEVs whose moduli lie outside the unit circle is lower than the
number of free variables we have local indeterminacy of some order. The order
measures the difference between the number of free variables and the number of
GEVs whose moduli lie outside the unit circle. Consequently, when the difference
is one, we label that Order 1 Indeterminacy. This denotes a situation with a sys-
tem exhibiting a one dimensional continuum of stationary equilibria. When the
difference is two, we label that Order 2 Indeterminacy. This denotes a situation
with a system exhibiting a two dimensional continuum of equilibria and so on.
The idea behind is to indicate “the number of independent sunspots required to
specify the solution”, see Evans and McGough (2005, p.1816). Finally, when the
number of GEVs whose moduli lie outside the unit circle exceeds the number of
free variables there is local explosiveness.14
1.2.3 The Calibration of the Economy
In order to carry out our numerical analysis, we need to choose a calibration of the
structural parameters of the model. We calibrate our model according to Table
1.1 below. If we compare these choices to Evans and Honkapohja (2006, p.22),
Parameter Value Source
α ∈ {1.00, 0.60} -
β 0.99 -
λ 0.024 Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1114)
σ 0.157 Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1114)
θ ∈ {0.90, 1.10} Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
ϕpi ∈ [0.00, 2.00] Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
ϕx ∈ [0.00, 2.00] Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
ϕi ∈ {0.00, 0.65} Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1188)
Table 1.1: Calibration of the economy.
14In our analysis we ignore the special case, where one or more moduli of the GEVs
may lie on the unit circle.
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Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1114) and Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1182) we find
that these studies provide results for the same choices of β, λ and σ. Moreover,
all three studies cover the parameter-space with regard to the monetary policy
coefficients of the simple rules ϕpi and ϕx in Section 1.3 below. Thus, there is
a high degree of comparability of our results with the ones of popular studies.
Note that the choice of the monetary policy parameter ϕi is based on empirical
evidence.15 Recall that our analysis considers expectational heterogeneity. In
particular, next to the case of only rational agents (α = 1.00), we also study
the coexistence of rational and non-rational agents (α 6= 1), which in turn puts
the parameter θ into action. The latter parameter characterizes the type of non-
rational expectations. Compared to Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.) we
allow for a higher degree of heterogeneity as we choose α ∈ {1.00, 0.60} in our
analysis. We do so, as there is evidence for heterogeneous expectations among
agents in micro data that corresponds to α = 0.60, see Branch (2004).
1.3 Dynamic Properties of the Model with Sim-
ple Monetary Policy Rules
Herein, we carry out a numerical investigation of the dynamic consequences of
simple monetary policy rules without and with policy inertia. These are linear
rules that condition the central bank’s instrument rate on the rate of inflation and
the output gap which shall reflect the central bank’s mandate. We also consider
policy inertia to capture the tendency of central banks to gradually alter their
policy instrument.
1.3.1 Monetary Policy Rule with Contemporaneous Data
Assume, as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.1.) that the central bank feeds
back to contemporaneous data on inflation and the output gap.16 Such a rule
15We highlight any additional parameter and the related numerical choice that is
introduced in the text as the analysis proceeds.
16Be aware that each simple rule considered herein may have some advantages and
shortcomings with regard to measurement issues etc. that are not related to the dy-
namic properties. For a discussion of these issues, we refer the interested reader to
Bullard and Mitra (2002) or McCallum (1999a).
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may be of the functional form
it = ϕpipit + ϕxxt + ϕiit−1. (1.12)
For the moment, we ignore policy inertia, i.e. we set ϕi = 0.00. We can plug
this version of (1.12) into (1.1), combine the latter with (1.2) and get a system
as (1.5) with the vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and system matrices
A =
α
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)
[
σ 1− βϕpi
σλ λ+ β(σ + ϕx)
]
(1.13)
and
C =
(1− α)θ2
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)
[
σ 1− βϕpi
σλ λ+ β(σ + ϕx)
]
. (1.14)
Please be aware that with RE only (α = 1.00) the matrix C is equal to zero and
we are exactly in the case considered by Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1115). In
consequence, all the analytical proofs therein hold, both, with respect to deter-
minacy and E-stability.
Now, we compare the case of homogeneous RE (α = 1.00) to the case of het-
erogeneous expectations (α = 0.60), where non-rational expectations are either
purely adaptive (θ = 0.90) or extrapolative (θ = 1.10). Consider the numeri-
cal illustration in Figure 1.1 at the end of this subsection. Please note that in
all figures below that plot regions the color-code is as follows: red regions label
Order 2 Indeterminacy, blue regions label Order 1 Indeterminacy, green regions
label Determinacy and yellow regions label Local Explosiveness. The horizontal
axis measures the policy coefficient ϕpi and the vertical axis measures the policy
coefficient ϕx.
Realize that Panel 1.1(a) is nothing but an extract of Bullard and Mitra (2002,
Fig.1, p.1117) and restates their numerical result with regard to determinacy. We
observe that a large share of the policy space yields determinacy and the Taylor-
principle yields determinacy throughout the parameter space.17
17Please note that we discuss our results in the light of the Taylor-principle as it
appears to be a quite robust phenomenon that sticking to this principle yields deter-
minacy. But be aware that this principle is not an exact and general condition (see
Bullard and Mitra (2002)).
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 1.1: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on contemporaneous data.
The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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Furthermore, inspection of the differences between Panels 1.1(c) and 1.1(e)
indicates two results. In case of contemporaneous data in the policy rule, where
next to RE, purely adaptive expectations (θ = 0.90) exist, the Taylor-principle
still yields determinacy in the whole parameter space, whereas this is not true
in the case of extrapolative expectations (θ = 1.10). Next, the region of deter-
minacy increases relatively to the region of indeterminacy for the case of purely
adaptive expectations, whereas the reverse is true for the case of extrapolative
expectations. Put differently, policies that used to lead to indeterminacy under
homogeneous RE yield determinacy in the presence of purely adaptive expecta-
tions and the opposite is true in the presence of extrapolative expectations. This
has been observed by Branch and McGough (2009, p.11) for a forward-looking
monetary policy rule (as we will discuss in Section 1.3.3) and we can confirm that
observation herein for a policy rule with contemporaneous data.
Now, consider the case with policy inertia, i.e. ϕi = 0.65. We can combine
this version of (1.12) and (1.1) with (1.2) and get a system as (1.5) with the
vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′ and matrices
A =
α
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)
 σ 1− βϕpi 0σλ λ+ β(σ + ϕx) 0
σ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) ϕx + ϕpi(λ+ βσ) 0
 (1.15)
and
C =
1
(σ + ϕx + λϕpi)
× (1− α)θ
2σ (1− α)θ2(1− βϕpi) −ϕi
(1− α)θ2σλ (1− α)θ2(λ+ β(σ + ϕx)) −λϕi
(1− α)θ2σ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) (1− α)θ2(ϕx + ϕpi(λ+ βσ)) σϕi
 . (1.16)
When α = 1.00 we are in the case of homogeneous RE. Numerical results are
presented in the right column of Figure 1.1. First, compare Panel 1.1(b) to Panel
1.1(a), the case without policy inertia. One can observe that in an economy with
homogeneous RE the set of policies {ϕpi, ϕx} that yield determinacy increases.18
This is a result that was also observed by Bullard and Mitra (2007), but for policy
18Sensitivity analyses with parameter ϕi suggest that the larger the policy inertia,
the larger the regions of determinacy throughout most of the cases in this study.
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rules that we will to study in Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 below. A comparison of
Panel 1.1(d) to Panel 1.1(c) as well as Panel 1.1(f) to Panel 1.1(e) reveal that
this pattern of observation is robust to heterogeneous expectations. This holds
independent of the nature of the expectations of non-rational agents. Moreover,
the Taylor-principle appears to be an appropriate policy recommendation in the
case of homogeneous RE as well as in the case where the non-rational agents have
purely adaptive expectations. Unfortunately this is not generally true, when non-
rational agents have extrapolative expectations.
1.3.2 Monetary Policy Rule with Lagged Data
Next we assume, as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.2.) that the central bank
feeds back to lagged data on inflation and the output gap, i.e.
it = ϕpipit−1 + ϕxxt−1 + ϕiit−1. (1.17)
Notice that for the beginning we ignore policy inertia and set ϕi = 0.00. We
combine this version of (1.17) with (1.1) and (1.2) in order to get a system as
(1.5) with the vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and matrices19
A = α
[
1 σ−1
λ λσ−1 + β
]
(1.18)
and
C =
[
(1− α)θ2 − ϕxσ−1 σ−1[(1− α)θ2 − ϕpi]
λ[(1− α)θ2 − ϕxσ−1] (1− α)θ2β + λσ−1[(1− α)θ2 − ϕpi]
]
. (1.19)
In the case when expectations are completely rational (α = 1.00) matrix C is
zero and we are exactly in the case of Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1118). Thus, in
this case all the analytical proofs therein hold, both, with respect to determinacy
and E-stability.
When we turn to the numerical results in Figure 1.2, inspection of Panel 1.2(a)
19Note that Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.2.) forward (1.17) by one period and
then combine it with (1.1) and (1.2) in order to get a system as (1.5) with yt =
[xt, pit, it]
′ for the derivation of the set of sufficient conditions and the related formal
proof. Our analysis is purely numerical, and for the sake of simplicity, we eliminate as
much variables as we can. The numerical results appear to be equivalent.
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 1.2: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on lagged data. The right
column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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makes clear that it is just an extract of Bullard and Mitra (2002, Fig.2, p.1120).
We find regions of determinacy, indeterminacy and local explosiveness. In addi-
tion, the Taylor-principle only yields determinacy in case of modest feedback to
output gap deviations.
Next, we observe that when non-rational agents are present and have purely
adaptive expectations (θ = 0.90), both the regions of determinacy and indeter-
minacy of order one become smaller and the region of explosiveness increases.
Note that if the non-rational agents have extrapolative expectations (θ = 1.10),
then the reverse is true. The regions of determinacy and indeterminacy of order
one increase but local explosiveness is no longer present. If we regard local explo-
siveness as a serious threat, then one cannot conclude that the presence of purely
adaptive expectations is favourable to stability and the presence of extrapolative
expectations is not. This is at odds with the numerical results in Branch and
McGough (2009, p.11ff.).
Finally, there are two additional observations. First, sticking to the Taylor-
principle is not a good policy in general, as it cannot rule out regions of indeter-
minacy or local explosiveness. Second, a policy that exclusively feeds back to the
output gap (ϕx 6= 0, ϕpi = 0) has the potential to yield determinacy, which is an
unusual observation.
Now, we assume that the central bank favours policy inertia, which is similar
to the rule studied in Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.). We set ϕi = 0.65. This
version of rule (1.17) together with equations (1.1) and (1.2) can be written as a
system (1.5) with a vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′ and matrices20
A =
1
(ϕx + ϕpiλ− ϕiσ)
 −αϕiσ −α(ϕpiβ + ϕi) 1−αϕiσλ −α[ϕi(σβ + λ)− ϕxβ] λ
ασ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) α[ϕx + ϕpi(σβ + λ)] −σ
(1.20)
and
C =
(1− α)θ2
(ϕx + ϕpiλ− ϕiσ)
 −ϕiσ −(ϕpiβ + ϕi) 0−ϕiσλ −[ϕi(σβ + λ)− ϕxβ] 0
σ(ϕx + ϕpiλ) [ϕx + ϕpi(σβ + λ)] 0
 . (1.21)
20As in Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.) we forward the rule by one period, before
we build the system.
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Again, it is an easy task to verify that for the case of homogeneous RE (α = 1.00),
we are exactly in the case of Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.). Then their
results with respect to determinacy and E-stability hold.
We present our numerical results in Figure 1.2 below. From comparison of
Panel 1.2(b) to 1.2(a) it is hard to tell if the region of determinacy really increases
in the case of policy inertia in an economy with homogeneous RE.21 Furthermore,
comparisons of Panel 1.2(d) to Panel 1.2(c) as well as Panel 1.2(f) to Panel 1.2(e)
indicate that policy inertia does not improve the dynamic properties with regard
to determinacy in general. This is only true for the case of purely adaptive
expectations. In addition, with policy inertia the Taylor-principle is no suitable
policy recommendation for a lagged data rule in general. Sticking to that principle
cannot rule out indeterminacy or local explosiveness universally.
1.3.3 Forward-Looking Monetary Policy Rule
This section basically recapitulates the numerical analysis of Branch and Mc-
Gough (2009, p.11ff.). We do so for completeness on the one hand and on the
other hand because our calibration is slightly different, i.e. α ∈ {1.00, 0.60}. We
choose the latter in order to highlight the fact that heterogeneous expectations
might cause local explosiveness in this specific setting. This is an observation
possibly overlooked by Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.). Thus, similar as
in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.3.) or Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
we assume that central bank feeds back to RE on period t + 1 inflation and the
output gap, i.e.
it = ϕpiEt{pit+1}+ ϕxEt{xt+1}+ ϕiit−1. (1.22)
One could also think of the expectations in the rule (1.22) as the central bank’s
forecast of the aggregate variables based on its period t information set. For
the time being, we assume that there is no policy inertia, i.e. ϕi = 0 . For the
analysis, we plug (1.22) into (1.1), combine the latter with (1.2) and get a system
21Note that Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1183ff.) attribute a beneficial role to policy
inertia as the region that yields both determinate and E-stable outcomes increase with
policy inertia.
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as (1.5) with a vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and matrices
A =
[
α− σ−1ϕx σ−1(α− ϕpi)
λ(α− σ−1ϕx) αβ + λσ−1(α− ϕpi)
]
(1.23)
and
C = (1− α)θ2
[
1 σ−1
λ (β + λσ−1)
]
. (1.24)
Note that for the case of RE only (α = 1.00) the matrix C is equal to zero. In
this case all the analytical proofs with respect to determinacy and E-stability in
Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1121) hold.
Next, consider the illustration of numerical results in Figure 1.3 below. Panel
1.3(a) is an exact reproduction of north-west panel in Branch and McGough
(2009, Fig.1, p.12) which is an extract of Bullard and Mitra (2002, Fig.3, p.1123),
but in the latter study, there is no distinction between indeterminacy of different
orders and for that reason labels in Panel 1.1(a) are different compared to the
latter.22
In Panel 1.1(a) we observe regions of indeterminacy of order 1 and order 2
next to regions of determinacy. In addition, it is obvious that the Taylor-principle
does not hold in general, but only for modest feedback to output gap deviations.
Next, Panels 1.3(c) and 1.3(e) make clear that in presence of heterogeneous
agents, regions of explosiveness may arise. Interestingly, these regions seem to
originate and expand from an area around (ϕpi ≈ 1, ϕx = 0) with decreasing α,
the fraction of non-rational agents. As a consequence, sticking too close to the
Taylor-principle might turn out to be a rather dangerous policy in an economy
with heterogeneous expectations. As a matter of fact, such a policy could trigger
explosive paths of the price level under the rule (1.22) without policy inertia.
Our findings for this particular rule make clear that the results in Branch and
McGough (2009, p.11ff.) are heavily dependent on the fraction of non-rational
22If one compares the two figures Branch and McGough (2009, Fig.1, p.12) and
Bullard and Mitra (2002, Fig.3, p.1123), one realizes that regions of indeterminacy of
order one, are found to be E-stable and regions of indeterminacy of order two, are
found to be E-unstable by Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1121ff.). From our perspective,
it would be interesting to examine, whether or not there is a link between the concepts
of E-stability and indeterminacy of some order.
20
Heterogeneous Expectations and the Merit of Monetary Policy Inertia
agents. For our choice of expectational heterogeneity (α = 0.60) explosive re-
gions emerge for both the case of purely adaptive expectations and the case of
extrapolative expectations. Therefore, one cannot claim that the former type
of adaptive expectations may improve the dynamic properties with regard to
determinacy in general, whereas for the latter type the opposite is true.
Finally, note from Panel 1.3(c) that in the presence of purely adaptive expec-
tations policies that solely feed back to output gap deviations (ϕx 6= 0, ϕpi = 0)
again have the potential to yield determinacy. This is a rather unusual observa-
tion.
Let us get back to rule (1.22) and assume that central bank attaches impor-
tance to policy inertia as in Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1184ff.). Then the system
to analyze (1.5) has matrices
A =
 α− σ
−1ϕx σ−1(α− ϕpi) 0
λ(α− σ−1ϕx) αβ + λσ−1(α− ϕpi) 0
ϕx ϕpi 0
 (1.25)
and
C =
 (1− α)θ
2 (1− α)θ2σ−1 −ϕiσ−1
(1− α)θ2λ (1− α)θ2(β + λσ−1) −ϕiσ−1λ
0 0 ϕi
 (1.26)
corresponding to a vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′. If there are only fully rational agents
(α = 1.00), we are exactly in the case of Bullard and Mitra (2007, p.1184ff.).
Hence their results with respect to determinacy and E-stability hold. The nu-
merical results are illustrated in the right column of Figure 1.3.
By comparing Panel 1.3(b) to Panel 1.3(a) we find that in the case of homo-
geneous RE the region of determinacy increases. This pattern remains stable for
the case of heterogeneous expectations, independent of the nature of expectations
of non-rational agents as Panels 1.3(d) and 1.3(f) reveal. Most notably, policy
inertia eliminates regions of local explosiveness in the case of heterogeneous ex-
pectations. Moreover, the Taylor-principle does not hold in general as in the case
without policy inertia.
A priori, it is not clear, why the central bank should feedback to RE of
aggregate variables. It may simply do so, because it assumes a pure RE model of
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 1.3: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on expectations of period
t+ 1 values. The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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the economy. Alternatively, as Branch and McGough (2009, p.9) propose that one
could assume that the central bank is aware of the exact nature of heterogeneous
expectations and conditions its instrument on these expectations, which is
it = ϕpiÊt{pit+1}+ ϕxÊt{xt+1}+ ϕiit−1. (1.27)
From our perspective, this appears to be a strong assumption in practice. We
presume that tracking the exact shares (α) of agents with their different types
(γ) of expectations demands a non-negligible effort from central banks. This may
come at large information costs. Nevertheless, it is of interest, whether or not the
potential benefit of such a rule could justify the costs. As before, we start with
rule (1.27) without considering policy inertia (ϕi = 0). This leads to a system
with a vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and matrices
A = α
[
1− σ−1ϕx σ−1(1− ϕpi)
λ(1− σ−1ϕx) β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi)
]
(1.28)
and
C = (1− α)θ2
[
1− σ−1ϕx σ−1(1− ϕpi)
λ(1− σ−1ϕx) β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi)
]
. (1.29)
Obviously we end up in the case of Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1121) if we set
α = 1.00. In this case, all the analytical proofs with respect to determinacy and
E-stability therein hold. Our numerical results are outlined in the left column of
Figure 1.4 below.
Panel 1.4(a) does coincide with Panel 1.3(a) by construction. But how do
things change once expectational heterogeneity is in place? We observe that
the locally explosive regions in Panels 1.3(c) and 1.3(e) are not longer present
in Panels 1.4(c) and Panel 1.4(e). Thus, it is evident that when the central
bank makes use of a monetary policy rule featuring feedback on heterogeneous
expectations, it may at least be able to rule out explosive paths of nominal
variables. With regard to indeterminacy the results for rules (1.22) and (1.27)
appear to be observationally equivalent in the absence of policy inertia.
Now, we may again ask how policy inertia in rule (1.27) affects the dynamics.
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Then, the system (1.5) with vector yt = [xt, pit, it]
′ has matrices
A = α
 1− σ
−1ϕx σ−1(1− ϕpi) 0
λ(1− σ−1ϕx) β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi) 0
ϕx ϕpi 0
 (1.30)
and
C =
 (1− α)θ
2(1− σ−1ϕx) (1− α)θ2σ−1(1− ϕpi) −ϕiσ−1
(1− α)θ2[λ(1− σ−1ϕx)] (1− α)θ2[β + λσ−1(1− ϕpi)] −ϕiσ−1λ
(1− α)θ2ϕx (1− α)θ2ϕpi ϕi
 .
(1.31)
Results are displayed in the right column of Figure 1.4. Panels 1.4(b), 1.4(d) and
1.4(f) reveal that at least qualitatively the results do no change compared to the
situation, where the central bank is not aware of expectational heterogeneity.
The observations in this section suggest that if a forward-looking rule is in
place there are two ways of ruling out local explosiveness. One way is to track the
exact nature of expectations as is done by rule (1.27). The second way is to simply
add policy inertia to rule (1.22). The latter option is less costly with regard to
information and may therefore be preferred by central banks that implement a
forward-looking instrument rule. This is de facto another merit of policy inertia.
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 1.4: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on heterogeneous expecta-
tions of period t+ 1 values. The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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1.3.4 Monetary Policy Rule with Contemporaneous Ex-
pectations
The final simple rule we are going to consider is the one in which the central bank
feeds back to contemporaneous expectations on inflation and the output gap as
in Bullard and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.4.), i.e.
it = ϕpiEt{pit}+ ϕxEt{xt}+ ϕiit−1. (1.32)
One can motivate such a rule by the fact that real time data of aggregate variables
usually are not available for central bankers or only with high imprecision and it
may be far more realistic to assume that the policy makers feed back to their RE
forecast of period t variables, rather than actual contemporaneous data. In such
a situation, the information set of the central bank contains observations up to
period t− 1. In order to ensure symmetry in information sets, we follow Bullard
and Mitra (2002, sec. 3.4.) and assume that policy makers as well as agents
in the economy form expectations with an information set as of period t − 1.23
Otherwise private sector agents would observe more data then the central bank.
Thus, our economy now evolves according to
xt = Êt−1{xt+1} − σ−1
(
it − Êt−1{pit+1}
)
(1.33)
and
pit = βÊt−1{pit+1}+ λxt. (1.34)
The average expectations of aggregate variables are now given by
Êt−1{xt+1} = αEt−1{xt+1}+ (1− α)θ2xt−1 (1.35)
Êt−1{pit+1} = αEt−1{pit+1}+ (1− α)θ2pit−1 (1.36)
23From our understanding the assumptions in Branch and McGough (2009, sec. 2.1.)
are general enough to allow for a change in the timing of expectations.
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instead of (1.3) and (1.4). Finally, (1.32) is transformed to
it = ϕpiEt−1{pit}+ ϕxEt−1{xt}+ ϕiit−1. (1.37)
We can rewrite the resulting system (1.33)-(1.37) as
A0 st = A1 Et−1{st}+ A2 Et−1{st+1}+ A3 st−1, (1.38)
where st = [xt, pit]
′ is a p× 1 vector and matrices are given by
A0 =
[
1 0
−λ 1
]
, (1.39)
A1 =
[
−ϕxσ−1 −ϕpiσ−1
0 0
]
, (1.40)
A2 =
[
α σ−1α
0 βα
]
(1.41)
and
A3 =
[
(1− α)θ2 σ−1(1− α)θ2
0 β(1− α)θ2
]
. (1.42)
In order to bring this system into our standard form (1.5), we follow Binder and
Pesaran (1999, p.140ff.) as (1.38) matches their general multivariate structural
RE model
n1∑
i=0
n2∑
j=0
Mij E(st+j−i|Ωt−i) = 0. (1.43)
The matrices Mij are of dimension p× p and the vectors st+j−i are of dimension
p × 1. Ωt−i is the non-decreasing information set. In our specific case it is
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convenient to consider two lags n1 = 2 and two leads n2 = 2, thus
0 = M00 st + M01 Et{st+1}+ M02 Et{st+2}+ M10 st−1 + M20 st−2
+M11 Et−1{st}+ M21 Et−2{st−1}
+M12 Et−1{st+1}+ M22 Et−2{st}. (1.44)
Note that M00 = −A0, M10 = A3, M11 = A1, M12 = A2 and 02 = M01 =
M02 = M20 = M21 = M22. Next, we can recast the latter expression as
0 =
 M00 M01 M020 I 0
0 0 I

 stEtst+1
Etst+2
+
 M10 M11 M120 0 0
0 0 0

 st−1Et−1st
Et−1st+1

+
 M20 M21 M220 0 0
0 0 0

 st−2Et−2st−1
Et−2st
+
 0 0 0−I 0 0
0 −I 0

 Etst+1Etst+2
Etst+3

or with zt = [s
′
t, Ets
′
t+1, Ets
′
t+2]
′ more compact as
0 = Γ0 zt + Γ1 zt−1 + Γ2 zt−2 + Γ−1 Etzt+1. (1.45)
Now, we can rewrite equation (1.45) as
0 =
[
Γ0 Γ1
0 I
][
zt
zt−1
]
+
[
0 Γ2
−I 0
][
zt−1
zt−2
]
+
[
Γ−1 0
0 0
][
Etzt+1
zt
]
,
or by defining yt = [z
′
t, z
′
t−1]
′ more compactly as a second-order stochastic differ-
ence system, which in general can be written as
Λ0 yt = −Λ−1 Et{yt+1} −Λ1 yt−1
yt = −Λ−10 Λ−1 Et{yt+1} −Λ−10 Λ1 yt−1
yt = A Et{yt+1}+ C yt−1. (1.46)
This is the same as our standard form (1.5).24 The numerical results appear to
be observationally similar to the left column of Figure 1.1 above for the rule with
24Λ0 is non-singular and invertible as matrices Γ0 and A0 are non-singular. We omit
matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 12× 12 in this case.
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contemporaneous actual data (1.12).25
This is good news for the central bank. The interest rate rule depending on
contemporaneous expectations (1.32) does only require data up to period t − 1,
as mentioned above. Therefore, it is easier to implement compared to the con-
temporaneous data rule (1.12) and still yields similar results. Consequently, rule
(1.32) is preferable to rule (1.12) even in an economy of heterogeneous expecta-
tions and not only in an economy of homogeneous RE as argued by Bullard and
Mitra (2002, p.1108).
Next, we would like to consider the effect of policy inertia in rule (1.32), i.e.
ϕi = 0.65. Similar steps as detailed above yield a system
A0 st = A1 Et−1{st}+ A2 Et−1{st+1}+ A3 st−1, (1.47)
where st = [xt, pit, it]
′ and matrices are given by
A0 =
 1 0 σ
−1
−λ 1 0
0 0 1
 , (1.48)
A1 =
 0 0 00 0 0
ϕx ϕpi 0
 , (1.49)
A2 =
 α σ
−1α 0
0 βα 0
0 0 0
 (1.50)
25For the analysis we may also replace expected values by their actual counterparts
in (1.38) as is done by Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1123ff.). We understand the latter
approach as a kind of shortcut. Then it is easy to verify that the matrices for the case of
contemporaneous data rule and contemporaneous expectations rule coincide and that
for α = 1 we are in the same case as in Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1123ff.). Then
all the analytical proofs with respect to determinacy and E-stability therein hold. We
choose to analyze the system in a rigorous way as we are not aware of the argument
behind “shortcut” of Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1123ff.).
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and
A3 =
 (1− α)θ
2 σ−1(1− α)θ2 0
0 β(1− α)θ2 0
0 0 ϕi
 . (1.51)
Once more we make use of (1.43) and the subsequent steps outlined above to bring
the system (1.47) into our standard form (1.5).26 We find that the numerical re-
sults are the same as in the right column of Figure 1.4 for the contemporaneous
data rule. Nevertheless, once more we would like to emphasize that the contempo-
raneous expectations rule (1.32) is preferable compared to the contemporaneous
data rule (1.12) as it is operational.
Next, one could again assume that the central bank is aware of the hetero-
geneous expectations as in Section 1.3.3 above. Then the central bank sets the
nominal interest rate not according to (1.32) but according to
it = ϕpiÊt−1{pit}+ ϕxÊt−1{xt}+ ϕiit−1. (1.52)
Also note that, given the assumptions in Branch and McGough (2009, p.3), we
have
Êt−1{xt} = αEt−1{xt}+ (1− α)θxt−1, (1.53)
Êt−1{pit} = αEt−1{pit}+ (1− α)θpit−1. (1.54)
For the moment, we omit policy inertia, i.e. ϕi = 0. We can rewrite the system
(1.33)-(1.36) and (1.52)-(1.54) as
A0 st = A1 Et−1{st}+ A2 Et−1{st+1}+ A3 st−1, (1.55)
where the vector of variables is st = [xt, pit]
′ and the system matrices are given
26Again we omit matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 18 × 18 in this
case.
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by
A0 =
[
1 0
−λ 1
]
, (1.56)
A1 =
[
−ϕxσ−1α −ϕpiσ−1α
0 0
]
, (1.57)
A2 =
[
α σ−1α
0 βα
]
(1.58)
and
A3 =
[
(1− α)θ(θ − ϕxσ−1) σ−1(1− α)θ(θ − ϕx)
0 β(1− α)θ2
]
. (1.59)
Again we use the general form (1.43) and the subsequent steps outlined above
to bring the system into our standard form (1.5).27 The numerical results are
illustrated in the left column of Figure 1.5. It appears that the numerical re-
sults look similar to the ones for the contemporaneous data rule in Section 1.3.1
above. Therefore, they are also observationally similar to the results for the con-
temporaneous expectations rule (1.37). This makes clear that it does not make a
difference whether or not the central bank is aware of expectational heterogeneity
in case of the contemporaneous expectations rule. This is true at least for the
parameter space considered herein.
Finally, we study the impact of policy inertia in rule (1.52) on the dynamics,
i.e. ϕi = 0.65. With assumptions (1.53)-(1.54) we can derive a system similar to
(1.47) with matrices
A0 =
 1 0 σ
−1
−λ 1 0
0 0 1
 , (1.60)
27Again we omit matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 12× 12.
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A1 =
 0 0 00 0 0
ϕxα ϕpiα 0
 , (1.61)
A2 =
 α σ
−1α 0
0 βα 0
0 0 0
 (1.62)
and
A3 =
 (1− α)θ
2 σ−1(1− α)θ2 0
0 β(1− α)θ2 0
ϕx(1− α)θ ϕpi(1− α)θ ϕi
 . (1.63)
Again we can bring this version of (1.47) into our standard form (1.5).28 The
numerical results are illustrated in the right column of Figure 1.5. It appears that
the numerical results look similar to the ones obtained for the contemporaneous
data rule (1.12) above. Therefore, they are also similar to the results for the rule
(1.32) with policy inertia. Thus, also for the rule that depends on contempora-
neous expectations, it does not make a qualitative difference if the central bank
tracks heterogeneous expectations or not. Furthermore, these results again indi-
cate that in an economy with expectational heterogeneity the central bank can
instead choose a rule that is easier to implement, i.e. the rule that depends on
contemporaneous expectations. It will not encounter a disadvantage with regard
to determinacy compared to the rule that depends on contemporaneous data.
In this section we have observed that the simple contemporaneous expecta-
tions rule is more desirable than other simple rules in an economy with het-
erogeneous expectations. This is due to the fact that this policy prescription
rules out explosiveness and does not require to track individuals’ expectations.
Furthermore, the Taylor-principle holds under this rule for a large share of the
parameter space. If there is a moderate feedback to the output gap, it can hold
in general. We have also noticed that rules that depend on forecasts can be im-
proved by tracking the nature of expectations and applying this information to
28Once more we omit matrices A and C as they are both of dimension 18 × 18 in
this case.
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(a) ϕi = 0.00 (b) ϕi = 0.65
(c) ϕi = 0.00 (d) ϕi = 0.65
(e) ϕi = 0.00 (f) ϕi = 0.65
Figure 1.5: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness for the rule with feedback on heterogeneous expecta-
tions of period t values. The right column contains the results for this rule with policy inertia.
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the forecast. Most importantly, policy inertia can improve the properties of all
rules and is much easier to implement compared to expectations tracking. This
is an important aspect of the merit of policy inertia.
1.4 Dynamic Properties of the Model Under Con-
ventional Optimal Policy
So far we have only considered simple monetary policy rules. These rules can
implement some REE. Now, we will discuss several policies that aim to implement
the optimal REE. By optimal we mean that central banks are committed to the
economic well-being of the individuals that populate the economy. Thus, they
should maximize the utility of individuals. Therefore, optimal policies assessed in
this section are based on the assumption that the central bank tries to minimize
welfare losses caused by large volatility in variables that matter for the utility of
individuals.
1.4.1 Dynamic Properties of the Model with Reaction
Functions
Let us consider the case in which the central bank incorrectly assumes the stan-
dard NK model with fully rational agents. Thus, the central bank is not aware
of the expectational heterogeneity and the actual aggregate demand and supply
relations (1.1) and (1.2) respectively, but assumes that the aggregate demand is
given by
xt = Et{xt+1} − σ−1 (it − Et{pit+1}) (1.64)
and aggregate supply evolves according to
pit = βEt{pit+1}+ λxt. (1.65)
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Furthermore, it aims to minimize a welfare loss function29
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
βs
1
2
(pi2t+s + ωxx
2
t+s)
}
(1.66)
subject to (1.65), similar as in Evans and Honkapohja (2006, p.18). Intuitively,
the central bank is now concerned about stabilizing inflation and output gap over
the whole time horizon. The parameter ωx in (1.66) is the relative weight that the
central bank assigns to stabilizing the output gap relative to inflation. We assume
that the central bank is free to choose this parameter. The subsequent analysis
will therefore focus on this parameter. Next, the Lagrangian of the central bank’s
problem is
L = Et
{∑∞
s=0 β
s 1
2
(pi2t+s + ωxx
2
t+s) + κt+s [pit+s − βEt{pit+s+1} − λxt+s]
}
.
The related first-order conditions are:
(a) ∂L
∂pit+s
: Et {βs{pit+s + κt+s}+ βs−1{κt+s−1[−β]}} != 0
(b) ∂L
∂xt+s
: Et {βs{ωxxt+s + κt+s[−λ]}} != 0.
The central bank deduces from (a) and (b) that the specific targeting rule should
be
pit+s = −ωx
λ
(xt+s − xt+s−1) (1.67)
for s ≥ 0, given that the central bank employs a commitment to the specific
targeting rule from a timeless perspective.30 Thus, we can neglect the s in the
subscript. In case the central bank wants to know the optimal REE, it now needs
to solve its model for this REE. As discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2006,
29Such a welfare loss function can be derived by a second-order approximation of the
utility function of the individuals, see Gal´ı (2008, p.95ff.) or Woodford (2003, p.379).
One can therefore regard this loss-function as micro-founded. Notice that as in Evans
and Honkapohja (2006, p.18) we consider the case where the output gap target is zero
to omit the problem of inflation bias.
30This requires that the central bank respects “the optimality conditions from the full
inter-temporal optimization under commitment, except for the current decision-making
period”, see Evans and Honkapohja (2006, p.16).
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p.19ff.), it can apply the method of undetermined coefficients. A conjecture for
the equilibrium paths of inflation and output gap under commitment may be of
the form
xt = bxxt−1 (1.68)
pit = bpixt−1, (1.69)
which could be written in the form of (1.6). Step-by-step, we follow the exposition
in McCallum and Nelson (2004, p.46) for the sake of clarity. It follows that a
forecast of inflation based on (1.69) would be
Et{pit+1} = bpixt
= bpibxxt−1, (1.70)
which corresponds to (1.7).31 One can then plug this conjecture into (1.65) as well
as into (1.67) in order to derive undetermined coefficient conditions. Equation
(1.65) becomes
xt = λ
−1 [pit − βEt{pit+1}]
= λ−1 [bpixt−1 − β (bpibxxt−1)]
= λ−1 [bpi − βbpibx]xt−1. (1.71)
Similarly (1.67) becomes
pit = −ωx
λ
xt +
ωx
λ
xt−1
=
ωx
λ
xt−1 − ωx
λ
bxxt−1
=
ωx
λ
(1− bx)xt−1. (1.72)
31One could simply augment (1.70) by a forecast for the output gap Et{xt+1} =
b2xxt−1 and write the two forecasts in matrix form similar to (1.7).
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Inspection of (1.71) and (1.72) makes clear that the undetermined coefficient
conditions
bx
!
= λ−1 [bpi − βbpibx] (1.73)
bpi
!
=
ωx
λ
(1− bx) (1.74)
must hold. From (1.73) and (1.74) one can find a condition that is satisfied by
bx, that is
0 = −βbpibx + bpi − λbx
0 = −βωx
λ
(1− bx) bx + ωx
λ
(1− bx)− λbx
0 = βb2x −
[
1 + β +
λ2
ωx
]
bx + 1
0 = βb2x − γbx + 1, (1.75)
where γ ≡
[
1 + β + λ
2
ωx
]
. Following the arguments in McCallum (1999b, p.626ff.),
the relevant root, both in terms of stability as well as the minimal state variable
criterion32, is given by
b¯x ≡ γ −
√
γ2 − 4β
2β
, (1.76)
which satisfies 0 < b¯x < 1. Given b¯x one directly gets
b¯pi =
ωx
λ
(
1− b¯x
)
(1.77)
from (1.74). Now, from (1.68) and (1.69) the central bank gets
xt = b¯xxt−1 (1.78)
pit = b¯pixt−1 (1.79)
32Intuitively speaking this is the solution with the minimal set of predetermined
endogenous and exogenous variables that pins down free endogenous variables.
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and can consequently compute expectations
Et{xt+1} = b¯2xxt−1 (1.80)
Et{pit+1} = b¯pi b¯xxt−1. (1.81)
Given the specific targeting rule under RE and the optimal REE, the central
bank must now take a stand on how it may try to implement this REE. Usually
implementation works via a so-called reaction function and we will discuss two
alternatives in what follows.
1.4.1.1 Fundamentals-Based Reaction Function
For the first implementation alternative, the central bank may plug (1.78)-(1.81)
into (1.64) and solve this equation for the nominal interest rate. This leads to
it = b¯x[σ(b¯x − 1) + b¯pi]xt−1,
it = ψxxt−1, (1.82)
where ψx ≡ b¯x[σ(b¯x−1)+b¯pi]. This reaction function (1.82) corresponds to the one
in Evans and Honkapohja (2006, p.21) and is often called “fundamentals-based”
as it explicitly depends on the RE solution coefficients b¯x and b¯pi.
What happens if the central bank sticks to this reaction function, but the
actual economy evolves not according to (1.64) and (1.65), as the central bank
assumes, but according to (1.1) and (1.2)? In order to answer this question, we
plug (1.82) into (1.1), combine the latter with (1.2) and get a system as (1.5)
with a vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and matrices
A = α
[
1 σ−1
λ λσ−1 + β
]
(1.83)
and
C =
[
(1− α)θ2 − ψxσ−1 (1− α)θ2σ−1
λ[(1− α)θ2 − ψxσ−1] [(1− α)θ2 − ψxσ−1]λσ−1 + (1− α)θ2β
]
. (1.84)
Recall that ψx depends on the relative weight for output gap stabilization ωx.
This is the free policy preference parameter and therefore we plot the resulting
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four GEVs33 for ωx ∈ (0, 2].34 However, it is important that the lines in the figures
below represent borders. This means that we sort the GEVs for each value of ωx
in descending order. Thus, a line does not always necessarily represent the same
GEVs for all values of ωx. Instead, for each value of ωx, we can assess how many
GEVs are smaller or larger than one in modulus by counting the number of lines
that are below or above unity for any value of ωx. We choose to do so as the
figures become much easier accessible. Note that we have two free variables in
this system. Thus determinacy is obtained if exactly two GEVs lie outside the
unit circle for a value of ωx. In Figure 1.6 below, this is equivalent to two lines
above and two lines below unity for a value of ωx.
In Panel 1.6(a) one of the GEVs is always larger than one in modulus for all
values of ωx considered here and a second one is always equal to zero. A third one
becomes larger than one in modulus for ωx ≥ 0.16. Thus, left to this value, there is
indeterminacy of order 1 and on the right to this value there is determinacy in the
parameter-space. It is important to mention that in a situation of indeterminacy
no matter which non-explosive equilibrium is to be reached, it will not satisfy the
optimality condition (1.67), thus equilibria for ωx < 0.16 are suboptimal.
35
Inspection of Panel 1.6(b) makes clear that in the presence of purely adaptive
expectations there is once more one GEV larger than one in modulus for all
values of ωx considered here. This holds for a second one for ωx ≥ 0.10 and for a
third one for ωx ≥ 0.15. Thus we can only find determinacy within the interval
[0.10, 0.15). Left from that interval there is indeterminacy of order 1 and right of
that interval there is local explosiveness.
Finally, in Panel 1.6(c) we observe again that there is always one GEV larger
than one in modulus for all values of ωx. This is also true for a second one for
ωx ≥ 0.17, which yields determinacy for this and higher values. For smaller values
of ωx there is indeterminacy of order 1.
A sensitivity analysis in Appendix 1.6.1 reveals that in case of purely adaptive
expectations of type γ = 2 agents these observations hold for α ∈ {0.50, ..., 0.90},
whereas for α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.40} the system is locally explosive for almost all
values of ωx. In case of extrapolative expectations the observations are true for
α ∈ {0.60, ..., 0.90}. For α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.50} the system is locally explosive for all
33Note that matrices A¯ and C¯ are of dimension 4× 4 in this case.
34We cannot include ωx = 0 into the analysis as in this case b¯x is not defined.
35See Evans and Honkapohja (2006, p.22) for the details.
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Figure 1.6: The generalized eigenvalues (GEVs) for various types of expectational settings for the fundamentals-
based reaction function.
values of ωx.
Overall, our results suggest that a fundamentals-based reaction function is a
risky way of implementing optimal monetary policy in case the central bank bases
its decision on a pure RE version of the NK model in world with heterogeneous
expectations. For example, consider a situation in which the central bank chooses
ωx ≥ 0.17. If the central bank is lucky, non-rational agents have extrapolative
expectations and the economy is determinate. But if the central bank is less lucky
and non-rational agents have purely adaptive expectations, then the central bank
triggers locally explosive behaviour of nominal variables.
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1.4.1.2 Expectations-Based Reaction Function
The central bank may also choose to implement the optimal monetary policy by
an alternative reaction function. To do so, it can plug (1.67) with its assumption
about aggregate supply (1.65) in order to eliminate current period inflation pit.
Next, it solves the resulting equation for the output gap xt, which leads to
xt =
λ
ωx + λ2
[ωx
λ
xt−1 − βEt{pit+1}
]
. (1.85)
Finally, the central bank can substitute (1.85) into its assumption about aggregate
demand (1.64) and solve this expression for the nominal interest rate it. This
yields
it = − ωxσ
ωx + λ2
xt−1 +
[
1 +
λσ
ωx + λ2
β
]
Et{pit+1}+ σEt{xt+1}
= δLxt−1 + δpiEt{pit+1}+ δxEt{xt+1}, (1.86)
where δL ≡ − ωxσωx+λ2 , δpi ≡
[
1 + λσ
ωx+λ2
β
]
and δx ≡ σ. Note that (1.86) corre-
sponds to the reaction function in Evans and Honkapohja (2006, p.26) and is
often called “expectations-based”. The name originates from the fact that this
reaction function conditions on private sector expectations (in our case at least
from the perspective of the central bank). Note also that (1.86) does not explicitly
depend on the optimal RE solution.
Once more, we are interested in the case in which the central bank sticks
to its reaction function, but the actual economy evolves according to (1.1) and
(1.2) instead of (1.64) and (1.65). Thus, we plug (1.86) into the actual aggregate
demand curve (1.1), combine the latter with the actual aggregate supply curve
(1.2) and get a system as (1.5) with a vector yt = [xt, pit]
′ and matrices
A =
[
α− δxσ−1 σ−1(α− δpi)
λ(α− δxσ−1) λσ−1(α− δpi) + αβ
]
(1.87)
and
C =
[
(1− α)θ2 − δLσ−1 (1− α)θ2σ−1
λ[(1− α)θ2 − δLσ−1] λσ−1(1− α)θ2 + (1− α)θ2β
]
. (1.88)
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As in the subsection before, we now plot the resulting four GEVs for ωx ∈ (0, 2].
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
α = 1.00
G
EV
ω
x
(a)
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
α = 0.60 | θ = 0.90
G
EV
ω
x
(b)
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
α = 0.60 | θ = 1.10
G
EV
ω
x
(c)
Figure 1.7: The generalized eigenvalues (GEVs) for various types of expectational settings for the expectations-
based reaction function.
Again there are two free variables in the system. Thus, if there are two GEVs
outside the unit circle, determinacy follows. We observe that in Panel 1.7(a) one
of the GEVs is always infinite. Thus, for all values of ωx considered herein, there
are always two GEVs larger than one in modulus and two GEVs smaller than one
in modulus. In consequence, determinacy prevails in the complete parameter-
space. This is not a surprise as there are only agents with RE in this case
(α = 1.00) and it is well known that optimal monetary policy under commitment
in the pure RE version of the NK model yields determinacy when implemented
in this way. For a formal proof see for example Evans and Honkapohja (2006,
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p.35ff.) or Woodford (2003, ch.7).
In Panel 1.7(b) we observe a qualitatively similar pattern, although there is no
infinite GEV within the parameter-space. Thus, it appears that in the presence of
non-rational agents with purely adaptive expectations, the central bank can still
render the economy determinate independent of its choice of ωx ∈ (0, 2] although
it is not aware of the heterogeneity of expectations.
In Panel 1.7(c) the picture changes. In the presence of non-rational agents
with extrapolative expectations, two GEVs are always larger than one in modu-
lus in the parameter space. A third one becomes larger than one in modulus for
ωx ≥ 0.08. Thus, for this and larger values of ωx the central bank triggers locally
explosive behaviour of nominal variables, due to the fact that it is not aware
of the expectational heterogeneity. Put differently, we now observe qualitatively
the result opposite from the fundamentals-based reaction function. For values
ωx ≥ 0.08 the central bank is lucky if non-rational agents have purely adaptive
expectations, but less lucky when non-rational agents have extrapolative expec-
tations.
The sensitivity analysis in Appendix 1.6.1 makes clear that our observation
for purely adaptive expectations is true within α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.90}. For extrap-
olative expectations, the observations are true for α ∈ {0.40, ..., 0.90}, but for
α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.30} the system is locally explosive.
Overall, our results for the two reaction functions above suggest that in a NK
economy with heterogeneous expectations it is quite hazardous for a central bank
to incorrectly base its optimal policy on a RE version of the NK model.
1.4.2 Dynamic Properties of the Model with an Implicit
Instrument Rule
So far we dealt with simple interest rate rules with and without policy inertia
and two variants of implementing optimal policy. In the latter case the central
bank is concerned about variations in inflation and the output gap based on its
(incorrectly assumed) NK model with RE. Under expectational heterogeneity, one
lesson learned is that conducting optimal policy as outlined above is rather risky.
Another lesson learned is that policy inertia in simple rules may be a good tool
in order to reduce regions of indeterminacy or local explosiveness. Consequently,
one may ask whether or not policy inertia has similar effects in case of optimal
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policy? For a pure RE version of the NK model, Woodford (2003, p.582ff.) as
well as Giannoni and Woodford (2005, p.106ff.) present related analyses that
extend the loss function (1.66) by an interest stabilization objective, i.e.
Et
{ ∞∑
s=0
βs
1
2
(pi2t+s + ωxx
2
t+s + ωii
2
t+s)
}
. (1.89)
In this case ωx, ωi > 0 are the relative weights that the central bank may at-
tach to output and interest rate stabilization.36 Note that this objective can be
justified by a micro-foundation. See Woodford (2003, p.420ff.) for the techni-
cal derivation and Woodford (2003, p.582ff.) as well as Giannoni and Woodford
(2005, p.106ff.) for details of two theoretical arguments in favour of such an
objective. Briefly these are non-negligible transaction frictions as discussed in
Friedman (1969) or punishment of potential violations of the zero lower bound
on the policy instrument.
As before, we assume that the central bank minimizes (1.89) subject to (1.64)
and (1.65). This means that the central bank again incorrectly assumes that it
operates in an economy of homogeneous RE. The Lagrangian of this problem is
given by
L = Et{
∑∞
s=0 β
s 1
2
(pi2t+s + ωxx
2
t+s + ωii
2
t+s)
+κ1|t+s [xt+s − Et{xt+s+1}+ σ−1it+s − σ−1Et{pit+s+1}]
+κ2|t+s [pit+s − βEt{pit+s+1} − λxt+s]}.
The related first-order conditions are given by
(a) ∂L
∂pit+s
: Et
{
βs{pit+s + κ2|t+s}+ βs−1{κ1|t+s−1[−σ−1] + κ2|t+s−1[−β]}
} !
= 0
(b) ∂L
∂xt+s
: Et
{
βs{ωxxt+s + κ1|t+s + κ2|t+s[−λ] + βs−1{−κ1|t+s−1}
} !
= 0.
(c) ∂L
∂it+s
: Et
{
βs{ωiit+s + κ1|t+sσ−1}
} !
= 0,
36Compared to Woodford (2003, p.582ff.) and Giannoni and Woodford (2005,
p.106ff.) we consider the case where the optimal constant interest rate target is zero.
The output gap target is also zero once more.
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for each date s ≥ 0 and initial conditions κ1|−1 = κ2|−1 = 0, given that the
central bank employs a commitment to its optimality conditions from a timeless
perspective. Thus, we can again ignore the s in the subscript and equivalently
write (a), (b) and (c) as
pit − β−1σ−1κ1|t−1 + κ2|t − κ2|t−1 = 0 (1.90)
κ2|t =
ωx
λ
xt +
1
λ
κ1|t − 1
βλ
κ1|t−1 (1.91)
κ1|t−1 = −σωiit. (1.92)
It is easy to eliminate both Lagrange multipliers. First, we plug (1.92) into (1.91)
both for period t and t− 1. Second, we can use the resulting version of (1.91) as
well as (1.92) to express (1.90) free of Lagrange multipliers as
it =
ωx
σωi︸︷︷︸
≡γ1
4xt + λ
σωi︸︷︷︸
≡γ2
pit + (1 +
λ
βσ
+ β−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡γ3
it−1 − β−1︸︷︷︸
≡γ4
it−2. (1.93)
Woodford (2003, p.582ff.) denotes (1.93) as the implicit instrument rule. Fur-
thermore, he proves that commitment to this rule yields a determinate REE that
is optimal from a timeless perspective as long as (1.64) and (1.65) are true.
In the case of expectational heterogeneity (1.64) and (1.65) do not hold, but
instead the economy evolves according to (1.1) and (1.2). Nevertheless, we assume
that the central bank commits to (1.93) in all periods. We recognize that we now
have a difference equation with one lead and two lags. Therefore, we recast our
system once more in the way outlined by Binder and Pesaran (1999, p.140ff.) for
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n1 = 2 and n2 = 1
0 =
 −1 0 −σ
−1
λ −1 0
γ1 γ2 −1

 xtpit
it
+
 α σ
−1α 0
0 βα 0
0 0 0

 Etxt+1Etpit+1
Etit+1

+
 (1− α)θ
1 −σ−1(1− α)θ1 0
0 β(1− α)θ1 0
−γ1 0 γ3

 xt−1pit−1
it−1

+
 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 −γ4

 xt−2pit−2
it−2
+ 0
 Et−1xtEt−1pit
Et−1it
+ 0
 Et−2xt−1Et−2pit−1
Et−2it−1

or with st = [xt, pit, it]
′ more compact as
0 = M00 st + M01 Etst+1 + M10 st−1 + M20 st−2
+M11 Et−1st + M21 Et−2st−1. (1.94)
We can rewrite the latter as
0 =
[
M00 M01
0 I
][
st
Etst+1
]
+
[
M10 M11
0 0
][
st−1
Et−1st
]
+
[
M20 M21
0 0
][
st−2
Et−2st−1
]
+
[
0 0
−I 0
][
Etst+1
Etst+2
]
or with zt = [s
′
t, Ets
′
t+1]
′ more compact as
0 = Γ0 zt + Γ1 zt−1 + Γ2 zt−2 + Γ−1 Etzt+1. (1.95)
Again, we can rewrite this equation as
0 =
[
Γ0 Γ1
0 I
][
zt
zt−1
]
+
[
0 Γ2
−I 0
][
zt−1
zt−2
]
+
[
Γ−1 0
0 0
][
Etzt+1
zt
]
,
or by defining yt = [z
′
t, z
′
t−1]
′ more compactly as
Λ0 yt = −Λ−1 Et{yt+1} −Λ1 yt−1.
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Obviously, Λ0 is non-singular and invertible (as Γ0 and M00 are non-singular too)
and we can finally arrive at the familiar system (1.5)
yt = A Et{yt+1}+ C yt−1, (1.96)
with A = −Λ−10 Λ−1 and C = −Λ−10 Λ1.37 As we have two relative weights ωx
and ωi that the central bank may choose freely, we return to plot regions in a
plane. For each combination of the relative weights we exhibit the number of
GEVs in or outside the unit circle. Panels 1.8(a)-1.8(c) indicate that the implicit
instrument rule yields determinate outcomes for all cases within the parameter
space. This finding makes such an implicit instrument rule a highly desirable way
of implementing optimal monetary policy in the case of expectational heterogene-
ity. Put differently, if the NK model with heterogeneous expectations herein is
the true model of the economy, then the central bank may ignore non-rational
expectations as long as its objective function contains a term for instrument sta-
bilization. This demonstrates the merit of policy inertia in the context of optimal
monetary policy.
37We omit details of matrices A and C due to space limitations, as in our case they
are both of dimension 12× 12 in this case.
47
Heterogeneous Expectations and the Merit of Monetary Policy Inertia
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1.8: The generalized eigenvalues (GEVs) for various types of expectational settings for the implicit in-
strument rule.
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1.5 Conclusion
In our analysis of simple monetary policy rules, we find that a rule that feeds
back to contemporaneous data of inflation and output gap yields qualitatively
the same results as the ones presented in Branch and McGough (2009). There
are both regions of indeterminacy and determinacy in the parameter space for
the case of homogeneous rational agents. In the presence of heterogeneous ex-
pectations, if non-rational agents have purely adaptive expectations, the region
of determinacy increases relative to the region of indeterminacy, if non-rational
agents have extrapolative expectations the opposite is true. The Taylor-principle
does not hold in general.
Next, the interest rule that depends on lagged data does not yield qualitatively
similar results as presented in Branch and McGough (2009). The reason is, that
we observe regions of local explosiveness next to regions of (in-)determinacy which
is not a desirable feature of a policy rule. Therefore, we can only partly confirm
Branch and McGough (2009)’s results for those two rules, i.e. that the presence of
purely adaptive expectations improves the situation with regard to determinacy,
whereas the presence of extrapolative expectations worsens the situation.
Moreover, the forward-looking interest rate rule that feeds back on purely
RE, does also exhibit regions of local explosiveness. Interestingly these regions
occur in the area, in which the central bank would fight inflation expectations
moderately by more than one-for-one, i.e. sticking to the Taylor-principle. Once
the central bank is aware of the nature of expectations in the economy and feeds
back to heterogeneous expectations, it is able to rule out local explosiveness and
results are qualitatively the same as in Branch and McGough (2009). But one
should be aware that this type of rule imposes large informational requirements
for the central bank. The central bank must perfectly track the nature of each
type of expectations as well as the exact fraction of agents of each type within the
economy, which appears to be quite unrealistic. In addition, both variants of the
forward-looking policy rule enable the central bank to bring about determinacy
by solely giving feedback to expectations about the output gap when non-rational
agents have purely adaptive expectations. This is a rather unusual observation.
Next, simple monetary policy rules that depend on contemporaneous expec-
tations, no matter whether the central bank considers purely RE or is aware of
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expectational heterogeneity, yield similar results as rules that depend on con-
temporaneous data. Most importantly, both of these rules do not depend on
measurement of contemporaneous data. This makes them easier to implement.
Furthermore, as both rules yield similar results, the central bank is not necessar-
ily required to have an idea about the nature and fractions of different types of
heterogeneous expectations.
Once a realistic degree of policy inertia is present in the simple rules, our
conclusions with regard to the Taylor-principle do not change. In addition, we
observe for almost all simple rules that with an increasing level of policy inertia
the regions of determinacy appear to increase relative to regions of indetermi-
nacy and local explosiveness. This holds no matter whether expectations in the
economy are homogeneous RE or heterogeneous. Remarkable is the case of the
forward-looking monetary policy rule. We observe that the presence of policy
inertia rules out locally explosive paths of nominal variables in that case. Over-
all, we conclude that this finding of Bullard and Mitra (2007) remains robust
also in the case of heterogeneous expectations. Policy inertia is a merit of simple
monetary policy rules.
In the subsequent analysis we examine optimal monetary policy in a setting in
which the central bank is not aware of heterogeneous expectations. It implements
optimal monetary policy based on the assumption of homogeneous RE via a
fundamentals-based reaction function or an expectations-based reaction function.
We find that both reaction functions are a rather hazardous way of conducting
optimal policy in presence of expectational heterogeneity.
Finally, we examine optimal monetary policy when the central bank’s objec-
tive enforces policy inertia and is implemented via an implicit instrument rule. We
find that this implicit instrument rule renders the economy determinate through-
out the parameter space considered and that this finding is robust to hetero-
geneous expectations. This is another important aspect of the merit of policy
inertia.
Policy recommendations in the light of our results are as follows. A central
bank that prefers a simple rule may conduct monetary policy by a rule that
depends on contemporaneous expectations with policy inertia and stick to the
Taylor-principle in the sense that it feeds back to contemporaneous inflation
expectations more than one-for-one and in addition it may moderately feed back
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to contemporaneous expectations about the output gap. In case, the central
bank wants to implement optimal policy it should consider policy inertia in its
objective, as the implicit instrument rule always yields determinacy within the
parameter space in an economy with heterogeneous expectations.
Naturally the question arises, how these results for optimal monetary policy
change, once the central bank is aware of the expectational heterogeneity? From
our point of view, this is an interesting subject for future research, but we want to
remind the reader that tracking heterogeneous expectations could be costly. Thus
the implicit instrument rule considered may still be the superior policy choice for
central banks. Another path of future inquiry may be to study a NK model with
heterogeneous expectations that allows for three different types of expectations
at the same time. Such results would help to evaluate the robustness of our
findings. In future research we could also replace one of the types of expectations
considered herein by a type of expectations not considered herein as has been
emphasized by Branch and McGough (2009, p.14). Another direction of future
research could aim to study simple and optimal monetary policy in larger scale
versions of the NK model with heterogeneous expectations. Possible examples
are models with capital accumulation or monetary and fiscal policy interactions.
1.6 Appendices
1.6.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Reaction Functions
A relevant issue is the robustness of our findings with regard to the expecta-
tional set-up. The key factor that determines this set-up is the fraction of non-
rational agents (1−α). Note that both in the case of the fundamentals-based and
expectations-based reaction function, there are two free variables in the system.
Therefore, determinacy requires that there are two GEVs outside the unit circle
and two GEVs inside the unit circle. We label the GEVs according to the size of
their modulus in descending order GEV4, GEV3, GEV2 and GEV1.
In order to assess the robustness of results, we vary α ∈ [0, 1] and plot the
GEV of interest, which is GEV2. Note that GEV4 is always outside the unit circle
and GEV3 is usually outside the unit circle for α ∈ [0, 1], except we explicitly
mention the opposite. Furthermore, GEV1 is usually inside the unit circle for
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α ∈ [0, 1]. If GEV2 remains inside the unit circle for α ∈ [0, 1], then determinacy
occurs.
Figure 1.9 illustrates the outcome of the sensitivity analysis for the fundamentals-
based reaction function of Subsection 1.4.1.1.
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Figure 1.9: The second generalized eigenvalue (GEV2) in the sensitivity analysis for the fundamentals-based
reaction function.
The case of purely adaptive expectations is outlined in Panel 1.9(a). We
find a pattern comparable to the one described Subsection 1.4.1.1 above for α ∈
{0.50, ..., 0.90}. For small values of ωx the economy is indeterminate of order
one as both GEV3 (not displayed) and GEV2 are inside the unit circle. As ωx
increases, first GEV3 becomes larger than one in modulus and shortly thereafter
GEV2 becomes larger than one in modulus. Thus, determinacy prevails only for
a relatively small range of ωx. For α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.40} the economy is even more
unstable. The upper four lines indicate the GEV2 for these values of α. Only
where these U-shaped lines are below unity, determinacy arises.
Next, the case of extrapolative expectations is outlined in Panel 1.9(b). We
observe that in the range α ∈ {0.60, ..., 0.90} the pattern is as reported above.
GEV2 remains inside the unit circle for the values of ωx considered herein, as the
lower four lines indicate. Thus, as mentioned above, once GEV3 becomes larger
than one in modulus, determinacy occurs. This is not true for α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.50}
as the upper five lines indicate. For these values of α, there is local explosiveness
because GEV3 is also always outside the unit circle.
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In Figure 1.10, we can observe the outcome of the sensitivity analysis for the
expectations-based reaction function of Subsection 1.4.1.2.
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Figure 1.10: The second generalized eigenvalue (GEV2) in the sensitivity analysis for the expectations-based
reaction function.
For the case of purely adaptive expectations we find that there are always
two GEVs outside the unit circle and one GEV inside the unit circle for α ∈
{0.10, ..., 0.90}. The crucial question is, whether the fourth GEV that we label
GEV2 remains inside the unit circle for α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.90}. Panel 1.10(a) reveals
that this is indeed the case as all lines remain below unity. Thus, the expectations-
based reaction function ensures determinacy under purely adaptive expectations
for all values of α considered herein.
Finally, Panel 1.10(b) illustrates the GEV of interest for α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.90}
given extrapolative expectations. We find that for α ∈ {0.40, ..., 0.90} GEV2 is
inside the unit circle for small values of ωx, which results in determinacy, but be-
comes locally explosive for larger values of ωx. In addition, for α ∈ {0.10, ..., 0.30}
the GEV2 is outside the unit circle for all values of ωx considered herein, which
yields local explosiveness.
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Chapter 2
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Interaction in a World with
Heterogeneous Expectations
2.1 Motivation
The interaction of fiscal and monetary policies and its consequences for the dy-
namics of an economy have been subject of ongoing research for many years.
The main motivation is that in standard monetary models fiscal policy is often
neglected. It is assumed that the fiscal authority in the economy ensures govern-
ment solvency at any time. This behaviour of the fiscal authority may not always
be true and therefore it may become the central bank’s task to enforce govern-
ment solvency. It is usually argued that in this case, fiscal policy may have the
potential to limit the central bank’s ability to control inflation. In particular re-
ducing the public debt burden and fighting inflation may represent a trade-off for
the interest rate policy of a central bank. A classic example is Leeper (1991) who
considers interactions of fiscal and monetary policies in a Neo-Classical economy
with homogeneous rational agents and its consequences for the equilibrium path
of the price level. He models policy interactions between authorities as responses
of the policy instrument of one authority to a shock in the instrument of another
authority. He considers shocks to be additive components of the authorities’
policy rules. His findings may be summarized in Table 2.1.
What Leeper (1991) denotes active monetary policy, is when the central bank
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy passive active
passive
(iii) (ii)
indeterminacy determinacy
active
(i) (iv)
determinacy explosive paths
Table 2.1: Types of fiscal and monetary policies and resulting outcomes for the price level in Leeper (1991).
fights inflation by sticking to the Taylor principle.1 Passive monetary policy
means weak responses to inflation. Passive fiscal policy means that the govern-
ment ensures a balanced budget in each period, whereas under active fiscal policy
this may not necessarily be the case.2
As one can see from Table 2.1, different combinations of policy stances lead
to alternative outcomes for the price level. The outcome is determinate, when
there exists a locally unique stationary solution. Whether or not, or under which
conditions there is determinacy is an important issue in monetary economics and
has generated an immense body of literature. As it appears from our reading, the
conventional wisdom is that only policies that render the economy determinate,
are desirable. These policies rule out arbitrary large fluctuations in response
to aggregate shocks. Be also aware that indeterminacy describes a situation in
which there are multiple stationary solutions. Intuitively one can think of this as
a situation in which there is too much stability in the economy. A drawback of
such a situation is that some solutions potentially depend on extrinsic uncertainty
(i.e. sunspots). Sunspots are known to lead to large fluctuations. If there exists
no local stationary solution this results in local divergence from a steady-state.
We denote such a situation explosive. Note that local divergence can result in
deflation or hyperinflation. It is important to mention that such explosive paths of
nominal variables are not prohibited by the common assumption of transversality
conditions as they only limit the paths of real variables. This point was recently
highlighted by Cochrane (2007).
1Taylor (1993) suggests a simple interest rate rule and assumes an inflation coeffi-
cient of 1.5, i.e. if inflation deviates from its target level, then the central bank should
react with the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one, in this case one-and-a-half-
for-one. In Taylor (1999) he denotes this suggestion from 1993 (with regard to the
functional form) a “normative recommendation”. In Taylor (1999) he explicitly advo-
cates an inflation coefficient larger than one in such a policy rule. This policy stance
towards inflation is denoted the “Taylor-principle” in the literature.
2Nowadays, an active fiscal policy is also often denoted a non-Ricardian fiscal policy.
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Notice that both cases (i) and (ii) in Table 2.1 yield determinacy. The former
case is also often denoted as the monetarist view and the latter case is often
denoted the fiscalist view.3 One should mention, that the two cases differ most
importantly in the issue whether or not fiscal variables have an impact on infla-
tion. An important implication of the results of Leeper (1991) is that in case of
active fiscal policy it is dangerous for the central bank to conduct active monetary
policy as this could trigger explosive paths of the price-level.
Evans and Honkapohja (2007) emphasize the central role of expectations in
economics in a straightforward extension of the analysis of Leeper (1991). They
follow the approach sketched out by Leeper (1991) and compare the dynamic
properties of an economy around a steady-state under the assumption of fully ra-
tional agents to an economy where agents are engaged in one-step ahead forecasts
of the structural parameters of the economy. This behaviour is usually labeled as
adaptive learning.4 They find that the rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
in both cases (i) and (ii) of Leeper (1991) (compare Table 2.1) is expectational
stable and therefore robust to a modest deviation from the rational expectations
(RE) assumption of Leeper (1991).
Be aware that so far monetary and fiscal policy interactions have only been
analyzed when out of equilibrium behaviour of agents depends either on RE or
on adaptive expectations. From our point of view, it may be a natural extension
to abandon the idea of comparing two different assumptions on homogeneous
agents’ expectations formation process and instead focus on a world, in which
there are heterogeneous agents. In particular, one can assume that agents’ het-
erogeneity stems from different expectations formation processes. We make this
conjecture as there is convincing micro-data evidence for heterogeneous expecta-
tions among agents. See for example Branch (2004, p.607ff.) who, depending on
the specification, estimates shares roughly varying around 7%, 40% and 50% for
naive, adaptive and VAR-forecast expectations respectively from the Michigan
3Leeper (2009, p.9ff.) consolidates the diverse nomenclatures.
4One can find the foundations of the learning theory in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). Evans and Honkapohja (2007) consider what Preston (2005, p.96) labels the
“Euler Equation Approach”, to properly distinguish it from the “Long-Horizon Ap-
proach” therein. Be aware that a recent equivalence result by Bullard and Eusepi
(2008, p.8ff) makes the point that explicitly considering long-horizons may be dispens-
able for a quite general class of models as long as there exists only a single discount
factor in the economy.
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Survey of Professional Forecasters.
In the recent years the Neo-Classical framework has been to large extent re-
placed by the New Keynesian (NK) framework. Thus, we consider heterogeneous
expectations in a NK framework.5 The challenge of introducing heterogeneous
expectations into the NK framework has recently been tackled by Branch and
McGough (2009). The model features the coexistence of agents with RE and
simple adaptive expectations. In their “axiomatic approach” fiscal policy has
only a passive role. This is an assumption that the majority of authors impose
as Leeper (2009) criticises. Nevertheless, Branch and McGough (2009) present
some very important insights with regard to the dynamics of the economy. In
presence of a quite modest fraction of agents with adaptive expectations the dy-
namic implications of sticking to the Taylor principle can change dramatically. In
particular, the implications depend on the exact nature of adaptive expectations.
Remarkably, the Taylor principle does not yield determinacy in general.
We add the additional layer of fiscal and monetary policy interaction to the
NK framework with heterogeneous expectations. In contrast to Branch and Mc-
Gough (2009), we model a decentralized market economy instead of a yeoman
farmer model. Our main goal is to ask how heterogeneous expectations affect
the interaction of fiscal and monetary policies with regard to determinacy. Can
we still distinguish the cases (i) and (ii) of Leeper (1991) in a clear-cut manner?
Can we relate particular policy combinations (active/passive monetary policy
and/or active/passive fiscal policy) to particular outcomes? Can we still find
combinations of policy stances that lead to determinacy in general?
We find that our model does not lead to clear-cut analytical results as in
Leeper (1991), therefore we follow a numerical approach. Similar as Branch and
McGough (2009) we impose that monetary policy is conducted by a simple linear
rule that depends on expected inflation and expected output gap. We therefore
can illustrate regions of (in-)determinacy or explosiveness in a plane, in which the
axes measure the monetary policy feedback coefficients of the rule given active
or passive fiscal policy.
For passive fiscal policy, we are able to confirm the results of Branch and
McGough (2009) with regard to the impact of the presence of heterogeneous ex-
5Note that Evans et al. (2008) provide a global analysis of monetary and fiscal
policy interaction in a NK framework with homogeneous agents that are assumed to
be adaptive learners where they explicitly take into account the zero lower bound.
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pectations on determinacy and indeterminacy. Once heterogeneous expectations
are in place, regions of determinacy increase relative to regions of indeterminacy
if non-RE are purely adaptive. The opposite is true if non-RE are extrapolative.6
Surprisingly, we detect locally explosive regions, independent of the fiscal
policy stance. As a consequence one might label some monetary policies as dan-
gerous. In order to be concrete, a monetary policy that feeds back to inflation
expectations with around one-for-one, and features a low or no feedback to ex-
pected output gap deviations appears to be explosive. This is an important
finding in the light that data from 1979 to 1993 suggest that since 1979 some
countries have been conducting comparable policies with a forward-looking in-
flation targeting rule. In particular, Clarida et al. (1998, p.1045ff.) found that
feedback on expected inflation was 1.31/1.79 for Germany and the US respec-
tively and feedback on expected output gap was 0.25/0.07. Moreover, we find
that active fiscal policy tends to increase the size of locally explosive regions as
well as regions of indeterminacy. Nevertheless, monetary policies that render the
economy determinate remain feasible.
Another important finding is that in our set-up a passive monetary / active
fiscal policy regime economy is unlikely to yield determinacy even under RE.
In Section 2.2, we outline our model, discuss derivations and refer to the
assumptions used to achieve them. In addition, we clarify what we denote as
active/passive monetary policies and active/passive fiscal policies. Section 2.3
characterizes the appropriate equilibrium conditions. We also derive the natural
and efficient levels of output and account for distortions caused by the fiscal
policy framework. These conditions and our assumptions about expectations
form the fully specified system we are going to analyze in Section 2.4. Therein,
in Section 2.4.3, we visualize regions of (in-)determinacy in the parameter-space
for monetary policy. Section 2.5 concludes.
6Be aware that in this context non-RE are always adaptive. Agents use past obser-
vations of an endogenous variable to forecast its future value. We distinguish “purely
adaptive” and “extrapolative” expectations to make clear that the coefficient on the
past observations is smaller than one in the former case and larger than one in the
latter case.
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2.2 The Economic Environment
The model in this study is a mash-up of a standard decentralized market economy
with a continuum of households and a continuum of firms, the model in Branch
and McGough (2009) and ingredients of economies considered in the literature
on sticky information.7,8 We will in turn outline households that consist of a
worker and a consumer. The ultimate goal of both members of the household is
to maximize the household’s lifetime utility by their decisions. Moreover, there is
an actuary fair insurance agency that serves households to ensure themselves
against income risk. Next, firms consist of a hiring and a sales department
that maximize the firm’s profit. Finally, there will be a fiscal authority and
a central bank. Figure 2.1 captures the main points of this model. The following
subsections give the details.
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Figure 2.1: Model overview outlining the interactions of the different sectors. A dashed box indicates a contin-
uum.
7In this way we are able to ensure that household income is dependent on household
effort. This route was suggested by Branch and McGough (2009, p.6) but not pursued
therein.
8Sticky information models go back to Mankiw and Reis (2002) and base the deriva-
tion of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve on the assumption of inattentive agents in-
stead of sticky prices. Some remarks regarding the insurance mechanism we are going
to use are provided in Mankiw and Reis (2007).
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2.2.1 The Household Sector
We assume a continuum of infinitely-lived households, where each household i ∈
[0, 1] can be of one of the two types γ ∈ {1, 2}. Please be aware that all households
are completely identical except for the way they form expectations about the
future. For this particular reason we introduce the two different types γ.
A single household consists of two decision makers, the worker and the con-
sumer. The household’s worker offers one differentiated type of labour Nt(i) at
a perfectly competitive labour market in period t and earns labour income given
his intra-temporal decision.9 The household’s consumer is responsible for the
inter-temporal decisions, where he forms expectation given household’s type γ.
In particular, he decides how much to consume of a consumption aggregate at
given prices Ct(i) and how much to invest in bonds Bt(i). Furthermore, the
household’s consumer holds a portfolio of the continuum of firms (described be-
low) and therefore earns a share of the firms’ profit stream Γt(i). The household
members jointly maximize their life-time utility given by
Eγt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt U(Ct(i), Nt(i))
}
,
where Ct(i) is the quantity of real consumption of agent i of a consumption aggre-
gate defined below and Nt(i) represents individual labour supply. The parameter
β is the common discount rate. A fraction χ of the households are of type γ = 1
and form period t expectations about unobserved and future values of variables
using the expectations operator E1t . The remaining (1 − χ) households are of
type γ = 2 and form period t expectations about unobserved and future values of
variables using the expectations operator E2t . Thus, we impose a heterogeneous
expectations operator Eˆt = χE
1
t + (1− χ)E2t as in Branch and McGough (2009,
p.3). Eγt is usually denoted a subjective expectations operator. In our study this
9Note that in a world with homogeneous agents it is equivalent to assume a rep-
resentative household that offers all varieties of labour. In the case of homogeneous
agents the assumption of complete financial markets is sufficient to ensure that each
individual household earns average income, although its individual labour income may
vary due to the Calvo (1983)-pricing of the firm that hires this particular variety to
produce a differentiated good. Woodford (2003, p.144ff.) discusses risk sharing issues
in models with homogeneous agents in context of a representative agent, a continuum
of agents as well as a yeoman farmer setting. For a more general treatment of this kind
of risk sharing see Cochrane (2005, p.54ff.)
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operator is assumed to fulfill exactly the same assumptions as detailed in Branch
and McGough (2009, p.3).10 With regard to household preferences we assume
additive separable instantaneous utility
U(Ct(i), Nt(i)) =
Ct(i)
1−σC
(1− σC) −
Nt(i)
1+ϕ
(1 + ϕ)
.
The parameter σC is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which in this set-
ting equals the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of private
consumption and the parameter ϕ is the degree of convexity of labour disutil-
ity. Ct(i) is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consumption aggregate consisting of a
continuum of differentiated goods on the interval j ∈ [0, 1] defined as
Ct(i) ≡
(∫ 1
0
Ct(i, j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
,
where  > 1 is the price elasticity of demand11, i.e. the elasticity of substitution
between the differentiated goods. Ct(i, j) denotes the quantity of real consump-
tion of good j by household i. The corresponding price index Pt is defined as
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
(1−)dj
) 1
1−
. (2.1)
Pt(j) is the price charged for good j in period t. Demand for a good j of a
household i is derived by assuming that for any given level of consumption ex-
penditures the household i maximizes his consumption basket. These choices
result in household i’s demand equations for a good j
Ct(i, j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Ct(i), ∀j ∈ [0, 1]. (2.2)
Please be also aware that the consumption goods are non-durable, i.e. households
buy them and consume them within period t. These are the only types of goods
10We listed the assumptions in Appendix 2.6.1 and will refer to them in the deriva-
tions below. Note that one can also find a critical discussion about the assumptions in
Branch and McGough (2009, p.7ff.).
11Assuming  > 1 ensures that we look at an economy with monopolistic competition
among firms, where each firm has a constant desired markup, see Section 2.2.2 below
for the details.
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in the economy. Thus, the government purchases the same types of goods (see
Section 2.2.3 below on government spending).
We also want to remind the reader that we will ignore some features of more
elaborate models in order to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Among
these features are investment and capital accumulation.12 In addition, we con-
sider a single, closed economy and ignore any kind of open economy issues like
international trade, exchange rates or purchasing power parities.13
Note that each household i faces a nominal flow budget constraint
PtCt(i) + E
γ
t {Qt,t+1}Bt(i) +Mt(i) + Ipt(i) + PtT ≤ WtNt(i) +Bt−1(i) (2.3)
+Mt−1(i) + Irt(i) + Γt.
The left hand side lists how household i distributes his means in period t. The
list includes expenses on real consumption at aggregate price level Pt, zero-bond
holdings Bt(i) at price Qt,t+1 (the nominal stochastic discount factor
14), money
holdings Mt(i) and payments to an actuary fair insurance agency Ipt(i).
15 T
denotes a fixed lump-sum tax. The means originate from several types of nom-
inal income of household i in period t. First, there is the household’s share of
firm-sector nominal after-tax profit16 Γt(i) = Γt. This has to be the same for
all households as we assume that each household owns an equal share of the
portfolio of all firms in the economy. Furthermore, there is the nominal labour
income WtNt(i), where Wt is the aggregate nominal period t wage faced by each
household. Next, we have the nominal interest income from bonds Bt−1(i), money
holdings at the beginning of period t, Mt−1(i) and receipts Irt(i) from the actuary
fair insurance agency.
12See Woodford (2003, ch.5, sec.3), the related corrections in Woodford (2005) or
Sveen and Weinke (2005).
13See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Clarida et al. (2002) or Gal´ı (2008, ch.7).
14See for example Cochrane (2005, p.10) for this concept in general.
15It is assumed that at the outset of time the household’s consumer signs a contract
with the actuary fair insurance agency. The contract guarantees the household the
type-dependent average income. As a result, all households of one type will face the
same initial as well as subsequent inter-temporal budget constraints in each point in
time and in each state of the world, given initial financial assets,.
16For the moment we simply accept that there is a revenue tax levied on each firm.
This tax is common to all households and is at rate TREt ∈ [0, 1]. In Section 2.2.3 below
we will detail the nature of the fiscal policy framework.
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Be aware that we look at the cashless limit, i.e. Mt−1(i) = Mt(i) = M(i).17
We also impose that agents pay their profits to the actuary fair insurance agency
(Ipt(i) = Γt). From the agency, they receive an individual payment that ensures
them the average nominal income of their type γ given their individual labour
income Irt(i) = PtΩ
γ
t −WtNt(i). Thus, Ωγt is the average type-dependent real
income net of taxes.
We will now detail consequences of the insurance mechanism for a household.
First, we discuss the average type-dependent income net of taxes. It can be
calculated by dividing the sum of aggregate profit shares and aggregate labour
income of households of a type γ by the number of households of this type.
Formally this is
Ω1t =
1
χPt
[∫ χ
0
Γtdi+
∫ χ
0
WtNt(i)di
]
=
1
χPt
[
χΓt +
∫ χ
0
WtNt(i)di
]
for type γ = 1 and similarly
Ω2t =
1
(1− χ)Pt
[∫ 1
χ
Γtdi+
∫ 1
χ
WtNt(i)di
]
=
1
(1− χ)Pt
[
(1− χ)Γt +
∫ 1
χ
WtNt(i)di
]
,
for type γ = 2. Thus, aggregate after-tax income in the economy can be written
as the sum of aggregate after-tax profits and the aggregate wage bill
PtΩt = Pt(χΩ
1
t + (1− χ)Ω2t )
= Γt +Wt
[∫ χ
0
Nt(i)di+
∫ 1
χ
Nt(i)di
]
= (1− TREt )PtYt −WtNt +WtNt
= (1− TREt )PtYt. (2.4)
As a direct consequence on the aggregate level in real terms we have Ωt = (1 −
17Considering the cashless limit is common practice when monetary policy is mod-
eled by interest rate rules (as is detailed in Section 2.2.4 below). Woodford (2003,
p.31ff.) provides the reasoning for the cashless limit. Be also aware that in the context
of analyzing optimal monetary policy, the cashless limit case may lead to distinctive
outcomes compared to an analysis which gives a role to money, see Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2004, p.328ff.).
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TREt )Yt, in steady-state we have Ω = (1− TRE)Y and in log-deviations
ω̂t = ŷt − T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t (2.5)
holds.18 In general, we define a log-deviation of a variable Zt (in levels) of its
steady-state level Z as log(Zt)− log(Z) ≡ zt − z ≡ ẑt.
Now, we want to emphasize that the household’s worker in each period t will
make his labour-supply decision on the base of the flow budget constraint
PtCt(i) + E
γ
t {Qt,t+1}Bt(i) + PtT = WtNt(i) +Bt−1(i) + PtΩγt (i). (2.6)
Next, turn attention to the household’s consumer and his insurance contract.
Each individual consumer, given his type is paid
PtΩ
1
t (i) = Γt +
1
χ
Wt
∫ χ
0
Nt(i)di−WtNt(i) = Γt +Wt
[
1
χ
∫ χ
0
Nt(i)di−Nt(i)
]
or
PtΩ
2
t (i) = Γt +
1
(1− χ)Wt
∫ 1
χ
Nt(i)di−WtNt(i)
= Γt +Wt
[
1
(1− χ)
∫ 1
χ
Nt(i)di−Nt(i)
]
.
In each of the two identities above, the first term is the individual share of
aggregate after-tax profits and the second term is the difference between average
type dependent labour income and individual labour income. The latter term
is the core of the risk sharing mechanism. It becomes clear that, with the risk
sharing mechanism in place, for the household’s consumer, we can equivalently
write (2.6) as
PtCt(i) + E
γ
t {Qt,t+1}Bt(i) + PtT = Bt−1(i) + PtΩγt ,
18The derivation of the latter identity is outlined in Appendix 2.6.2.1. Please be
aware that we follow DeJong and Dave (2007, p.13ff.) in all log-linear approximations.
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which in real terms is
Ct(i) + E
γ
t {Qt,t+1}
Bt(i)
Pt
+ T ≤ Bt−1(i)
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t + Ω
γ
t , (2.7)
where Πt−1,t ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate from period t − 1 to period
t. Furthermore, we assume that each household faces the subjective solvency
condition
lim
T 7→∞
Eγt {Qt,T+1}
BT (i)
PT
≥ 0
for all t. Loosely speaking, households need to have zero or positive real bond
holdings at Judgement Day. The initial period endowment of households with
bonds is assumed to be zero, i.e. B0(i) = 0. Given the insurance mechanism
above, we can set up the Lagrangian for a household i, which is given by
L = Eγt
∑∞
t=0 β
t{ (Ct(i))1−σC
(1−σC) −
(Nt(i))1+ϕ
(1+ϕ)
−λt [PtCt(i) + Eγt {Qt,t+1}Bt(i) + PtT −WtNt(i)−Bt−1(i)− PtΩγt (i)]}.
The related first-order conditions are
(a) ∂L
∂Ct(i)
: βt{(Ct(i))−σC − λtPt} != 0
(b) ∂L
∂Bt(i)
: Eγt {−βtλtQt,t+1 + βt+1λt+1} != 0
(c) ∂L
∂Nt(i)
: −βt{(Nt(i))ϕ − λtWt} != 0,
whereby the household’s consumer chooses (a) and (b) and the worker chooses
(c). Conditions (a) and (b) yield the (general) household Euler equation
Eγt {Qt,t+k} = βkEγt
{(
Ct+k(i)
Ct(i)
)−σC Pt
Pt+k
}
. (2.8)
Taking logs and subtracting c on both sides yields
ĉt(i) = E
γ
t {ĉt+1(i)} −
1
σC
[it − Eγt {pit+1} − ρ] , (2.9)
for k = 1, where it ≡ − log(Eγt {Qt,t+1}) denotes the short-term nominal inter-
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est rate and ρ ≡ − log(β) denotes the discount rate. This equation expresses
the inter-temporal decision of each household i between consumption today and
tomorrow depending on the real rate of interest, given his type of expectations.
Condition (a) and (c) relate the intra-temporal consumption-leisure trade-off
to the real wage
Wt
Pt
= Nϕt (i)C
σC
t (i).
We recognize that this decision is the same for all households independent of their
type and therefore, in log-linear terms, we get
wt − pt = ϕnt + σCct. (2.10)
Next we get back to the household’s flow budget constraint (2.7). In a zero-
inflation steady-state, in which Eγt {Qt,t+k}) = βk and Πt,t+k = Π = 1 hold, a
log-linear approximation around the steady-state19 is
ĉt(i) =
B/P
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂t−1(i)− pit
]
+
β(B/P )σC
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
Eγt {ĉt+1(i)}
− β(B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂t(i)− Eγt {pit+1}
]
+
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
C + β(B/P )σC
ω̂γt
≡ Ŵγt . (2.11)
Loosely speaking a household can only consume (here in terms of deviations) what
he owns in each period. In the household’s individual perception this is inflation-
adjusted real bond income plus deviations in expected next period consumption
minus inflation adjusted real bond purchases plus the average real income of his
type. One can think of Ŵγt as wealth deviations from steady-state of a household
i of type γ. We can plug (2.11) into the Euler equation (2.9) to get
Ŵγt = Eγt {Ŵγt+1} −
1
σC
[it − Eγt {pit+1} − ρ] (2.12)
19See Appendix 2.6.2.2 for the derivation.
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and iterate this equation forward to obtain
Ŵγt = lim
k 7→∞
Eγt {Ŵγt+k+1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ŵγ∞
− 1
σC
Eγt
{ ∞∑
k=0
[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]
}
or
Ŵγt = Ŵγ∞ −
1
σC
Eγt
{ ∞∑
k=0
[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]
}
, (2.13)
where we make use of assumptions A1, A3, A4 and A5.20
2.2.2 The Firm Sector
There exists a continuum of firms i ∈ [0, 1], where each firm produces one dif-
ferentiated good j ∈ [0, 1]. Every individual firm consist of two decision makers,
the hiring department and the sales department. Before turning to an individual
firm i’s production technology and pricing problem, we will outline the evolution
of the aggregate price level in the economy.
Aggregate Price Level Dynamics
We assume that firms set prices according to mechanism introduced by Calvo
(1983). In each period t a fraction of firms (1 − θ) will, at random, receive a
signal to reset prices and will consequently choose the optimal price P ∗t . The
fraction θ, at random has to stick to its individual price already in place at the
beginning of period t. On the aggregate this is Pt−1. If we recall the definition
of the aggregate price level (2.1), it becomes clear that the aggregate price level
20Appendix 2.6.2.3 discusses the iteration procedure and the application of the as-
sumptions in greater detail.
68
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations
evolves according to
Pt =
[
θP
(1−)
t−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )(1−)
] 1
(1−)
or 1 =
[
θ(Pt−1
Pt
)(1−) + (1− θ)(P ∗t
Pt
)(1−)
] 1
(1−)
or 1 =
[
θ(Πt−1,t)−(1−) + (1− θ)(P
∗
t
Pt
)(1−)
] 1
(1−)
or 1 = θ(Πt−1,t)−(1−) + (1− θ)(P
∗
t
Pt
)(1−).
A log-linear approximation21 around a zero inflation steady-state is given by
p̂∗t − p̂t =
θ
(1− θ)pit. (2.14)
Thus, in our economy inflation arises from the firms’ optimal price deviations
from the aggregate price level.
Technology
As mentioned before there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms
where each firm i ∈ [0, 1] produces a differentiated good j ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm has
access to the identical technology
Yt(i, j) = Yt(i) = At Nt(i)
1−α, (2.15)
where Yt(i, j) = Yt(i) is period t output of the variety j by firm i. Thus, indices
i and j coincide. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the output elasticity of labour
and the variable At is the multi-factor productivity evolving exogenous over time
according to
at = ρa at−1 + at . (2.16)
This law of motion is stated in terms of the logarithm, i.e. at ≡ log(At). We
assume that ρa ∈ [0, 1) and at is a white-noise process with mean zero and
21See Appendix 2.6.2.4 for the derivation.
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constant variance σ2a. Next, firm i’s real marginal costs by definition are
MCt(i) =
Wt
Pt MPNt(i)
. (2.17)
Here MPNt(i) denotes the marginal product of labour which is given by
MPNt(i) ≡ ∂Yt(i)
∂Nt(i)
= (1− α)AtNt(i)−α. (2.18)
Therefore we can rewrite (2.17) as
MCt(i) =
Wt Nt(i)α
Pt (1−α) At
or
= Wt Nt(i)
Pt (1−α) Yt(i) .
(2.19)
Optimal Price Setting
Recall that each household owns an equal share of the portfolio of the continuum
of firms. This is crucial with regard to the optimal price setting behaviour of
a single firm. Exactly on these grounds we assume that every firm will act
in proportion to the owners expectations when it forms expectations about the
future. Thus, we directly apply the heterogeneous expectations operator Êt to
the firm’s problem.22 In our case, it is sufficient to restrict attention to a firm
i that revises its price optimally in period t and takes the whole time-span k
into account, in which the price is valid. Overall, the firm faces the problem
of choosing a price for its good P ∗t (i), the level of employment Nt+k|t(i) and
the quantity of its output Yt+k|t(i) given its constraints and a revenue tax TREt+k .
Formally, that is
max
Nt+k|t(i),Yt+k|t(i),P ∗t (i)
∞∑
k=0
θkÊt
{
Qt,t+k
[
(1− TREt+k) P ∗t (i) Yt+k|t(i)−Wt+kNt+k|t(i)
]}
22This is clearly a deviation from Branch and McGough (2009, p.6ff.), who derive
the type-dependent optimal pricing decision in a yeoman-farmer setting. From our
understanding, the results must be equivalent.
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s.t.
(i) Yt+k|t(i) =
(
P ∗t (i)
Pt+k
)−
Yt+k
(ii) Yt+k|t(i) = At+kNt+k|t(i)(1−α).
Condition (i) is the market demand for the good produced by firm i, i.e. the
household demand schedule (2.2) together with a similar schedule for constant
government purchases G given aggregate price level (2.1) (see details for the latter
in Section 2.2.3 below). The private and public demand schedule add up to the
total demand schedule (see Section 2.3.1 below). Condition (ii) is the production
technology (2.15).23 Thus, the Lagrangian of a firm is given by
L = ∑∞k=0 θkÊt{Qt,t+k[(1− TREt+k) P ∗t (i) Yt+k|t(i)−Wt+kNt+k|t(i))
−λt+k(i)(Yt+k|t(i)−
(
P ∗t (i)
Pt+k
)−
Yt+k))
−ξt+k(i)(Yt+k|t(i)− At+kNt+k|t(i)(1−α))]}.
The first-order condition with respect to Nt+k|t(i) is given by
∂L
∂Nt+k|t(i)
: −Wt+k + ξt+k(i)At+k(1− α)Nt+k|t(i)−α != 0
Wt+k Nt+k|t(i)
Yt+k|t(i) (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCn
t+k|t(i)
= ξt+k(i),
where MCnt+k|t(i) are the period t+ k nominal marginal costs of a firm that last
reset its price in period t.24 The first-order condition with respect to Yt+k|t(i) is
23Please be aware that a revenue tax for firms is equivalent to a distortionary tax
on labour income as both types affect the marginal after-tax profit of a firm in exactly
the same way in this economy.
24The decreasing returns to scale technology causes asymmetry among individual
marginal cost. This technology therefore introduces some endogenous price stickiness
which usually brings the behaviour of inflation closer to empirical evidence in this type
of models. In order to understand this, note, that a firm always will serve the market
demand for the specific good it offers. Now, suppose that a firm that receives the
exogenous signal to change the price and has to fix this price over the expected lifetime
of the price, expects the average marginal cost to increase over this life-span.
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given by
∂L
∂Yt+k|t(i)
: (1− TREt+k)P ∗t (i)− λt+k(i)− ξt+k(i) != 0
(1− TREt+k)P ∗t (i)− ξt+k(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal after−tax profit
= λt+k(i).
The first-order condition with respect to P ∗t (i) is given by
∂L
∂P ∗t (i)
: Êt{
∑∞
k=0 θ
kQt,t+k×
[
(1− TREt+k)Yt+k|t(i)− λt+k(i)(−(−)
(
P ∗t (i)
Pt+k
)−−1
1
Pt+k
Yt+k|t)
]
} != 0.
We now plug in constraint (i), multiply by P ∗t (i) and rearrange terms to get
Êt
{∑∞
k=0 θ
kQt,t+kYt+k|t(i)
[
(1− TREt+k)P ∗t (i)− λt+k(i)
]}
= 0.
If it does not change the price, the market demand for its specific good will increase
and this will decrease its individual marginal product of labour and increase its indi-
vidual marginal cost leading to suboptimal profits for a monopolistically competitive
firm.
If it does change the price to exactly match the expected increase in average marginal
cost, this will decrease the market demand for its specific good and this will increase its
individual marginal product of labour and decrease its individual marginal cost leading
again to suboptimal profits for monopolistically competitive firm.
Consequently, in order to maintain a situation of optimal profits, the monopolistically
competitive firm that is aware of the impact of its price-setting behaviour on the market
demand for the specific good it offers and expects average marginal cost to increase,
will set a price below the price that will exactly match the expected increase in average
marginal cost. The reason is that the increased price will, via the reduced demand for
the specific good offered by the firm, also decrease the individual marginal cost to some
extent. In this way the firm is able to maintain optimal profits.
Thus, this channel does limit the size of price changes. In consequence, a larger
fraction of firms that is allowed to reset its price may forgo a change of its price at all
and exactly this causes a higher degree of price stickiness via endogenous firm behaviour
as the fraction of firms that changes prices, via the law of large numbers, determines
the frequency of price changes.
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Using the other two first-order conditions from above, we get
Êt{
∑∞
k=0 θ
kQt,t+kYt+k|t(i)×[
(1− TREt+k)P ∗t (i)− (1− TREt+k)P ∗t (i) + MCnt+k|t(i)
]
} = 0
Êt
{∑∞
k=0 θ
kQt,t+kYt+k|t(i)
[
(1− TREt+k)P ∗t (i)− −1MCnt+k|t(i)
]}
= 0
Êt
{∑∞
k=0 θ
kQt,t+kYt+k|t(i)
[
(1− TREt+k)P ∗t (i)−MMCnt+k|t(i)
]}
= 0,
where M≡ 
−1 . We can see that for θ = 0, i.e. in the absence of nominal price
rigidity, (1 − TREt )P ∗t (i) = MMCnt|t(i) holds. Thus, M can be interpreted as
the desired constant after-tax mark-up. In addition, we can divide the equation
above by the aggregate price level in the economy Pt, which yields
Êt
{∑∞
k=0 θ
kQt,t+kYt+k|t(i)
[
(1− TREt+k)P
∗
t (i)
Pt
−M Pt+k
Pt+k
1
Pt
MCnt+k|t(i)
]}
= 0
Êt
{∑∞
k=0 θ
kQt,t+kYt+k|t(i)
[
(1− TREt+k)P
∗
t (i)
Pt
−M Πt,t+k MCt+k|t(i)
]}
= 0,
where MCt+k|t(i) ≡ MC
n
t+k|t(i)
Pt+k
are real marginal costs and Πt,t+k ≡ Pt+kPt is gross
inflation. Furthermore, we can use the household Euler equation (2.8) in order
to get
Êt{
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σC
Π−1t,t+k Yt+k|t(i)×[
(1− TREt+k)
P ∗t (i)
Pt
−M Πt,t+k MCt+k|t(i)
]
} = 0. (2.20)
A log-linearized version of (2.20) is25
p̂∗t (i)− p̂t = (1− βθ)Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k +
(
pit|t+k + m̂ct+k|t(i)
)]}
.
(2.21)
25See Appendix 2.6.2.5 for the derivation.
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2.2.3 The Fiscal Authority’s Policy
The fiscal authority is in charge of financing constant government expenditures
G and considers the nominal flow government budget constraint
Bt−1 +Mt−1 + PtG ≤ Êt{Qt,t+1}Bt +Mt + PtTREt Yt + PtT,
stating that the government in each period can refinance its debt outstanding
(left-hand side) by issuing new bonds, money, levying a revenue tax at rate TRE ∈
[0, 1] on nominal output or a lump-sum tax T . Considering the cashless limit case
yields
Bt−1
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t +G ≤ Êt{Qt,t+1}
Bt
Pt
+ TREt Yt + T (2.22)
in real terms. In addition, we assume that the government must obey the
transversality condition
lim
T 7→∞
Êt{Qt,T+1}BT ≤ 0
for all t and initial value B0. Thus, the government must ensure that at the end
of all times its debt outstanding equals either zero or is negative. Next, basically
following the approach of Leeper (1991) or more recently Evans and Honkapohja
(2007, p.669), we assume that the government sets the revenue tax rate TREt to
back a fraction %1 ∈ [0, 1] of the real debt outstanding by tax revenue. Formally
the tax rule is
T + TREt Yt =
[
%0 + %1
Bt−1
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t
]
Ψt. (2.23)
The parameter %0 is a constant and Ψt is a tax-revenue shock. A log-linear
approximation is26
τ̂REt =
B/P
TREY
%1 [̂bt−1 − pit]− ŷt + (T + T
REY )
TREY
Ψ̂t, (2.24)
where we assume that Ψ̂t follows an AR(1) process according to
Ψ̂t = ρΨΨ̂t−1 + Ψt
26See Appendix 2.6.2.6 for the derivation.
74
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations
with the coefficient ρΨ ∈ [0, 1). Ψt is a white-noise process with mean zero and
constant variance σ2Ψ.
Thus, the revenue tax rate deviations increase with inflation adjusted real
debt outstanding and decrease with output.27 We want to emphasize the latter
fact, as it makes clear that we do not exactly follow Leeper (1991) or Evans and
Honkapohja (2007, p.669). Our revenue tax rate is responsive to the business-
cycle. Higher employment or an increase in multi-factor productivity both in-
crease output and this in turn increases the tax base. Given the level of real-debt
outstanding, this tax base increase reduces the tax rate deviations. Furthermore,
a log-linear approximation to the flow government budget constraint (2.22) is
given by28
b̂t − Êt{pit+1} = σCÊt{ĉt+1} − σC ĉt + 1
β
(̂bt−1 − pit)− T
REY
β(B/P )
(τ̂REt + ŷt). (2.25)
We may plug (2.24) into (2.25) to get
b̂t − Êt{pit+1} = σCÊt{ĉt+1} − σC ĉt + (1− %1)
β
(̂bt−1 − pit)− (T + T
REY )
β(B/P )
Ψ̂t,
which indicates that except for a passive fiscal policy (%1 = 1) current real debt
outstanding increases in last periods inflation adjusted real debt outstanding as
well as the aggregate expected consumption growth. Moreover, a positive surprise
in the tax revenue decreases current real debt outstanding to some extent. Given
our fiscal policy setting, defining active and passive fiscal policy in the spirit
of Leeper (1991) and Evans and Honkapohja (2007) means that fiscal policy is
passive if %1 = 1, i.e. all debt outstanding is repaid each period and active if
%1 ∈ [0, 1).29
27This appears to be a very volatile tax rate setting mechanism that may not be in
line with empirical evidence.
28See Appendix 2.6.2.7 for the derivation.
29Note that our system has more dimensions and complexity than the systems of
Leeper (1991) and Evans and Honkapohja (2007) by construction. Therefore we could
not manage to link the characterization of active and passive fiscal policy to the eigen-
values of the system matrix. The same is true for the characterization of active and
passive monetary policy in section 2.2.4 below.
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2.2.4 The Central Bank’s Policy
The central bank’s policy instrument is the nominal interest rate it. The central
bank is assumed to implement its policy by the use of a forward-looking version
of a Taylor-type rule
it = φx̂ Et{x̂t+1}+ φpi Et{pit+1}+ vt. (2.26)
The parameters φx̂ ≥ 0, φpi ≥ 0 are the monetary policy response coefficients
with regard to expected output gap deviations and expected inflation deviations
respectively.30 Furthermore, vt denotes a monetary policy shock that follows an
AR(1) process
vt = ρvvt−1 + vt
with the coefficient ρv ∈ [0, 1). vt is a white-noise process with mean zero and
constant variance σ2v .
This is a deviation from the assumption about monetary policy by Leeper
(1991) or Evans and Honkapohja (2007) who both assume that the central bank
follows a Taylor-type rule that feeds back solely on current inflation and ignores
output. We believe that our assumption on the conduct of monetary policy
is closer to actual practice. Nowadays central banks are often concerned with
price stability and the business cycle. Furthermore, this specific functional form
mimics the basic features of some reaction functions. These functions implement
optimal monetary policy based on a specific target criterion, as is demonstrated
by Woodford (2003, p.293ff.) or Svensson and Woodford (2005, p.71ff.) for
example. Another argument in favour of the choice of this particular interest
rule is to keep results more comparable to the analysis of Branch and McGough
(2009), who assume the same functional form.
Please be aware that if a central bank sticks to the Taylor principle, this
corresponds to φpi > 1 for the simple rule (2.26). At least under RE it is a
quite robust finding in the literature that sticking to this principle is sufficient
to render an economy determinate. But the principle is only the exact formal
sufficient condition for determinacy if φx̂ = 0. This was demonstrated in Bullard
and Mitra (2002). In our setting, as in Leeper (1991) as well as in Evans and
30Note that x̂t measures the welfare relevant output gap deviations in period t. We
account for these deviations in Section 2.3.7 below.
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Honkapohja (2007), sticking to this principle is equivalent to an active monetary
policy, while φpi ∈ [0, 1] is denoted as a passive monetary policy.
2.3 Components of Equilibrium
We will now examine under which conditions the goods market, bonds market and
labour market clear. Furthermore, we derive the natural levels and the efficient
levels of output and account for the tax distortions in the equilibrium conditions.
2.3.1 Goods Market Clearing
Each firm j satisfies total demand for its good, that is
Yt(j) = Ct(j) +G(j),
where Ct(j) is total private sector demand for good j and G(j) is total public
sector demand for good j. By definition31 we can rewrite the total private sector
demand for good j as the aggregate of individual household demands for good j,
that is
Yt(j) =
∫ 1
0
Ct(i, j)di+G(j)
and making use of (2.2) as well as the counterpart for public demand G(j) =(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
G yields
Yt(j) =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Ct(i)di+
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
G,
or
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−(∫ 1
0
Ct(i)di+G
)
.
It follows that
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
(Ct +G) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt. (2.27)
31Please keep in mind that aggregating a variable Zt(i) over all agents i ∈ [0, 1]
requires to take the integral
∫ 1
0 Zt(i)di = Zt.
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The latter identity holds, as the aggregate output of the economy is defined as
Yt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
.
Applying this definition to (2.27), yields the aggregate goods market clearing
condition
Yt = Ct +G. (2.28)
By log-linearizing this condition around a steady-state32, we obtain
ŷt =
C
Y
ĉt (2.29)
in terms of steady-state deviations. Notice that government spending G plays no
role as we assumed it to be constant.
2.3.2 Bonds Market Clearing
First, for the bond market to clear, the total amount of bonds issued by the
government must either be held by agents of type γ = 1 or of type γ = 2, that is
Bt = χB
1
t + (1− χ)B2t . (2.30)
A log-linear approximation to (2.30) in real terms using assumption A2 is33
b̂t = χb̂
1
t + (1− χ)̂b2t . (2.31)
Given (2.31) the overall period t average real wealth in the economy
Ŵt = χŴ1t + (1− χ)Ŵ1t
32See Appendix 2.6.2.8 for the derivation.
33See Appendix 2.6.2.9 for the derivation.
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can be computed by
Ŵt = χ[ (B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂1t−1 − pit
]
+
β(B/P )σC
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
E1t {ĉt+1}
− β(B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂1t − E1t {pit+1}
]
+
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
C + β(B/P )σC
ω̂1t ]
+(1− χ)[ (B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂2t−1 − pit
]
+
β(B/P )σC
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
E2t {ĉt+1}
− β(B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂2t − E2t {pit+1}
]
+
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
C + β(B/P )σC
ω̂2t ]
=
(B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+
β(B/P )σC
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
Êt{ĉt+1}
− β(B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
+
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
C + β(B/P )σC
ω̂t, (2.32)
where we make use of (2.11), assume that within-type decisions are symmetric
and each household i ∈ [0, χ] is of type γ = 1 and each household i ∈ (χ, 1] is of
type γ = 2. Furthermore, from taking into account (2.31), (2.32), (2.11) as well
as (2.29) (for each type γ) and (2.5), we get
ŷt =
[
C + β(B/P )σC
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡δ1
[
χŴ1t + (1− χ)Ŵ2t
]
−
[
(B/P )
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+
[
β(B/P )σC
(B/P )(1− β)− C − T
Y
C
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡δ3
Êt{ŷt+1}
+
[
β(B/P )
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡δ4
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t ,
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or more compact
ŷt = δ1
[
χŴ1t + (1− χ)Ŵ2t
]
− δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+ δ3Êt{ŷt+1}
+δ4
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t
= δ1[χ
(
Ŵ1∞ −
1
σC
E1t
{ ∞∑
k=0
[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]
})
+(1− χ)
(
Ŵ2∞ −
1
σC
E2t
{ ∞∑
k=0
[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]
})
]
−δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+ δ3Êt{ŷt+1}+ δ4
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t
= δ1
[
χŴ1∞ + (1− χ)Ŵ2∞ −
1
σC
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]
}]
−δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+ δ3Êt{ŷt+1}+ δ4
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t ,
(2.33)
where we make use of (2.13). One period ahead, (2.33) reads
Êt {ŷt+1} = δ1
[
Êt
{
χŴ1∞ + (1− χ)Ŵ2∞
}
− 1
σC
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=1
[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]
}]
−δ2
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
+ δ3Êt{ŷt+2}+ δ4
[
Êt{b̂t+1} − Êt{pit+2}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE)Êt{τ̂
RE
t+1}
− term of higher order beliefs︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, due to A6
.
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We can subtract the two equations above to finally get a Dynamic IS Curve
ŷt = Êt {ŷt+1} − δ1 1
σC
[
it − Êt{pit+1} − ρ
]
−δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+ δ3
[
Êt{ŷt+1} − Êt{ŷt+2}
]
+ (δ4 − δ2)
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
−δ4
[
Êt{b̂t+1} − Êt{pit+2}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE)(τ̂
RE
t − Êt
{
τ̂REt+1
}
)
+δ1
[
χŴ1∞ + (1− χ)Ŵ2∞ − Êt
{(
χŴ1∞ + (1− χ)Ŵ2∞
)}]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, due to A7
,
or
ŷt = Êt {ŷt+1} − δ1 1
σC
[
it − Êt{pit+1} − ρ
]
−δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+ δ3
[
Êt{ŷt+1} − Êt{ŷt+2}
]
+ (δ4 − δ2)
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
−δ4
[
Êt{b̂t+1} − Êt{pit+2}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE)(τ̂
RE
t − Êt
{
τ̂REt+1
}
). (2.34)
We realize that this version of the Dynamic IS curve features not only the (ex-
pected) output and real rate dynamics as is standard in NK literature, but also
the (expected) real debt dynamics and the expected change in revenue tax rate
deviations.
2.3.3 Labour Market Clearing
Aggregate labour supply is given by
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di.
Combined with firm i’s production technology (2.15) and the economy-wide de-
mand (2.27) we get:
Nt =
∫ 1
0
(
Yt(i)
At
) 1
1−α
di =
(
Yt
At
) 1
1−α
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 
1−α
di.
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Up to a first-order log-linear approximation, we can write aggregate output as34
yt = at + (1− α)nt. (2.35)
2.3.4 Marginal Cost
From (2.17) and by imposing symmetry among firms, we see that economy’s
average real marginal cost in logs is
mct = (wt − pt)−mpnt
(2.37)
= (wt − pt)− (at − αnt − log(1− α))
(2.35)
= (wt − pt)− 1
(1− α)at +
α
(1− α)yt + log(1− α), (2.36)
where the log-linearized form of the marginal product of labour (2.18) is
mpnt = at − αnt − log(1− α). (2.37)
Similarly, period t+ k marginal cost for a firm, that last reset its price in period
t, is
mct+k|t(i) = (wt+k − pt+k)−mpnt+k|t(i)
(2.37)
= (wt+k − pt+k)− (at+k − αnt+k|t(i)− log(1− α))
(2.35)
= (wt+k − pt+k)− (at+k − α 1(1−α) [yt+k|t(i)− at+k]− log(1− α))
= (wt+k − pt+k)− 1(1−α)at+k + log(1− α) + α(1−α)yt+k|t(i)
34See Gal´ı (2008, p.46) and the related proof therein.
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= (wt+k − pt+k)− 1
(1− α)at+k +
α
(1− α)yt+k + log(1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=mct+k
+ α
(1−α) [yt+k|t(i)− yt+k]
(2.27)
= mct+k − α(1−α) [p∗t (i)− pt+k],
where we make use of the aggregate output (2.35) as well as the log-linearized de-
mand schedule (2.27) and the marginal product of labour (2.37). In consequence,
we can express the marginal cost in log-deviations from the steady-state as
m̂ct+k|t(i) = mct+k|t(i)−mc
= mct+k − α
(1− α) [p̂
∗
t (i)− p̂t+k]−mc
= m̂ct+k − α
(1− α) [p̂
∗
t (i)− p̂t+k]. (2.38)
This illustrates formally the asymmetry among individual marginal costs that
may result in endogenous price stickiness as explained above. Next, if we apply
(2.38) to (2.21), we get
p̂∗t (i)− p̂t = (1− βθ)Êt{
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k ×
[
Θ
(
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k + m̂ct+k
)
+
βθ
(1− βθ)pit+k+1
]
}, (2.39)
where Θ ≡ (1−α)
1+α(−1) ≤ 1. We can forward this equation one period, apply A1,
A3, A4 and A5 to arrive at the difference equation35
p̂∗t (i)− p̂t = (1− βθ)Θ
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + m̂ct
]
+ βθÊt {pit+1}
+βθÊt
{
p̂∗t+1(i)− p̂t+1
}
. (2.40)
35In Appendix 2.6.2.10 we outline the steps and the application of the assumptions.
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Now, as decision making is equal among all firms, we get
p̂∗t − p̂t = (1− βθ)Θ
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + m̂ct
]
+ βθÊt {pit+1}+ βθÊt
{
p̂∗t+1 − p̂t+1
}
.
Using the Calvo (1983) assumption about aggregate price setting (2.14) yields
θ
(1− θ)pit = (1−βθ)Θ
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + m̂ct
]
+βθÊt {pit+1}+βθ θ
(1− θ)Êt {pit+1} .
Finally, we rearrange terms, define λ ≡ (1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ
Θ and get the inflation equation
pit = λ
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + m̂ct
]
+ βÊt {pit+1} . (2.41)
We can iterate this equation forward and see that inflation can be expressed as
a weighted average of the actual and the expected future steady-state deviations
of the tax-rate as well as the marginal cost, which are determinants of the firms
pricing decisions. Formally this is
pit = λ Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
βk
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k + m̂ct+k
]}
.
Be aware that an innovation in the fiscal authorities policy rule can affect aggre-
gate inflation through this channel and may therefore affect monetary policy.
Next, we impose goods market clearing (2.29), labour market clearing (2.35),
as well as an efficient consumption labour choice (2.10) to the average real
marginal cost (2.36) and get
mct =
[
(ϕ+ α)
(1− α) + σC
Y
C
]
yt − σCG
C
g −
[
(1 + ϕ)
(1− α)
]
at + log(1− α).
Consequently for the steady-state follows that36
mc =
[
(ϕ+ α)
(1− α) + σC
Y
C
]
ynt − σC
G
C
g −
[
(1 + ϕ)
(1− α)
]
at + log(1− α)
36We denote the natural level of a variable in logs zt by z
n
t . The natural level is the
result of a flexible price equilibrium.
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is true. Furthermore, we have
m̂ct = mct −mc =
[
(ϕ+ α)
(1− α) + σC
Y
C
]
(yt − ynt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y˜t
), (2.42)
where y˜t is the difference between actual and natural level of output. Combining
(2.42) with (2.41) yields the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
pit = βÊt {pit+1}+ λ T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + λ
(
(ϕ+ α)
(1− α) + σC
Y
C
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κ
y˜t
= βÊt {pit+1}+ λ T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + κy˜t. (2.43)
Compared to the functional form of the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve
there is the additional term with the revenue tax rate deviations.
2.3.5 The Flex-Price Equilibrium
Under flexible prices each monopolistically competitive firm i facing given prices
and wages will maximize its profits
max
P ∗t (i),Yt(i),Nt(i)
(1− TREt ) P ∗t (i) Yt(i)−Wt Nt(i)
subject to technology (2.15) as well as market demand (2.27). The Lagrangian
of this problem is
L = (1− TREt ) P ∗t (i) Yt(i)−Wt Nt(i)
−λ1
[
Yt(i)− AtNt(i)1−α
]− λ2 [Yt(i)− (P ∗t (i)
Pt
)−
Yt
]
.
Combining first-order conditions indicates the optimal firm behaviour. A firm
should increase employment until the real wage equals the constant markup over
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after-tax marginal product of labour
Wt
P ∗t (i)
=
(1− TREt )
M (1− α)AtN
−α
t (i)
Wt
Pt
=
(1− TREt )
M (1− α)AtN
−α
t . (2.44)
The latter identity makes use of the assumption of symmetry among firm be-
haviour. A log-linear approximation of (2.44) yields37
ŵt − p̂t = at − αn̂t − T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t . (2.45)
Goods market clear (2.29) and households supply labour according to (2.10),
therefore
ϕn̂t + σC
Y
C
ŷt = at − αn̂t − T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t
should hold. Labour market clearing condition (2.35) and rearranging terms
yields
ŷnt =
≡ψnya︷ ︸︸ ︷[
(1 + ϕ)C
C(ϕ+ α) + σC(1− α)Y
]
at−
≡ψn
yTRE︷ ︸︸ ︷[
TRE
(1− TRE)
(1− α)C
C(ϕ+ α) + σC(1− α)Y
]
τ̂REt
or
ŷnt = ψ
n
yaat − ψnyTRE τ̂REt (2.46)
as the natural level of output in terms of steady-state deviations.
2.3.6 Efficient Levels
Under flexible prices, perfect competition and without taxes each firm i facing
given prices and wages will maximize its profits
max
Yt(i),Nt(i)
Pt Yt(i)−Wt Nt(i)
37See Appendix 2.6.2.11 for the derivation.
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subject to technology (2.15). Optimal firm behaviour now requires increasing
employment until the real wage equals the marginal product of labour
Wt
Pt
= (1− α)AtN−αt , (2.47)
where we again made use of the assumption of symmetry among firms. Taking
logs yields
wt − pt = at − αnt + log(1− α). (2.48)
Goods market clear (2.29), and households supply labour according to (2.10),
therefore
ϕnt + σC
[
Y
C
yt − G
C
g
]
= at − αnt + log(1− α)
should hold. Labour market clearing (2.35) and rearranging terms yields38
yet =
≡ψeya=ψnya︷ ︸︸ ︷[
C(1 + ϕ)
C(ϕ+ α) + σC(1− α)Y
]
at +
≡ψeyg︷ ︸︸ ︷[
G(1− α)
C(ϕ+ α) + σC(1− α)Y
]
g
+
[
C(1− α)
C(ϕ+ α) + σC(1− α)Y
]
log(1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ϑey
or
yet = ψ
e
yaat + ψ
e
ygg + ϑ
e
y (2.49)
as the efficient level of output. In terms of steady-state deviations, this is given
by
ŷet = ψ
e
yaat.
2.3.7 Accounting for Distortions
Comparing (2.44) to (2.47) makes clear that the flex price equilibrium is distorted
by the revenue tax rate as well as the monopolistic competition and, in order to
write the equilibrium conditions in terms of the welfare relevant output gap, we
need to account for these distortions.39 In order to do so, we have to rewrite
38We denote the efficient level of a variable in logs zt by z
e
t .
39This is necessary as we do assume the more realistic case, in which the authorities
cannot perfectly offset the distortions by lump-sump transfers.
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the Dynamic IS Curve (2.34), the New Keynesian Philips Curve (2.43), the tax
rule (2.24) and the government budget constraint (2.25) in terms of the welfare
relevant output gap deviation x̂t ≡ xt − x = (yt − yet ) − (y − ye). So it follows
that ŷt = x̂t + ŷ
e
t as well as y˜t = x̂t + (ŷ
e
t − ŷnt ). The Dynamic IS curve (2.34)
becomes
(x̂t + ŷ
e
t ) = (1 + δ3)Êt
{
(x̂t+1 + ŷ
e
t+1)
}− δ3Êt{(x̂t+2 + ŷet+2)}
−δ1 1
σC
[
it − Êt{pit+1} − ρ
]
− δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+(δ4 − δ2)
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
− δ4
[
Êt{b̂t+1} − Êt{pit+2}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE)(τ̂
RE
t − Êt
{
τ̂REt+1
}
),
x̂t = (1 + δ3)Êt {x̂t+1}+ δ1 1
σC
[
ρ+
σC
δ1
4Êt{ŷet+1} − δ3
σC
δ1
4Êt{ŷet+2}
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ret
−δ1 1
σC
it + δ1
1
σC
Êt{pit+1} − δ3Êt{x̂t+2} − δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+(δ4 − δ2)
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
− δ4
[
Êt{b̂t+1} − Êt{pit+2}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE)(τ̂
RE
t − Êt
{
τ̂REt+1
}
),
or
x̂t = (1 + δ3)Êt {x̂t+1} − δ3Êt{x̂t+2} − δ1 1
σC
[
it − Êt{pit+1} − ret
]
−δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+ (δ4 − δ2)
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
− δ4
[
Êt{b̂t+1} − Êt{pit+2}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE)(τ̂
RE
t − Êt
{
τ̂REt+1
}
). (2.50)
Here ret is the efficient real rate of interest, i.e. the rate of interest that prevails
in absence of any nominal rigidity as well as distortions. Note that, given the
efficient level of output (2.49), the process for multi-factor productivity (2.16)
and the expectations specified in Section 2.4.1 below, we can express this interest
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rate in terms of structural parameters and exogenous forces only
ret = ρ+
[
σC
δ1
(χρa + (1− χ)ι− 1)− δ3σC
δ1
(
χρ2a(1− χ)ι2 − χρa − (1− χ)ι
)]
ψeyaat.
Next, the New Keynesian Philips Curve (2.43) becomes
pit = βÊt {pit+1}+ λ T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + κ[x̂t + (ŷ
e
t − ŷnt )]
= βÊt {pit+1}+ λ T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + κx̂t + κ(ŷ
e
t − ŷnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ut
= βÊt {pit+1}+ λ T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + κx̂t + ut. (2.51)
ut is usually interpreted in the literature as a cost-push shock. We assume that
it follows an AR(1) process
ut = ρuut−1 + ut ,
where ρu ∈ [0, 1) and ut is a white-noise process with mean zero and constant
variance σ2u. Next, the tax rule (2.24) becomes
τ̂REt =
B/P
TREY
%1(̂bt−1 − pit)− [x̂t + ŷet ] +
(T + TREY )
TREY
Ψ̂t
=
B/P
TREY
%1(̂bt−1 − pit)− x̂t − ŷet +
(T + TREY )
TREY
Ψ̂t. (2.52)
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Finally, we make use of (2.29) and the government budget constraint (2.25) be-
comes
b̂t − Êt{pit+1} = σCÊt{Y
C
ŷt+1} − σC Y
C
ŷt +
1
β
(̂bt−1 − pit)− T
REY
βB
P
(τ̂REt + ŷt)
= σC
Y
C
Êt{x̂t+1 + ŷet+1} − σC
Y
C
(x̂t + ŷ
e
t ) +
1
β
(̂bt−1 − pit)
−T
REY
βB
P
(τ̂REt + x̂t + ŷ
e
t )
= σC
Y
C
Êt{x̂t+1} − σC Y
C
x̂t +
1
β
(̂bt−1 − pit)− T
REY
βB
P
(τ̂REt + x̂t)
+σC
Y
C
Êt{ŷet+1} − (σC
Y
C
+
TREY
βB
P
)ŷet . (2.53)
2.4 The Dynamics of the Model
In this section we detail the expectational setting. In addition, we write down the
fully specified system we are going to analyze and the methodology that is used
for this purpose. Finally, we characterize the dynamic properties of the economy.
2.4.1 The Nature of the Heterogeneous Expectations
Exactly following Branch and McGough (2009, ch.4.2), we assume that agents
of type γ = 1 have one-step ahead perfect foresight with regard to endogenous
variables. Agents of type γ = 2 have adaptive expectations on the same variables.
Therefore, for any variable zt that is not observable in period t, agents of type
γ = 2 compute E2t {zt} = ιzt−1 or E2t {zt+1} = ιE2t {zt} = ι2zt−1, where ι > 0.
From A6 it follows that on the aggregate for any variable zt that is not observable
for agents in period t we get
Êt{zt+1} = χEt{zt+1}+ (1− χ)ι2zt−1.
If zt is observable in period t, we get
Êt{zt+1} = χEt{zt+1}+ (1− χ)ιzt.
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Furthermore, notice that a rate of change 4zt is in general given by
Êt{4zt+1} = Êt{zt+1} − Êt{zt},
thus for any variable that is observable at the beginning of period t, we get
Êt{4zt+1} = χEt{zt+1}+ [(1− χ)ι− 1] zt,
and for any variable that is not observable at the beginning of period t, we get
Êt{4zt+1} = χEt{4zt+1}+ (1− χ)ι(ι− 1)zt−1.
Be aware that in what follows, we will stick to the learning literature’s widely
used assumption that for agents of type γ = 2 current period’s exogenous shocks
are observable, whereas aggregate levels of endogenous variables are not. Never-
theless, all agents are aware of the individual level they choose (see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001, p.200) or Branch and McGough (2009, p.4)). The idea behind
is, that we rule out situations, in which agents’ expectations may affect current
values of aggregate endogenous variables and vice versa. This could potentially
introduce some strategic behaviour. This may be viewed as a crucial shortcom-
ing of the learning approach in general as has been emphasized by Bullard (1991,
p.57), who states “making this assumption is unsatisfactory, however, because it
means that individuals ignore relevant and potentially useful information when
forming their forecasts”.
Next we need to specify the coefficient ι. With regard to our subsequent
analysis, as emphasized by Branch and McGough (2009) we distinguish three
cases. 0 < ι < 1 is what usually denotes adaptive expectations in a conventional
sense. Therefore, we call this purely adaptive. ι = 1 is often referred to naive
expectations. ι > 1 is what Branch and McGough (2009) denote extrapolative
expectations. Below, we will parallel the analysis of Branch and McGough (2009)
and consider the cases ι ∈ {0.90, 1.10}, where we will refer to the first case as
purely adaptive expectations and to the second case as extrapolative expectations.
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2.4.2 The Fully Specified System
The complete system at hand consists of the conditions (2.50), (2.51), (2.26),
(2.52) and (2.53). We have a non-policy block
x̂t = (1 + δ3)Êt {x̂t+1} − δ3Êt{x̂t+2} − δ1 1
σC
[
it − Êt{pit+1} − ret
]
−δ2
[
b̂t−1 − pit
]
+ (δ4 − δ2)
[
b̂t − Êt{pit+1}
]
−δ4
[
Êt{b̂t+1} − Êt{pit+2}
]
+
TRE
(1− TRE)(τ̂
RE
t − Êt
{
τ̂REt+1
}
)
pit = βÊt {pit+1}+ λ T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + κx̂t + ut.
Furthermore there is monetary policy
it = φx̂ Et{x̂t+1}+ φpi Et{pit+1}+ vt,
fiscal policy
τ̂REt =
B/P
TREY
%1(̂bt−1 − pit)− x̂t − ŷet +
(T + TREY )
TREY
Ψ̂t
b̂t − Êt{pit+1} = σC Y
C
Êt{x̂t+1} − σC Y
C
x̂t +
1
β
(̂bt−1 − pit)− T
REY
βB
P
(τ̂REt + x̂t)
+σC
Y
C
Êt{ŷet+1} − (σC
Y
C
+
TREY
βB
P
)ŷet
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and expectations
Êt{x̂t+1} = χEt{x̂t+1}+ (1− χ)ι2x̂t−1
Êt{x̂t+2} = χEt{x̂t+2}+ (1− χ)ι3x̂t−1
Êt{pit+1} = χEt{pit+1}+ (1− χ)ι2pit−1,
Êt{pit+2} = χEt{pit+2}+ (1− χ)ι3pit−1
Êt{b̂t+1} = χEt{b̂t+1}+ (1− χ)ι2b̂t−1
Êt{τ̂REt+1} = χEt{τ̂REt+1}+ (1− χ)ι2τ̂REt−1
Êt{ŷet+1} = χEt{ŷet+1}+ (1− χ)ιŷet
as well as the processes for natural and efficient levels. We can boil this system
down to four equations
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−
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χ
)ι
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0
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−
χ
)ι
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E
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0
0
0
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−
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x̂
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τ̂
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E
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1
     
+
     [ σ
C
Y C
(χ
ρ
a
+
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−
χ
)ι
)
−
( σ C
Y C
+
T
R
E
Y
β
B
/
P
)]
0
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0
−δ
1
1 σ
C
δ 1
1 σ
C
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
−1
0
0
0
(T
+
T
R
E
Y
)
T
R
E
Y
            
ŷ
e t v t re t u
t
Ψ̂
t
       .
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For the sake of convenience, we may rewrite the system as in Binder and Pesaran
(1999, p.140ff). They demonstrate how one can recast any multivariate RE model
with any finite number of leads and lags as a second-order system. With st =
[̂bt, x̂t, pit, τ̂
RE
t ]
′ of dimension e = 4 and Ut = [ŷet , vt, r
e
t , ut, Ψ̂t]
′ of dimension K = 5
we write the system in general as
MU Ut = M00 st + M01 Etst+1 + M02 Etst+2 + M10 st−1 + M20 st−2
+M11 Et−1st + M21 Et−2st−1
+M12 Et−1st+1 + M22 Et−2st, (2.54)
where in our case matrices M20 = M11 = M12 = M21 = M22 = 0. We can
rewrite the latter as MU 0 00 0 0
0 0 0

 Ut0
0
 =
 M00 M01 M020 I 0
0 0 I

 stEtst+1
Etst+2

+
 M10 M11 M120 0 0
0 0 0

 st−1Et−1st
Et−1st+1

+
 M20 M21 M220 0 0
0 0 0

 st−2Et−2st−1
Et−2st

+
 0 0 0−I 0 0
0 −I 0

 Etst+1Etst+2
Etst+3

or with zt = [s
′
t, Ets
′
t+1, Ets
′
t+2]
′ more compact as
ΓU νt = Γ0 zt + Γ1 zt−1 + Γ2 zt−2 + Γ−1 Etzt+1. (2.55)
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Again, we can rewrite this equation as[
ΓU 0
0 0
][
νt
0
]
=
[
Γ0 Γ1
0 I
][
zt
zt−1
]
+
[
0 Γ2
−I 0
][
zt−1
zt−2
]
+
[
Γ−1 0
0 0
][
Etzt+1
zt
]
,
or by defining yt = [z
′
t, z
′
t−1]
′ and Zt = [ν ′t, 0]
′ more compactly as a second-order
stochastic difference system which in general can be written as
A˘0yt = −A˘1Et{yt+1} − A˘2yt−1 + A˘3Zt, (2.56)
where yt is a e × 1 vector of endogenous variables and Zt is a K × 1 vector of
exogenous variables. Furthermore, the matrices A˘0, A˘1, A˘2 are of dimension e×e
and the matrix A˘3 is of dimension e×K. Zt is assumed to follow a dynamically
stable process
Zt = RZt−1 + t, (2.57)
where R is a K×K matrix, t is the K×1 vector of innovations and Et−1{t} = 0.
If A˘1 were non-singular, i.e. invertible, then we could simply follow the analysis
of Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.). But we face a singular matrix A˘1 so we
cannot bring our system into the standard form of Blanchard and Kahn (1980,
p.1305). A more general approach to analyze the dynamics of such a system
numerically has, for example, been proposed by Klein (2000), who makes use of
a generalized complex Schur decomposition. We follow this approach as outlined
in the recent paper by McCallum (2009a, p.13ff.).40 Starting from (2.56) we can
write the system as
yt = −A˘−10 A˘1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
Et{yt+1}−A˘−10 A˘2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C
yt−1 + A˘−10 A˘3︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D
Zt
or
yt = AEt{yt+1}+ Cyt−1 + DZt, (2.58)
40Other useful references for solution procedures may be Sims (2002), Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003) and Uhlig (2006).
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where A and C are e × e matrices and D is a e × K matrix. This system
corresponds to the class of linear models that is discussed by McCallum (2009a,
p.13ff.).41 Following this approach, we consider solutions to (2.57) and (2.58) of
the type
yt = Λyt−1 + ΥZt, (2.59)
where Λ is a e× e matrix and Υ is a e×K matrix. One can also think of (2.59)
as the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM). In Period t+ 1 (2.59) is
Et{yt+1} = Λyt + ΥEt{Zt+1}
= Λ(Λyt−1 + ΥZt) + Υ(RZt)
= (Λ2yt−1) + (ΛΥ + ΥR)Zt. (2.60)
If we plug (2.60) into the original model (2.58) we get the Actual Law of motion
(ALM) in the economy
yt = A[(Λ
2yt−1) + (ΛΥ + ΥR)Zt] + Cyt−1 + DZt
= [AΛ2 + C]yt−1 + [AΛΥ + AΥR + D]Zt. (2.61)
In a REE, the PLM has to coincide to the ALM, that is
Λ
!
= [AΛ2 + C] (2.62)
and
Υ
!
= [AΛΥ + AΥR + D]. (2.63)
In order to analyze the dynamics we focus on (2.62).42 We can augment condition
(2.62) by the matrix identity Λ = Λ and write the two conditions as[
A 0
0 I
][
Λ2
Λ
]
=
[
I −C
I 0
][
Λ
I
]
, (2.64)
41Note that our matrices A, C, D and R correspond to their counterparts in Mc-
Callum (2009a, p.13ff.).
42Inspecting (2.62)-(2.63) makes clear that given Λ we can pin down a unique solution
for Υ. But clearly there exist multiple solutions as (2.62) is a matrix quadratic.
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or more compact as
A¯
[
Λ2
Λ
]
= C¯
[
Λ
I
]
, (2.65)
where A¯, C¯ are (e+ e)× (e+ e) matrices. Now we look for the generalized eigen-
values (GEVs) of C¯ with respect to A¯ or equivalently for the GEVs of the matrix
pencil [C¯ − λA¯]. According to the Schur generalized (complex) decomposition
theorem there exist unitary (e+ e)× (e+ e) matrices Q and Z such that we can
decompose matrices A¯, C¯ into the upper triangular (e+ e)× (e+ e) matrices S
and T respectively. The GEVs of the matrix pencil [C¯− λA¯] are defined as the
ratio of the elements of the main diagonal of T to the main diagonal of S, i.e.
λi = tii/sii. Given these GEVs, we can now proceed as in Branch and McGough
(2009, p.11ff.) and visualize regions of determinacy and indeterminacy depending
on policy parameters.43
The decomposition itself is quite an easy numerical task, but in order to
characterize regions of (in-) determinacy we have to be conceptually clear about
the number of GEVs and under which conditions there prevails determinacy or
indeterminacy of some order.44
In order to be clear, notice that we may deal with N variables predetermined
and M variables determined within period t. Thus the (e + e) × (e + e) or
equivalently (N + M) × (N + M) matrix pencil [C¯ − λA¯] has (N + M) GEVs.
In general, such a system is considered determinate if exactly M of the (N +M)
GEVs are outside the unit circle. Consequently, if M − 1 GEVs are outside the
43Note that comparing eigenvalues of a system matrix a` la Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) and GEVs a` la Klein (2000) for the same economy may lead to slightly differ-
ent results, if one does not account properly for complex eigenvalues. By accounting
we mean that one needs to ensure that one calculates the moduli of possibly com-
plex numbers. In the software Mathematica for example, simple use of the command
SchurDecomposition[] is not sufficient. We became aware of this issue while repro-
ducing the results of Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.), see Appendix 2.6.3 for an
illustration. Note that using Matlab one can reproduce the same results with the func-
tion qz.m, the difference is that, whereas in Mathematica a QR iteration is employed,
in Matlab a QZ factorization is used. In consequence the matrices we label Q and Z
differ but T and S are the same.
44Evans and McGough (2005, p.1816) denote a situation with a system exhibiting a
one dimensional continuum of equilibria Order 1 Indeterminacy and a situation with
a system exhibiting a two dimensional continuum of equilibria Order 2 Indeterminacy.
The idea behind is to indicate “the number of independent sunspots required to specify
the solution”.
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unit circle, we consider it Order 1 Indeterminacy. If M − 2 GEVs are outside the
unit circle, we consider it Order 2 Indeterminacy and so on. Generally speaking
we talk about(
(N +M)
M
)
=
(N +M)!
M ! ((N +M)−M)! =
(N +M)!
M ! N !
(2.66)
combinations of GEVs, where N of the (N+M) GEVs are outside the unit circle
and determinacy prevails. Furthermore there are
M−1∑
m=0
(
(N +M)
m
)
=
M−1∑
m=0
(N +M)!
m! ((N +M)−m)! (2.67)
combinations of indeterminacy, where m = 0, 1, ... corresponds to Order M,M −
1, ... Indeterminacy respectively.
2.4.3 Regions of (In-)determinacy
Now we have to assign values to our free parameters. One can find an overview
in Table 2.2 below.
Param. Description Value(s) Reference
φx̂ Monetary policy response coefficient ∈ [0, 2]
with regard to output gap deviations
φpi Monetary policy response coefficient ∈ [0, 2]
with regard to inflation deviations
%1 Tax revenue backing parameter ∈ {1.00, 0.50}
for real debt outstanding
χ Fraction of households of type ∈ {1.00, 0.90, Branch and McGough (2009, p.11)
γ = 1 0.80, 0.60} Branch (2004, p.607ff.)
ι Weight on past data in expectations ∈ {0.90, 1.10} Branch and McGough (2009, p.11ff.)
formation of type γ = 2 agents
1/σC Inter-temporal elasticity of (1/0.157) Branch and McGough (2009, p.11)
substitution of private consumption
β Discount factor 0.99 Gal´ı (2008, p.52)
α Output elasticity of labour (1/3) Gal´ı (2008, p.52)
1/ϕ Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1.00 Gal´ı (2008, p.52)
 Elasticity of substitution between 6.00 Gal´ı (2008, p.52)
differentiated goods
θ Calvo (1983) parameter (2/3) Gal´ı (2008, p.52)
Y Steady-state level of output 1.00
TRE Steady-state level of the tax rate 0.20 Benigno and Woodford (2004, p.295)
B Steady-state level of nominal debt 2.40 Benigno and Woodford (2004, p.295)
C Steady-state level of consumption 0.70
P Steady-state level of the price level 1.00
Table 2.2: Calibration of structural parameters.
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Note that these values lead to an annual public debt to GDP ratio of 60%.
Moreover, we have ρ ≡ − log(β) ≈ 0.0101, Θ ≡ (1−α)
1+α(−1) = 0.25, λ ≡ (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ Θ=
0.0425 and κ ≡ λ
(
(ϕ+α)
(1−α) + σC
Y
C
)
≈ 0.095.
First, we want to make a note on so-called infinite GEVs. In our case, these
infinite GEVs may occur if the diagonal of matrix S has elements with absolute
value of zero, i.e. sii = 0 for some i. As emphasized by Klein (2000, p.1410), one
can treat such infinite GEVs in the same way as finite unstable eigenvalues, that
is eigenvalues outside the unit circle.
According to Klein (2000, p.1410), given the fact that our matrix A¯ is singular,
we have to deal with the infinite GEVs. The crucial question is, how many of
them are present in our setting. We are not aware of a straightforward procedure
to determine the number of infinite GEVs. Our conjecture is
max{Dimensions[A¯]} −MatrixRank[A¯].
We base this conjecture on the fact that it works for the whole parameter space,
given our calibration in Table 2.2. A proof of that conjecture is beyond the scope
of this paper.
In the illustration of numerical results that follow in this subsection, we adopt
the following legend: yellow regions are regions of explosiveness, red regions are
regions of Order 2 Indeterminacy, blue regions are regions of Order 1 Indeter-
minacy and green regions are regions of determinacy. Note also that in each
figure the vertical axis measures monetary policy feedback on the output gap via
the coefficient φx̂ and the horizontal axis measures feedback on inflation via the
coefficient φpi.
2.4.3.1 Purely Adaptive Expectations and Passive Fiscal Policy
Figure 2.2 shows the results for the case of purely adaptive expectations (ι = 0.90)
combined with passive fiscal policy (%1 = 1.00). Please keep in mind that we
denote such a fiscal policy as passive. Panel 2.2(a) displays the outcome for the
economy when only fully rational agents (χ = 1.00) are present. From Panel
2.2(b) over Panel 2.2(c) to Panel 2.2(d), χ takes values of 0.90, 0.80 and 0.60
respectively, i.e. the fraction of type γ = 2 households increases to up to 40%.
An obvious qualitative feature of our results, that coincides with “Result 3”
100
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.2: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness given purely adaptive expectations and passive fiscal
policy.
in Branch and McGough (2009, p.11), is that an increase of the fraction of type
γ = 2 households increases the region of determinacy and Order 1 Indeterminacy
relative to Order 2 Indeterminacy. Moreover, we observe locally explosive regions
in our model. This local divergence from steady-state is associated with policies
that give slightly less than one-for-one feedback to inflation and none or minor
feedback to the output gap.
Taking Panels 2.2(b)-2.2(d) into account, reveals our most notable result. The
small locally explosive region grows with the increase in the fraction of γ = 2
agents. These agents with purely adaptive expectations have a destabilizing effect
in the mathematical sense, that has not been observed by Branch and McGough
(2009, p.10ff.) in their model. In addition, note that the locally explosive area
expands around (φpi ≈ 1.0). Thus, in this set-up it appears to be a wise monetary
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policy to give feedback on inflation that is significantly larger than one.
Furthermore, we observe that sticking to the Taylor principle (φpi > 1.0), i.e.
active monetary policy is no guarantee to render the economy determinate. This
is another qualitative result, we share with Branch and McGough (2009, p.12),
but in our case, this insight must be viewed in the light of the given passive fiscal
policy (%1 = 1.00). Thus, in our setting, we cannot confirm the result of Leeper
(1991) and Evans and Honkapohja (2007) that combinations of active monetary
policy and passive fiscal policy lead to determinacy in general (compare case (i)
in Table 2.1).
2.4.3.2 Extrapolative Expectations and Passive Fiscal Policy
Figure 2.3 displays the outcome for the case of extrapolative expectations (ι =
1.10) under passive fiscal policy.
Please note that Panel 2.3(a) by construction exactly matches Panel 2.2(a).
But once we put heterogeneity of expectations into action, the picture changes,
compared to the case of purely adaptive expectations.
Inspection of Panels 2.3(b) and 2.3(c) gives the impression that, with an in-
creasing fraction of extrapolative households, policies {φpi, φx̂}, that used to lead
to Order 1 Indeterminacy now may lead to Order 2 Indeterminacy. This effect of
extrapolative expectations has been documented by Branch and McGough (2009,
p.13) in their “Result 4”. Furthermore, policies that used to lead to determinate
outcomes may lead to indeterminacy of some order or locally explosive outcomes.
Thus, in our economy it is not a necessary condition for local explosiveness to
have the presence of both active monetary policy and active fiscal policy as in
Leeper (1991) and Evans and Honkapohja (2007). Compared to Branch and Mc-
Gough (2009, p.13) this is a new level of destabilization, as it is destabilizing in
a mathematical sense.
Moreover, again we observe that sticking to the Taylor principle and there-
fore following combinations of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy
can lead to Order 1 Indeterminacy, in contrast to Leeper (1991) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2007) (compare case (i) in Table 2.1).
Inspection of Panel 2.3(d) illustrates our finding that around α ≈ 0.60 the pic-
ture changes dramatically. The parameter space turns out to become a minefield,
where we can no longer distinguish closed regions of any type. Our observations
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.3: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness given extrapolative expectations and passive fiscal
policy.
from Panels 2.3(a) to 2.3(c) do no longer hold. In particular, sensitivity analyses
reveal that for α . 0.60 an increasing fraction of agents with extrapolative ex-
pectations appears to reduce regions of indeterminacy of some order but increase
locally explosive regions, which is a destabilizing effect.
2.4.3.3 Purely Adaptive Expectations and Active Fiscal Policy
No we draw attention to active fiscal policy (%1 = 0.50). In Figure 2.4 below we
find results for the case of purely adaptive expectations (ι = 0.90).
First of all, let us suspend non-rational households and focus on an economy
in which only households of type γ = 1 are present. We compare the dynamics
of our economy under passive fiscal policy as in Panel 2.2(a) with active fiscal
policy as exhibited in Panel 2.4(a).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.4: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness given purely adaptive expectations and active fiscal
policy.
Obviously the consequence of an active fiscal policy are not that dramatic.
We can only observe a relatively small increase in the set of policies {φpi, φx̂},
that lead to indeterminacy of some order and a decrease in the set of policies
{φpi, φx̂} that render the economy determinate. Thus, in our economy active
fiscal policies have a minor impact apart from any interaction with heterogeneous
expectations. Moreover, we once more observe the locally explosive region similar
to the situation of passive fiscal policy.
Most notably, a passive monetary / active fiscal policy regime in our economy
is unlikely to yield determinacy. This is not in line with the results of Leeper
(1991) and Evans and Honkapohja (2007) (compare case (ii) in Table 2.1) in their
model. In addition, we may also observe that the Taylor principle once more is
not a guarantee for determinacy.
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Now, what happens, once heterogeneity in expectations among households
comes into effect? A first observation in Panels 2.4(b) and Panel 2.4(c) is that
with an increasing fraction of purely adaptive agents, the region of Order 2 Inde-
terminacy is decreasing, while the region of Order 1 Indeterminacy and determi-
nacy is increasing. But, also the region of local explosiveness is increasing in the
fraction of purely adaptive agents. Thus, once more we find that the presence of
purely adaptive agents does not lead to more stability in a mathematical sense.
With regard to active fiscal policy we observe that both regions of indeter-
minacy and local explosiveness are larger relative to the region of determinacy
compared to the case of passive fiscal policy. Thus, active fiscal policy has a
destabilizing influence on the economy.
2.4.3.4 Extrapolative Expectations and Active Fiscal Policy
Finally, we turn to the case of extrapolative expectations in an economy with
active fiscal policy. Figure 2.5 provides the results.
Note that Panel 2.5(a) by construction has to match Panel 2.4(a).
Once heterogeneity is introduced, the pattern of Figure 2.3 is closely resem-
bled. On the one hand, with an increasing fraction of extrapolative households,
policies {φpi, φx̂} that used to lead to Order 1 Indeterminacy, may then lead to
Order 2 Indeterminacy and on the other hand, policies {φpi, φx̂} that used to lead
to determinate outcomes may then lead to Order 1 Indeterminacy. Moreover, we
once more observe a region of locally explosive outcomes that expands around
φpi ≈ 1.00.
In addition, when expectations of type γ = 2 households are extrapolative and
fiscal policy is active, regions of indeterminacy of some order are larger relative
to the region of determinacy compared to the case of passive fiscal policy.
In addition, the Taylor principle does not hold in general, as in the cases
before.
Finally, from Panel 2.5(d) we can again observe that around α ≈ 0.60 the
parameter space turns out to become a minefield. Once more, the observations
from Panels 2.5(a) to 2.5(c) do no longer hold. If α . 0.60 an increasing fraction
of agents with extrapolative expectations again reduces regions of indeterminacy
of some order but increases locally explosive regions. Thus, extrapolative expec-
tations seem to have a destabilizing effect.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.5: Regions of (in-)determinacy and explosiveness given extrapolative expectations and active fiscal
policy.
2.5 Conclusion
Our study sheds light on the ability of a central bank to ensure price stability given
interactions with fiscal policy as well as heterogeneous expectations of private
sector agents.
Thereby, we contribute to the advancements in economic modelling by setting
up a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations and monetary and
fiscal policy interaction. Moreover, in contrast to the previous literature, we
derive aggregate equilibrium conditions from the assumption of a decentralized
market.
The stability analysis reveals that the Taylor principle breaks down for policies
that respond exclusively to expected inflation by one or slightly more than one-
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for-one as we detect a region of local explosiveness in this area of the parameter
space. The size of the locally explosive region increases with an increasing fraction
of agents with non-RE expectations.
Remarkably, when agents with RE and purely adaptive expectations coex-
ist, the latter type of expectations does not have a stabilizing effect in general.
Moreover, when we replace purely adaptive expectations with extrapolative ex-
pectations, the latter expectations do not destabilize the economy in general.
Another important finding is that even under RE a passive monetary / active
fiscal policy regime is unlikely to yield determinacy which contradicts with the
fiscalist view.
Finally, it turns out that active fiscal policy reduces the set of policies that
yield price stability, but price stability remains feasible. Future research may
explore the dynamic responses of key variables to structural shocks under mone-
tary policy that yields price stability. A special emphasis should be given on the
model’s ability to qualitatively mimic stylized facts we observe in the data.
2.6 Appendices
2.6.1 Assumptions for the Subjective Expectations Oper-
ator
Note that the assumptions A1 to A7 are word by word the same as in Branch
and McGough (2009, p.3). We restate them for the convenience of the interested
reader.
A1. Expectations operators fix observables.
A2. If x is a variable forecasted by agents and has steady state x¯ then E1{x¯} =
E2{x¯} = x¯.
A3. If x, y, x+ y and χx are variables forecasted by agents then Eγt {(x+ y)} =
Eγt {x}+ Eγt {y} and Eγt {χx} = χEγt {x}.
A4. If for all k ≥ 0, xt+k and
∑∞
k=0 β
t+kxt+k are forecasted by agents, then
Eγt
{ ∞∑
k=0
βt+kxt+k
}
=
∞∑
k=0
βt+kEγt {xt+k}.
107
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations
A5. Eγt satisfies the law of iterated expectations: If x is a variable forecasted by
agents at time t and time t+ k then Eγt ◦ Eγt+k{x} = Eγt {x}.
A6. If x is a variable forecasted by agents at time t and time t+ k then
Eγt E
γ′
t+k{xt+k} = Eγt {xt+k}, γ 6= γ′.
A7. All agents have common expectations on expected differences in limiting
wealth.
2.6.2 Model Derivations
2.6.2.1 Logarithmic Approximation of Aggregate Real After-Tax In-
come
Here we follow DeJong and Dave (2007, p.13ff.). Consider an identity F1(Zt) =
F2(Zt). The operator F•(Zt) denotes a function of a vector of variables Zt. The
logarithmic approximation to such functions in general terms is
log[F1(elog(Zt))] ≈ log[F1(Z)] + ∂ log[F1(Z)]
∂ log[Zt]
[log(Zt)− log(Z)].
for the left-hand side and the same holds for the right-hand side F2(Zt). Now
lets turn to our result (2.4)
Ωt︸︷︷︸
F1(Zt)
= (1− TREt )Yt︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2(Zt)
log[Ωt] = log[(1− TREt )Yt]
log[elog(Ωt)] = log[elog((1−T
RE
t )Yt)],
and please note that in steady-state
Ω︸︷︷︸
F1(Z)
= (1− TRE)Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2(Z)
.
In our case the left-hand side is approximated by
log[elog(Ωt)] ' log[Ω] + 1
Ω
elog(Ω) 1 [log(Ωt)− log(Ω)]
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and the right-hand side is
log[elog((1−T
RE
t )Yt)] ' log[(1− TRE)Y ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=log[Ω]
+
(1− TRE) Y
(1− TRE)Y [log(Yt)− log(Y )]
+
−Y TRE
(1− TRE)Y [log(T
RE
t )− log(TRE)].
Equating the two approximations and recalling the definition log(Zt)− log(Z) =
zt − z = ẑt yields (2.5)
ω̂t = ŷt − T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t . (2.68)
2.6.2.2 Logarithmic Approximation of the Household Budget Con-
straint
Here again we follow DeJong and Dave (2007, p.13ff.). The household budget
constraint (2.7) is
Ct(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1(Zt)
=
Bt−1(i)
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t − Eγt {Qt,t+1}
Bt(i)
Pt
+ Ωγt − T︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2(Zt,Zt−1)
. (2.69)
Note that in steady-state
C =
B
P
Π−1 − βB
P
+ Ωγ − T, (2.70)
where we make use of assumption A2 as Eγt {Qt,t+1} in steady-state (as one can
see from the household Euler equation (2.8)) becomes β. One can take natural
logs and write (2.69) as
log[F1(elog(Zt))] = log[F2(elog(Zt,Zt−1))].
This is
log[elog(Ct(i))] = log[e
log(
Bt−1(i)
Pt−1 Π
−1
t−1,t) − elog(βE
γ
t
{(
Ct+1(i)
Ct(i)
)−σC Pt
Pt+1
}
Bt(i)
Pt
)
+elog(Ω
γ
t ) − elog(T )]. (2.71)
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The approximation to the left-hand side is
log[C] + 1 [log(Ct(i))− log(C)].
The same holds for the right-hand side. Thus we get
log[
B
P
Π−1 − βB
P
+ Ωγ] +
B/P
C
[log(
Bt−1(i)
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t)− log(
B
P
Π−1)]
− βB/P
C
[log(Eγt {
(
Ct+1(i)
Ct(i)
)−σC Pt
Pt+1
}Bt(i)
Pt
)
− log(
(
C
C
)−σC P
P
B
P
)]
+
Ωγ
C
[log(Ωγt )− log(Ωγ)]−
T
C
[log(T )− log(T )].
We can combine left-hand side and right-hand side approximations and apply the
definition log(Zt) − log(Z) = zt − z = ẑt as well as use (2.70) to eliminate Ωγ
which yields45
ĉt(i) =
B/P
C
[̂bt−1(i)− pit]− βB/P
C
[−σCEγt {ĉt+1(i)}+ σC ĉt(i)
+b̂t(i)− Eγt {pit+1}] +
[
(C + T )
C
− B/P
C
(1− β)
]
ω̂γt . (2.72)
We can rearrange terms and finally get (2.11)
ĉt(i) =
B/P
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂t−1(i)− pit
]
+
β(B/P )σC
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
Eγt {ĉt+1(i)}
− β(B/P )
[C + β(B/P )σC ]
[
b̂t(i)− Eγt {pit+1}
]
+
C + T − (B/P )(1− β)
C + β(B/P )σC
ω̂γt . (2.73)
45It is valid to split −σCEγt {4ĉt+1(i)} into −σCEγt {ĉt+1(i)}+σC ĉt(i) as every agent
knows his own period t choice and there is no need to forecast that. Otherwise assump-
tion A1 would not be satisfied.
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2.6.2.3 The Forward Iteration of Household Wealth
We derived
Ŵγt = Eγt {Ŵγt+1} −
1
σC
[it − Eγt {pit+1} − ρ] , (2.74)
which originally is
Eγt {Ŵγt } = Eγt {Ŵγt+1 −
1
σC
[it − pit+1 − ρ]}, (2.75)
but could be rewritten as (2.74) due to assumptions A1 and A3. One period
ahead (2.75) is
Eγt+1{Ŵγt+1} = Eγt+1{Ŵγt+2 −
1
σC
[it+1 − pit+2 − ρ]},
or
Ŵγt+1 = Eγt+1{Ŵγt+2} −
1
σC
[
it+1 − Eγt+1{pit+2} − ρ
]
, (2.76)
again applying assumptions A1 and A3. We can plug this into (2.74) and get
Ŵγt = Eγt {Eγt+1{Ŵγt+2} −
1
σC
[
it+1 − Eγt+1{pit+2} − ρ
]}
− 1
σC
[it − Eγt {pit+1} − ρ]
or
Ŵγt = Eγt {Eγt+1{Ŵγt+2}} −
1
σC
[
Eγt {it+1} − Eγt {Eγt+1{pit+2}} − ρ
]
− 1
σC
[it − Eγt {pit+1} − ρ] ,
where we used assumptions A1 and A3 again. Applying assumption A5 allows
us to write
Ŵγt = Eγt {Ŵγt+2} −
1
σC
[Eγt {it+1} − Eγt {pit+2} − ρ]
− 1
σC
[it − Eγt {pit+1} − ρ] . (2.77)
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Iteration of the steps that lead to (2.77) yield
Ŵγt = lim
k 7→∞
Eγt {Ŵγt+k+1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ŵγ∞
− 1
σC
∞∑
k=0
Eγt {[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]},
which we can write as (2.13)
Ŵγt = Ŵγ∞ −
1
σC
Eγt
{ ∞∑
k=0
[it+k − pit+k+1 − ρ]
}
due to assumption A4 and the definition of Ŵγ∞.
2.6.2.4 Logarithmic Approximation of Aggregate Price Level Dynam-
ics
We start from
1 = θ(Πt−1,t)−(1−) + (1− θ)(P
∗
t
Pt
)(1−), (2.78)
which might be written as
log[1] = log
[
elog(θ(Πt−1,t)
−(1−)) + e
log((1−θ)(P
∗
t
Pt
)(1−))
]
. (2.79)
The left-hand side of (2.79) is exactly 0 and the right-hand side’s approximation
is
' log
[
elog(θ(Π)
−(1−)) + elog((1−θ)(
P∗
P
)(1−))
]
+θ[log(θ(Πt−1,t)−(1−))− log(θ(Π)−(1−))]
+(1− θ)[log((1− θ)(P
∗
t
Pt
)(1−))− log((1− θ)(P
∗
P
)(1−))].
Consequently we achieve (2.14)
p̂∗t − p̂t =
θ
(1− θ)pit. (2.80)
112
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations
2.6.2.5 Logarithmic Approximation of the Firm’s FOC
We start from (2.20)
0 = Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σC
Π−1t,t+k Yt+k|t(i)×[
(1− TREt+k)
P ∗t (i)
Pt
−M Πt,t+k MCt+k|t(i)
]}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1(Zt+k,Zt)
. (2.81)
In steady-state, we can write this as
0 = (1− βθ)
[
(1− TRE)P
∗(i)
P
−M Π MC
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1(Z)
(2.82)
We now equate the left-hand side of (2.81) to a log-linear approximation of its
right-hand side
0 = log
[
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σC
Π−1t,t+k Yt+k|t(i)×[
e
log(
P∗t (i)
Pt
) − elog(TREt+k
P∗t (i)
Pt
) −Melog(Πt,t+kMCt+k|t(i))
]}]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1(elog(Zt+k),elog(Zt))
.
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The right-hand side can be approximated by
log[F1(Z)]
+
1
F1(Z) ×(
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k(1− βθ)elog(P
∗(i)
P
)[log
(
P ∗t (i)
Pt
)
− log
(
P ∗(i)
P
)
]
})
− 1F1(Z) ×(
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k(1− βθ)elog(TRE P
∗(i)
P
)[log
(
TREt+k
P ∗t (i)
Pt
)
− log
(
TRE
P ∗(i)
P
)
]
})
− 1F1(Z) ×(
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kM(1− βθ)elog(ΠMC)[log (Πt,t+kMCt+k|t(i))− log (ΠMC)]}) .
Combining left-hand side and approximation of right-hand side, using the fact
that P ∗(i) = P as well as applying the definition log(Zt)− log(Z) = zt − z = ẑt
yields
0 = (1− βθ)Êt{
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k ×[
(1− TRE)[p̂∗t (i)− p̂t]− TRE τ̂REt+k −MΠMC[pit,t+k + m̂ct+k|t(i)]
]}.
Inspecting (2.82) indicates MΠMC = (1− TRE) so we can divide by (1− TRE)
and bring p̂∗t (i) on the left-hand side and therefore a log-linearized version is
(2.21)
[p̂∗t (i)− p̂t] = (1− βθ)×
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k +
[
pit|t+k + m̂ct+k|t(i)
]]}
, (2.83)
where we make use of assumption A1.
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2.6.2.6 Logarithmic Approximation of the Tax Rule
The tax rule (2.23)
T + TREt Yt︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1(Zt)
=
[
%0 + %1
Bt−1
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t
]
Ψt︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2(Zt,Zt−1)
log[T + TREt Yt] = log[
[
%0 + %1
Bt−1
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t
]
Ψt]
log[elog(T ) + elog(T
RE
t Yt)] = log[elog(%0Ψt) + e
log(%1
Bt−1
Pt−1 Π
−1
t−1,tΨt)],
and please note that in steady-state
T + TREY︸ ︷︷ ︸
F1(Z)
=
[
%0 + %1
B
P
Π−1
]
Ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2(Z)
In our case the left-hand side is approximated by
log[elog(T ) + elog(T
RE
t Yt)] ' log[T + TREY ]
+
elog(T
REY )
(T + TREY )
[log(TREt Yt)− log(TREY )]
+
elog(T )
(T + TREY )
[log(T )− log(T )]
and the right-hand side yields
log[elog(%0Ψt) + e
log(%1
Bt−1
Pt−1 Π
−1
t−1,tΨt)] ' log[F2(Z)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=log[T+TREY ]
+
1
F2(Z) e
log(%0Ψ)[log(%0Ψt)− log(%0Ψ)]
+
1
F2(Z) e
log(%1
B
P
Π−1Ψ)[log(%1
Bt−1
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,tΨt)− log(%1
B
P
Π−1Ψ)]
Equating the two approximations and recalling the definition log(Zt)− log(Z) =
zt − z = ẑt yields (2.24)
τ̂REt =
B/P
TREY
%1 [̂bt−1 − pit]− ŷt + (T + T
REY )
TREY
Ψ̂t. (2.84)
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2.6.2.7 Logarithmic Approximation of the Government Budget Con-
straint
The government budget constraint in real terms is given by (2.22)
G︸︷︷︸
F1(Zt)
= Êt{Qt,t+1}Bt
Pt
+ TREt Yt + T −
Bt−1
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2(Zt,Zt−1)
(2.85)
Note that in steady-state
G︸︷︷︸
F1(Z)
= β
B
P
+ TREY + T − B
P
Π−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
F2(Z)
where we make use of assumption A2 as Êt{Qt,t+1} in steady-state (as one can
see from the household Euler equation (2.8)) becomes β. One can take natural
logs and write (2.85) as
log[elog(G)] = log[e
log(βÊt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σC Pt
Pt+1
}
Bt
Pt
)
+ elog(T
RE
t Yt) + elog(T )
−elog
(
Bt−1
Pt−1 Π
−1
t−1,t
)
]
The approximation to the left-hand side is
log[G] +
1
G
elog(G)1 [log(G)− log(G)].
The same holds for the right-hand side. Thus we get
log[F2(Z)] + 1F2(Z)e
log(βB
P
)1 [log(βÊt
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σC Pt
Pt+1
}
Bt
Pt
)
− log(β
(
C
C
)−σC P
P
B
P
)]
+
1
F2(Z)e
log(TREY )1 [log(TREt Yt)− log(TREY )]
− 1F2(Z)e
log(BP Π−1)1 [log
(
Bt−1
Pt−1
Π−1t−1,t
)
− log
(
B
P
Π−1
)
].
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We can combine left-hand side and right-hand side approximations and apply the
definition log(Zt)− log(Z) = zt− z = ẑt and finally get to equation (2.25), which
is46
b̂t − Êt{pit+1} = σCÊt{ĉt+1} − σC ĉt + 1
β
(̂bt−1 − pit)− T
REY
βB
P
(τ̂REt + ŷt). (2.86)
2.6.2.8 Logarithmic Approximation of the Goods Market Clearing
Condition
The goods market clearing condition (2.28)
Yt = Ct +G
might be written as
log[elog(Yt)] = log[elog(Ct) + elog(G)],
The left-hand side of (2.87) is approximated by
log[elog(Yt)] ' log[Y ] + 1
Y
elog(Y ) 1 [log(Yt)− log(Y )]
and similarly the right-hand side’s approximation is
log[elog(Ct) + elog(G)] ' log[C +G]
+
1
C +G
elog(C) 1 [log(Ct)− log(C)]
+
1
C +G
elog(G) 1 [log(G)− log(G)].
Consequently we achieve (2.29)
ŷt =
C
Y
ĉt. (2.87)
46Splitting σCÊt{4ĉt+1} into σCÊt{ĉt+1} − σC ĉt is valid as we assume that the
government observes period t aggregate consumption. Otherwise assumption A1 is not
satisfied.
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2.6.2.9 Logarithmic Approximation of the Bonds Market Clearing
Condition
The bonds market clearing condition (2.28) in real terms is
Bt
Pt
= χ
B1t
Pt
+ (1− χ)B
2
t
Pt
and might be written as
log[e
log(
Bt
Pt
)
] = log[χe
log(
B1t
Pt
)
+ (1− χ)elog(
B2t
Pt
)
].
The left-hand side of (2.88) is approximated by
log[e
log(
Bt
Pt
)
] ' log[B
P
] +
1
B
P
elog(
B
P
) 1 [log(
Bt
Pt
)− log(B
P
)]
and similarly the right-hand side’s approximation is
log[χe
log(
B1t
Pt
)
+ (1− χ)elog(
B2t
Pt
)
] ' log[B
P
]
+
1
B
P
χelog(
B1
P
) 1 [log(
B1t
Pt
)− log(B
1
P
)]
+
1
B
P
(1− χ)elog(B
2
P
) 1 [log(
B2t
Pt
)− log(B
2
P
)].
Recognize assumption A2 which implies that beliefs of agents, no matter what
type, coincide in steady-state. Consequently all agents will hold the same amount
of bonds, that is
B = χB1 + (1− χ)B1 = χB2 + (1− χ)B2 = B1 = B2.
By making use of this fact we achieve (2.31)
b̂t = χb̂
1
t + (1− χ)̂b2t . (2.88)
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2.6.2.10 The Forward Iteration of the Firm’s FOC
Starting with (2.39)
p̂∗t (i)− p̂t = (1− βθ)Êt{
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k ×[
Θ
(
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k + m̂ct+k
)
+
βθ
(1− βθ)pit+k+1
]
},
where Θ ≡ (1−α)
1+α(−1) ≤ 1, we know that by assumption A1 this comes from
Êt {p̂∗t (i)− p̂t} = (1− βθ)Êt{
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k ×[
Θ
(
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k + m̂ct+k
)
+
βθ
(1− βθ)pit+k+1
]
}.
(2.89)
One period ahead, that is t+ 1, this becomes
Êt+1
{
p̂∗t+1(i)− p̂t+1
}
= (1− βθ)Êt+1{
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k ×
[Θ
(
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k+1 + m̂ct+k+1
)
+
βθ
(1− βθ)pit+k+2]}
or
βθÊt+1
{
p̂∗t+1(i)− p̂t+1
}
= (1− βθ)×
Êt+1
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k+1
[
Θ
(
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k+1 + m̂ct+k+1
)
+
βθ
(1− βθ)pit+k+2
]}
,
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where we multiplied both sides with (βθ) in the latter expression. We can evaluate
this expression with time t expectations Êt {•} and apply assumption A5 to get
βθÊt
{
p̂∗t+1(i)− p̂t+1
}
= (1− βθ)×
Êt
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k+1
[
Θ
(
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t+k+1 + m̂ct+k+1
)
+
βθ
(1− βθ)pit+k+2
]}
.
(2.90)
Now we can subtract (2.90) from (2.89), where we make use of assumption A4,
which leaves us with
p̂∗t (i)− p̂t = (1− βθ)Êt
{[
Θ
(
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + m̂ct
)
+
βθ
(1− βθ)pit+1
]}
+βθÊt
{
p̂∗t+1(i)− p̂t+1
}
.
When we apply assumptions A1 and A3 we finally arrive at the difference equa-
tion (2.40)
p̂∗t (i)− p̂t = (1− βθ)Θ
[
TRE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t + m̂ct
]
+ βθÊt {pit+1}
+βθÊt
{
p̂∗t+1(i)− p̂t+1
}
.
2.6.2.11 Logarithmic Approximation of the Optimality Condition Un-
der Flexible Prices
The optimality condition under flexible prices is (2.44)
Wt
Pt
=
(1− TREt )
M (1− α)AtN
−α
t .
We can equivalently write this as
log[e
log(
Wt
Pt
)
] = log[
(1− α)
M (e
log(AtN
−α
t ) − elog(TREt AtN−αt ))], (2.91)
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The left-hand side of (2.91) is approximated by
log[e
log(
Wt
Pt
)
] ' log[W
P
] +
1
W
P
elog(
W
P
) 1 [log(
Wt
Pt
)− log(W
P
)]
and similarly the right-hand side’s approximation is
log[
(1− α)
M (e
log(AtN
−α
t ) − elog(TREt AtN−αt ))] ' log[(1− TRE)(1− α)M AN
−α]
+
1
[(1− TRE) (1−α)M AN−α]
(1− α)elog(AN−α)
M [log(AtN
−α
t )− log(AN−α)]
− 1
[(1− TRE) (1−α)M AN−α]
(1− α)elog(TREAN−α)
M ×
[
log(TREt AtN
−α
t )− log(TREAN−α)
]
.
Combining the two approximations yields (2.45)
ŵt − p̂t = at − αn̂t − T
RE
(1− TRE) τ̂
RE
t . (2.92)
2.6.3 A Comparison of Two Solution Methods
In this section we compare the eigenvalues of the system matrix M in Branch
and McGough (2009, p.11ff.) derived according to the methodology of Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) to GEVs according to the methodology of Klein (2000) for the
same system matrix M. We twice demonstrate the methodology of Klein (2000),
first, we do not account for complex eigenvalues, whereas for the second time we
do account for complex eigenvalues. M is given by
M =

αβ
α2β−αβχy
σ
+
λ(α−χpi)
σ
(
α2β−αβχy
σ
) − α−χpi
σ
(
α2β−αβχy
σ
) − (1−α)αβθ2
α2β−αβχy
σ
(1−α)βθ2(α−χpi)
σ
(
α2β−αβχy
σ
) − (1−α)αβθ2
σ
(
α2β−αβχy
σ
)
− λ
(
α−χy
σ
)
α2β−αβχy
σ
α−χy
σ
α2β−αβχy
σ
0
(1−α)βθ2
(χy
σ
−α
)
α2β−αβχy
σ
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
,
where all symbols in this appendix are the same as in Branch and McGough
(2009, p.11ff.) and the calibration in what follows is also identical with their
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study as listed in Table 2.3 below.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
θ 0.900 α 1.000
σ 0.157 λ 0.024
β 0.9900 φ 6.3694
Table 2.3: Calibration of structural parameters for the appendix.
In order to be precise, we only reproduce the north-west Panel of Branch and
McGough (2009, p.12)’s Figure 1 for both methodologies. The result is displayed
Figure 2.6 below.
(a) (In-)determinacy regions result-
ing from the methodology of Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980).
(b) (In-)determinacy regions result-
ing from the methodology of Klein
(2000) without accounting for com-
plex eigenvalues.
(c) (In-)determinacy regions result-
ing from the methodology of Klein
(2000), accounting for complex
eigenvalues.
Figure 2.6: Reproduction of the results of the north-west Panel of Branch and McGough (2009, p.12)’s Figure
1.
First of all, 2.6(a) reproduces the north-west Panel of Branch and McGough
(2009, p.12)’s Figure 1. Second the regions of Order 2 Indeterminacy of Pan-
els 2.6(a) and 2.6(b) coincide (black region) . Third and more important, the
regions of Determinacy (light grey region) of Panels 2.6(a) and 2.6(b) do not
coincide. The same is true for the regions of Order 1 Indeterminacy (dark grey
region). Once we account for complex eigenvalues, that is Panel 2.6(c), the pic-
ture changes. We can again exactly reproduce the north-west Panel of Branch
and McGough (2009, p.12)’s Figure 1, as our Panels 2.6(a) and 2.6(c) coincide.
Please be aware that in an economy with fully rational agents only (α = 1.00),
122
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World with Heterogeneous Expectations
the matrix M becomes
M =

β
β− βχy
σ
+
λ(1−χpi)
σ
(
β− βχy
σ
) − 1−χpi
σ
(
β− βχy
σ
) 0 0
−λ
(
1−χy
σ
)
β− βχy
σ
1−χy
σ
β− βχy
σ
0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
 .
This is equivalent to
M =
[
B−1 0 0
0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
,
where matrix B in this case is the same as in Section 3.3 of Bullard and Mitra
(2002, p.1121ff.). In addition the calibrations of Bullard and Mitra (2002) and
Branch and McGough (2009) coincide. In consequence the NW Panel in Figure
1 of Branch and McGough (2009, p.12) is an extract of Figure 3 of Bullard and
Mitra (2002, p.1123). One can observe, that the region of Order 2 Indeterminacy
in Branch and McGough (2009, p.12) is E-unstable in Bullard and Mitra (2002,
p.1123) and the regions of Order 1 Indeterminacy and determinacy in Branch
and McGough (2009, p.12) are E-stable in Bullard and Mitra (2002, p.1123).
Logically the question arises, how the concepts of indeterminacy of some order
and E-stability are related?
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Chapter 3
Anticipation, Learning and
Welfare: the Case of
Distortionary Taxation
3.1 Motivation
Nowadays, fiscal policy is usually accompanied by legislation and implementation
lags. These lags create a non-negligible span of time between the announcement
and effective date of a fiscal policy change. This gives individuals in the economy
the opportunity to anticipate the tax changes. The economic literature denotes
this aspect of fiscal policy either anticipated fiscal policy or fiscal foresight. From
our reading, those two terms are equivalents and will be used as such.1
When agents anticipate, their resulting actions may to some extent depend
on the way they form expectations about the future. The standard assumption
of expectations in economics is perfect-foresight / rational expectations (RE).
This assumption might be questioned. One prominent deviation of RE that
imposes weaker requirements on the agent’s information set when making his
decisions, is the learning literature (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for the
1Recently Leeper (2009, p.11ff.) has listed empirical evidence for fiscal foresight
and reemphasized the relevance of expectations for sound fiscal policy. Furthermore,
Leeper et al. (2009) is another good example of empirical evidence of fiscal foresight.
Therein they also demonstrate the challenges for econometricians that aim to quantify
the impact of fiscal policy actions and at the same time account adequately for fiscal
foresight.
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foundations of this approach). The main idea is that agents form expectations
about future values of variables they cannot observe by engaging in a kind of
statistical inference when making their economic choices.
Although the learning approach has gained significant popularity in some
areas of macroeconomics, anticipated fiscal policy has, until recently, been ne-
glected. A pioneering contribution to studying the consequences of anticipated
fiscal policy when agents learn factor prices, has been made by Evans et al.
(2009). They demonstrate the adaptive constant gain learning approach in sev-
eral deterministic economic environments, taking changes in lump-sum taxation
as an example. The choice of a constant gain therein is motivated by the fact
that fiscal policy moves may state structural change. First Evans et al. (2009,
p.932ff.) consider permanent, temporary and repeated tax changes in an endow-
ment economy with a balanced-budget policy. The core message of their results is
that under learning, anticipated fiscal policy changes have instant effects on key
variables as in the perfect foresight case, but the transition paths are remarkably
different from the latter. This result, at least with regard to the volatility of key
variables’ time paths may not come as a surprise. It is well known that constant
gain learning causes excess volatility compared to the case of RE (see Evans
and Honkapohja (2001, p.49) for an illustration). Thereafter, Evans et al. (2009,
p.941ff.) turn attention to the scenario of debt financing of anticipated fiscal
policy changes and find that, given agents understand the structure of govern-
ment financing, the so-called “near Ricardian equivalence” holds under learning.
Finally, Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) introduce the adaptive learning approach
to the basic Ramsey model. For an anticipated balanced-budget permanent tax
change they once more confirm that under learning the time paths of key variables
are strikingly different from their perfect foresight counterparts.
In subsequent work, Evans et al. (2010) focus on Ricardian equivalence in
the basic Ramsey model with anticipated fiscal policy under learning. Most
important, Evans et al. (2010, p.8ff.) formally proof that the assumption of RE
is not necessary for the classic Ricardian equivalence result. Furthermore, Evans
et al. (2010, p.10ff.) provide new departures from the Ricardian equivalence
proposition. First, if government expenditures are endogenous, i.e. depend on
a fiscal rule, then Ricardian equivalence holds only under RE but fails under
learning. Second, Ricardian equivalence breaks down, if the expected interest
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rates depend on changes in the level of public debt.
Building on the contribution of Evans et al. (2009), we aim to generalize their
analysis of anticipated fiscal policy under learning into an economy featuring
distortionary taxes and elastic labour supply. More specifically, we derive the
dynamic paths of key variables for permanent changes in distortionary taxes in a
deterministic version of the prominent Ramsey model. In particular we consider
permanent changes in distortionary labour income, capital income and consump-
tion tax in turn. In addition, we examine more sophisticated fiscal policy reforms,
in the presence of several tax instruments. There are fundamental differences be-
tween lump-sum taxation and distortionary taxation: a labour income tax under
inelastic labour supply does not affect household margins and therefore causes
no distortion, but under elastic labour supply the labour income tax affects the
intra-temporal choice between consumption and leisure of the household and may
cause an intra-temporal distortion. Next, a capital income tax has the poten-
tial to cause up to two types of distortion. First, the capital income tax in any
case affects the inter-temporal household Euler equation. In case of elastic labour
supply, the capital income tax also affects the intra-temporal choice between con-
sumption and leisure of the household due to its distortion of the consumption
choice. Finally, a consumption tax may also cause an inter-temporal distortion
by affecting the household Euler equation, but there is an important difference
compared to capital income taxation. The consumption tax affects the price of
consumption in both periods considered in the household Euler equation whereas
the capital income tax always affects only the price of next period’s consumption
in the household Euler equation. Loosely speaking, a consumption tax can distort
consumption and investment decision via the household’s Euler equation, only
when it is changed, i.e. time-varying, whereas a capital income tax always causes
distortions in the Ramsey economy. Thus, we may expect that the dynamics of
the economy for a capital income tax reform may be fundamentally different from
the economic dynamics for a consumption tax reform.2
Furthermore, the assumption of elastic labour supply implies that endogenous
variables such as factor prices as well as employment and consumption are not
predetermined as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) or in Evans et al. (2010), but
2Note that a consumption tax may also be a desirable subject of study, as it has
special stability properties. See Giannitsarou (2007) for the details.
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determined simultaneously in each period.
Next to the analytical derivations, we also calibrate our model and calculate
welfare consequences for several policy experiments under perfect foresight as well
as under learning. For this purpose, we make use of the welfare measure proposed
by Lucas (1990) and also applied by Cooley and Hansen (1992) (for discrete
time), which takes into account the whole transition path between the initial and
new steady-states associated with initial and changed tax rate. Thus, putting it
differently, we ask, to what extent the excess volatility caused by constant gain
learning affects the well-being of households compared to the perfect foresight
case. Using such a measure of welfare consequences, may even allow comparison
of results for learning dynamics to previous studies such as Lucas (1990), Cooley
and Hansen (1992) or Garcia-Mila` et al. (2010). All these studies evaluate and
rank various distortionary tax reforms according to their welfare consequences
under perfect foresight.
Our main results are as follows. When we assume that agents use adaptive
learning rules to forecast factor prices, our model predicts oscillatory dynamic
responses to anticipated permanent tax changes. Unfortunately we cannot isolate
an exclusive source of the oscillatory dynamics. Sensitivity analyses suggest that
there are at least two sources. In addition, policy experiments indicate that these
volatile responses may have a major impact on the welfare consequences of tax
reforms. In particular we consider experiments that improve welfare but do so to
a much lower extent under learning compared to perfect foresight.
Note that our approach links the learning literature to that part of the public
finance literature that is concerned with the welfare consequences of different
types of taxation. See Chamley (1981) for an example of a comparative statics
analysis or Judd (1987) for differences in unanticipated and anticipated changes
in factor taxes. In addition, there have been studies in stochastic set-ups, like
Cooley and Hansen (1992). With regard to the implementation of anticipated
optimal fiscal policy an example is Domeij and Klein (2005) or its extension
for public goods and capital by Trabandt (2007). Moreover, Garcia-Mila` et al.
(2010) have recently conducted research on welfare consequences of fiscal policy
experiments in the spirit of Cooley and Hansen (1992) in a heterogeneous agents
model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we outline
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the economic model, derive optimality conditions and detail our approach of
learning. Section 3.3 compares the dynamics with and without elastic labour
supply for the case of lump-sum tax changes. This section also provides sensitivity
analysis for some structural parameters. In Section 3.4 we consider changes in
distortionary taxation and compare the resulting dynamics to the case of lump-
sum taxation. The last part of this section contains the welfare analysis of selected
policy experiments. Section 3.5 concludes and points out directions for further
research.
3.2 The Model
Our economy is a version of the Ramsey economy outlined in detail in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2000, p.305ff.). The capital stock kt evolves according to the
economy-wide resource constraint
kt+1 = F (kt, nt)− ct − gt + (1− δ)kt, (3.1)
where F (kt, nt) is the economy’s production function (equalling output) showing
that the firm sector uses capital kt and labour nt as inputs to produce the single
good of the economy (see Section 3.2.2 for the details). Output can either be
consumed by households (ct) or the government (gt) or added to the capital
stock. Capital is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate δ.
3.2.1 Households
With regard to the household sector, we assume a continuum of households,
where we normalize the size of the economy to unity and each household faces
the problem
max
ct,nt
E∗t
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(ct) + η log(L¯− nt)
]}
(3.2)
s.t.
kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
+ (1 + τ ct )ct = (1− τ lt )wtnt + (1− τ kt )rtkt + (1− δ)kt
+bt − τt + pit, (3.3)
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where all variables are in per capita terms. Thus, the variable kt+1 denotes the
level of capital in period t + 1 and bt+1 is the level of government debt holdings
chosen in period t. Furthermore, rt is the rental rate of capital and Rt is the
gross real interest rate in period t. The level of consumption chosen in period t
is indicated by ct. Next, τ
•
t denotes a distortionary tax either on consumption,
labour income or capital income3. The real wage in period t is given by wt and
lt = L¯−nt denotes leisure. In consequence, nt is labour supply of the household.
τt is a per capita lump-sum tax and pit = 0 is the profit under perfect competition.
Furthermore, the parameter η ≥ 0 measures the elasticity of labour supply.
E∗t {•} denotes subjective period t expectations for future values of variables.
Households apply this operator, if they do not have perfect foresight. This as-
sumption is commonly used in the learning literature. Furthermore, note that we
abstract from aggregate uncertainty, i.e. we conduct our analysis in a determinis-
tic economy. Thus, if households do not have perfect foresight, their expectations
are so-called point expectations, i.e. agents base their economic choices on the
mean of their expectations, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.61). In Section
3.2.4 below we outline our concept of learning. An important aspect of this
concept is that forecasts of single variables are independent of each other. In
consequence, we can assume that for any two variables X and Y it is true that
E∗t {XY } = E∗t {X}E∗t {Y } holds.
Now, we detail the household’s decisions. Each household solves the La-
grangian
L = E∗t
∞∑
t=0
βt{log(ct) + η log(L¯− nt)
−λt[kt+1 + bt+1
Rt
+ (1 + τ ct )ct − (1− τ lt )wtnt − (1− τ kt )rtkt − (1− δ)kt
−bt + τt]}
3We use the symbol • as a placeholder throughout our analysis.
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with first-order conditions
∂L
∂ct
: βt
{
c−1t − λt(1 + τ ct )
} !
= 0 (3.4)
∂L
∂kt+1
: βt {−λt}+ βt+1E∗t
{
λt+1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ kt+1)rt+1
]} !
= 0 (3.5)
∂L
∂bt+1
: βt
{−λtR−1t }+ βt+1E∗t {λt+1} != 0 (3.6)
∂L
∂nt
: βt
{−η(L¯− nt)−1 − λt[−(1− τ lt )wt]} != 0. (3.7)
From (3.4) and (3.6) we get the household Euler condition
c−1t = βRtE
∗
t
{
c−1t+1
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ ct+1)
}
, (3.8)
(3.5) and (3.6) yield the no-arbitrage condition for capital and bonds
Rt =
[
(1− δ) + (1− E∗t
{
τ kt+1
}
)E∗t {rt+1}
]
, (3.9)
and from (3.4) and (3.7) we get the consumption leisure trade-off
nt = L¯− η(1 + τ
c
t )ct
(1− τ lt )wt
. (3.10)
3.2.2 Firms
In our economy, there is a unit continuum of firms who compete perfectly. Each
firm in each period t rents capital at given price rt and labour at given price
wt and produces the numeraire good with constant returns to scale production
function
yt = F (kt, nt)
yt = Ak
α
t n
(1−α)
t , (3.11)
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where α ∈ (0, 1). The optimal firm behaviour requires that
rt
!
=
∂yt
∂kt
= Aαkα−1t n
1−α
t , (3.12)
as well as
wt
!
=
∂yt
∂nt
= A(1− α)kαt n−αt , (3.13)
i.e. each production factor earns its marginal product. Finally, we have the per
capita national income identity
yt = rtkt + wtnt,
pit = yt − rtkt − wtnt = 0, (3.14)
which means zero profits, as one can expect from perfect competition.
3.2.3 Government
The government finances its expenses on goods and debt repayment by tax rev-
enues and the issuance of new bonds in each period t
gt + bt = τ
c
t ct + τ
l
twtnt + τ
k
t rtkt + τt +
bt+1
Rt
.
For the remainder, we will assume that the government operates a balanced-
budget rule in each period t, thus tax revenues will fully cover expenses such that
bonds are in zero net supply as a direct consequence. Thus the government sets
gt, τ
c
t , τ
l
t , τ
k
t and τt constrained by
gt = τ
c
t ct + τ
l
twtnt + τ
k
t rtkt + τt (3.15)
in each period t.
3.2.4 Learning
Now, we aim to detail our concept of learning that was elaborated in Evans et al.
(2009, p.943ff.). For completeness we restate the crucial assumptions on learning.
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Under learning, households are supposed to know the entire history of endogenous
variables. They observe the current period value of exogenous variables and they
know the state variables. Furthermore, they know the structure of the economy
with regard to the fiscal policy sector. Agents understand the implications of
the announced policy change for the government budget constraint. They are
also convinced that the intertemporal government budget constraint will always
hold (see Evans et al. (2009, p.944)). Agents then forecast factor prices such as
interest rates and wages ret+j(t), w
e
t+j(t), j ≥ 1, by making use of constant-gain
steady-state adaptive learning rules4
ret+j(t) = r
e(t) and wet+j(t) = w
e(t), (3.16)
where
re(t) = re(t− 1) + γ(rt−1 − re(t− 1))
(3.17)
we(t) = we(t− 1) + γ(wt−1 − we(t− 1)),
where 0 < γ ≤ 1 is the gain parameter.5 Our choice of this specific learn-
ing rule is motivated by two well known arguments in the learning literature.
First, as Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.332) outline, choosing a constant gain
learning rule is the appropriate choice for agents, when they are aware of struc-
tural change, as in such a learning rule agents discount past data exponen-
tially. Note that rules (3.17) are equivalent to re(t) = γ
∑∞
i=0(1 − γ)irt−i−1 and
we(t) = γ
∑∞
i=0(1 − γ)iwt−i−1. Second, the timing of the learning rule, i.e. that
agents’ update in period t uses data up to period t − 1, is chosen in order to
avoid simultaneity between re(t) and rt as well as w
e(t) and wt (see for example
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.51)). Think of simultaneity in this context as a
4Here we apply the same short-hand notation as Evans et al. (2009). Thus for any
variable say z, its period t expected future value in period t+ j derived by a learning
rule may either be denoted E∗t {zt+j} or equivalently zet+j(t). An additional notation
we introduce is zpt+j(t) which denotes the agent’s planned choice of the variable z in
period t+ j based on expected values formed via the learning rule in period t.
5The gain parameter measures the responsiveness of the forecast to new observa-
tions, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.18). Be aware that in our model the gain
parameter is exogenous. See Branch and Evans (2007) for a recent example where
agents can choose the gain parameter.
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situation in which agents’ expectations affect current values of aggregate endoge-
nous variables and vice versa, which may potentially introduce some strategic
behaviour.
Such a learning rule yields a sequence of so-called temporary equilibria, which
consist of sequences of (planned) time paths for all endogenous variables. These
sequences satisfy the learning rule above, the expectation history, household and
firm optimality conditions, the government budget constraint and the economy-
wide resource constraint given the exogenous variables as well as the current stock
of capital in each period. These plans are revisited and potentially altered in each
period after expectations have been updated.
3.3 Base Case: Lump-Sum Tax
Before pursuing our core issue, i.e. the case of distortionary taxation, we would
like to illustrate the applied methodology for the case of lump-sum taxation for
two reasons: first, we want to illustrate the consequences of the introduction of
elastic labour supply compared to the case of inelastic labour supply as assumed
in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) and its effect on the dynamic paths of the key
variables such as consumption and capital, given their calibration (see Table 3.1
below); second, below in Subsection 3.3.2, we aim to present a sensitivity analysis
for the very basic version of the model under examination.
Let us now derive the dynamic paths under learning for an anticipated lump-
sum tax change. Consequently we assume all other types of taxation away, i.e.
τ ct = τ
l
t = τ
k
t = 0. The Euler equation (3.8) is standard
c−1t = β(c
p
t+1(t))
−1 [(1− δ) + ret+1(t)]
and forward substitution of this yields
cpt+j(t) = β
jDet,t+j(t)ct, (3.18)
where we define Det,t+j(t) ≡ Πji=1[(1− δ) + ret+i(t)]. One can think of this term as
“expectations of the interest rate factor Dt,t+j at time t” (see Evans et al. (2009,
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p.933)). Next, we notice that the consumption leisure trade-off in this case is
nt = L¯− ηct
wt
. (3.19)
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital
lim
T 7→∞
(
Det,t+T (t)
)−1
kpt+T+1(t) = 0, (3.20)
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
cpt+j(t) = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtnt − τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
[
wet+j(t)n
p
t+j(t)− τ et+j(t)
]
,
which by the virtue of (3.18) and (3.19) yields
ct
(1 + η)
(1− β) = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯− τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡SW1
−
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ST1
. (3.21)
Equations (3.12) and (3.13) hold for firms. Finally, government faces the con-
straint
gt = τt (3.22)
in each period t and the economy-wide resource constraint is given by (3.1).
We now need to think about the policy experiment we will study. We are
looking at a scenario of a credible permanent change in taxes announced at the
outset of period t = 1 and effective from period t = Tp onwards. In particular a
tax change from τ0 to τ1 at some point in time Tp. The dynamics under perfect
foresight are standard.6 Under learning we can directly follow Evans et al. (2009,
6Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, p.305ff.) illustrate the analytical derivations and
numerical simulation alternatives for the perfect foresight case. We will simply make
use of the DYNARE toolbox throughout all calculations to compute dynamics under
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p.943ff.). The crucial step is to calculate the infinite sums on the right-hand side
of (3.21), i.e. SW1 and ST1. Directly following the appendix in Evans et al.
(2009, p.951ff.) we calculate
SW1 =
we(t)L¯
re(t)− δ . (3.23)
With regard to ST1, we have
7
ST1 =
τ0
re(t)− δ + (τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 (3.24)
for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
ST1 =
τ1
re(t)− δ . (3.25)
for t ≥ Tp. From (3.21) follows that we have
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
{[(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯− τ0 + w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ
− τ0
re(t)− δ − (τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1} (3.26)
for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
[
[(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯− τ1 + w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ −
τ1
re(t)− δ
]
(3.27)
for t ≥ Tp. Given a calibration, we can then compute the dynamics of consump-
tion and other endogenous variables.
3.3.1 Inelastic Labour Supply vs. Elastic Labour Supply
We believe that it is of importance to use a model that features elastic labour sup-
ply in order to calculate welfare implications of fiscal policy reforms adequately.
Completely inelastic labour supply is a quite unrealistic assumption itself and at
least some moderately elastic labour supply should be considered. Moreover, it
perfect foresight. Note that this toolbox employs linearization methods.
7See Appendix 3.6.1.2 for details on derivations.
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implies that agents’ choices of current period endogenous variables are in fact pre-
determined as is pointed out in Evans et al. (2009, p.944). In order to illustrate
differences in the dynamics of endogenous variables based on the assumption of
inelastic and elastic labour supply, we return to the simulation exercise of Evans
et al. (2009, p.943ff.). Note that τ ct = τ
l
t = τ
k
t = δ = 0 and η = 0 imply that
nt = L¯ (i.e. inelastic labour supply) for all t (see equation (3.19)). Therefore, we
are exactly in the same scenario as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.). Although we
do not fully agree with the calibration of Evans et al. (2009), we will stick to their
calibration in this subsection to keep our results comparable. We will indicate,
when we deviate from their calibration. The basic reason for this disagreement is
the combination of parameters β = 0.95 and Tp = 20. These parameter choices
imply that a government, which in reality is usually in charge of a legislation pe-
riod of four to six years, may announce a tax policy change that will be effective
in 20 years’ time. From our perception of political execution and our confidence
in fiscal policy makers’ ability to commit, this appears to be unrealistic in most
cases. Nevertheless, we would like to mention, that in all the subsequent numeri-
cal illustrations of our analytical derivations, we experienced severe difficulties in
finding calibrations that could yield convergence for the dynamics under learning.
Our experience is, that it is quite a difficult task, to perfectly calibrate the model
to empirically estimated structural parameters and achieve convergence, at least
with the numerical methods, we have at our disposal.
For the moment, we calibrate the model according to Table 3.1 below. The
Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 20
β 0.95 γ 0.10
Table 3.1: Parameters similar as in Evans et al. (2009, p.945)
policy experiment considered in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) is a permanent
increase in government purchases from g0 = τ0 = 0.9 to g1 = τ1 = 1.1 that is
announced credibly in period t = 1 and will be effective from period Tp = 20
onwards. It is assumed that the economy is in steady-state in period t = 0.
Simulations in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for consumption and capital are
recalculated (with η = 0, L¯ = 0.5182) and displayed in Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b)
below. Furthermore, Figures 3.1(c) and 3.1(d) exhibit the dynamics for elastic
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labour supply with η = 2.00 and L¯ = 1.00, values that match n0 = 0.5182 and
g0 = 0.9 in this set-up.
8
Two distinct features emerge from Figure 3.1. First, when we compare the
dynamic paths of consumption (as well as capital) under perfect foresight and
learning, they are different from each other no matter with or without elastic
labour supply. Therefore, it may be quite important to consider learning when
evaluating fiscal policies as learning is a more realistic assumption of human be-
haviour from our point of view.9 Second, obviously the learning paths in Figures
3.1(a) and 3.1(b) for inelastic labour supply are strikingly different to the ones
under elastic labour supply in Figures 3.1(c) and 3.1(d). In particular, elastic
labour supply yields much more volatility in the time paths of consumption and
capital (as well as other variables in the model) compared to the inelastic labour
supply case. In fact, the variables oscillate around their steady-state until they
converge to it. This implies, that the tax reforms may have different welfare
implications in an economy with elastic labour supply, when one compares the
case of perfect foresight against the case of learning.
From our point of view, possible reasons for the significant differences in the
dynamics under learning between elastic and inelastic labour supply could be
as follows. Consider agents’ behaviour under perfect foresight. Agents fix their
current and future choices once and for all. They do not form expectations about
current and future factor prices. Second, agents without perfect foresight forecast
current period factor prices in each period. Therefore, they make an update of
their expectations of factor prices. Thereby agents also make an expectational
error. Based on their updated expectations of factor prices they revise current and
planned future choices of variables in each period. In addition, actual factor prices
in that period are determined based on the agents updated expectations of factor
prices. Be aware that the first and the second point above are true for inelastic
labour supply as well as elastic labour supply. So the learning itself cannot
explain the differences in the dynamics. Furthermore, note that with inelastic
labour supply, factor prices are predetermined, whereas with elastic labour supply
factor prices are free variables. Moreover, with elastic labour supply, households
8Note that n0 = 0.5182 corresponds to 12.44 hours per day. This appears to be
quite unrealistic, but we choose those numbers in order to achieve both comparable
magnitudes in Figure 3.1 below as well as convergence under learning.
9This is the core result of Evans et al. (2009).
138
Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the Case of Distortionary Taxation
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.4
t
 
 
Perfect Foresight
Learning
(a) Consumption
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
t
 
 
Perfect Foresight
Learning
(b) Capital
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.4
0.42
t
 
 
Perfect Foresight
Learning
(c) Consumption with elastic nt
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
t
 
 
Perfect Foresight
Learning
(d) Capital with elastic nt
Figure 3.1: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed
curve) with inelastic labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) as well as consumption (c) and
capital (d) dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve) with elastic
labour supply. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line
indicates period Tp.
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can react to structural changes by substitution of consumption for leisure or vice
versa in order to sustain a certain level of utility. For agents with perfect foresight
nothing really changes when factor prices are no longer predetermined. Now, as
labour supply is elastic, they choose a plan for leisure in addition to their plan for
consumption, but they still do that in a once and for all manner. Transition paths
should be smooth as before. But for agents that use adaptive learning, it might
make a difference. In particular, we suspect that the expectational error could
be larger in the case in which factor prices are no longer predetermined. This
could lead to more volatility in the expectations of factor prices which translates
into higher volatility of actual factor prices as well as consumption and leisure
choices. We suggest that the correction of the expectational error in each period
could explain the oscillations.
3.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Compared to the previous literature on welfare evaluation of tax reforms, our
learning approach introduces two additional structural parameters. One is γ, the
gain parameter and a second one is Tp, the period, in which the pre-announced
tax change becomes effective. Therefore, we are interested in how these two
parameters affect the dynamic properties of the model.
3.3.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Gain Parameter
No matter what calibration, one always has to choose a gain parameter γ in
the adaptive learning literature. In this subsection we would therefore like to
illustrate the consequences of different choices of the gain parameter. The sole
empirical estimate we are aware of is provided by Milani (2007, p.2074) for quar-
terly frequency and is γ = 0.0183. This number indicates that agents use ap-
proximately 1/γ ≈ 55 quarters of data. But a reason to be cautious to use the
estimate of Milani (2007, p.2074) is that it is based on a data set containing
output, inflation and the nominal interest rate, whereas in our setting agents
forecast the rental rate of capital and the real wage. Next, Milani (2007, p.2074)
mentions that for constant gain learning a range of γ ∈ [0.01, 0.03] is commonly
used. Evans and Honkapohja (2009, p.154) note a range of γ ∈ [0.01, 0.06] as
known estimates.
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Below we will present sensitivity of the dynamics under learning for γ ∈
{0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.08, 0.10}. We do so for the original numerical analysis of Evans
et al. (2009, p.943ff.) (L¯ = 1.00, η = 0.00), as in this case, there is inelastic labour
supply and we can focus solely on the possible fluctuations introduced by varying
the gain parameter γ. Note that the two thick lines in Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b)
exactly replicate the Figures 8 and 9 in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.).
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Figure 3.2: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning and perfect foresight with inelastic labour
supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for alternating values of γ. The dotted horizontal line
indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp.
In Figure 3.2(a) we observe that the smaller the gain γ, the smaller the increase
in consumption until the period of the tax change Tp (after the initial drop).
Furthermore, as we recognize from Figure 3.2(b), the smaller the gain γ, the
larger the increase in capital accumulation until the period of the tax change Tp.
However, in both Figure 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), we observe that with decreasing γ
the dynamics fluctuate around the steady-state with increasing amplitude and
it takes an increasing number of periods to converge to the steady-state. These
observations are partly at odds with what Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.332)
report: “a larger gain is better at tracking changes but at the cost of a larger
variance”. In our case it holds, that, the smaller the gain, the larger the volatility.
Summing up, we find that for the parameter range considered in this sensi-
tivity analysis, the choice of the gain parameter γ is not crucial for the shape of
the dynamic response.
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3.3.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis for the Implementation Date
Another issue that may be of interest is the implementation date Tp. As men-
tioned above a tax policy change that is going to be effective in 20 years time
appears to be unrealistic from our point of view. Therefore, we examine sensi-
tivity of dynamics under learning for various implementation dates, in particular
Tp ∈ {3, 10, 20}. Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) below display the results.
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Figure 3.3: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning with inelastic labour supply as in Evans
et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for alternating values of Tp. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new)
steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp = 20.
In Figure 3.3(a) we observe that the shorter the distance between the an-
nouncement date and implementation date of the tax change, the higher the
initial drop in consumption and the lower the increase in consumption until the
implementation date thereafter. Focusing on capital, in Figure 3.3(b) we observe
that with decreasing distance between the announcement date and implementa-
tion date of the tax change, the level that capital reaches until the implementation
date, is also lower. Finally, for implementation in three years time, i.e. Tp = 3,
learning dynamics are not significantly different from Tp ∈ {10, 20}, but lower in
scale. Overall, we observe that the shorter the distance between announcement
date and implementation date of the tax change, the earlier the learning dynam-
ics approach the steady-state, but, at least for the parameter range considered
herein, the nature of dynamics is not seriously affected.
Thus, we learn that in the subsequent numerical analysis, next to the elasticity
of labour supply η (and the commonly known candidate parameters β and δ),
142
Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the Case of Distortionary Taxation
the choice of the gain parameter γ as well as the implementation date Tp may
also be crucial in achieving convergence on the one hand and determining the
magnitude of volatility of the dynamics on the other hand. But these choices
may not affect the general nature of the dynamics. Furthermore, our experience
with β and δ suggests that they strongly affect the scale of results, next to their
impact on convergence.
In order to summarize, there are three important insights from the analysis
above. First, there are at least qualitative differences between the case of inelas-
tic labour supply (η = 0) and elastic labour supply (η > 0). Therefore, if one
regards the latter assumption as more realistic, a model that allows for elastic
labour supply is a more appropriate framework to study anticipated fiscal policy
under learning. Second, our sensitivity analysis suggests that the choice of the
gain parameters γ and the implementation date Tp does not affect the nature of
transition paths so we consider ourselves free to choose any of the values consid-
ered in the sensitivity analysis.10 Finally and most notably, we observed at least
a qualitative difference in the dynamics under learning compared to the dynamics
under perfect foresight. The former appear to be much more volatile than the
latter. This stylized fact, from our point of view, justifies the quantification and
comparison of welfare cost of anticipated fiscal policy reforms under learning and
under perfect foresight. In order to be able to mimic, at least to some extent,
a realistic fiscal policy reform, we will introduce distortionary taxes. Before we
look at complex fiscal policy reforms, we qualitatively inspect isolated changes in
distortionary taxes and the resulting dynamics for each type of tax. Thereafter,
we analyze more sophisticated fiscal policy reforms with regard to their welfare
costs in a realistic calibration.
3.4 The Case of Distortionary Taxation
After the base case of lump-sum taxation, we now study the case of distortionary
taxes. In the remainder, we will assume elastic labour supply. We first charac-
terize the dynamics for a permanent change in a single distortionary tax. This
follows closely from Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) similar to the last section. Next,
10In particular, in the subsequent analysis, we will choose γ = 0.08 and Tp = 8,
which will correspond to 8 quarters.
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we simulate the dynamic paths of the economy for a change in each type of dis-
tortionary tax in turn, given there are no other tax instruments. We inspect the
associated dynamics for each distortionary tax with regard to qualitative differ-
ences compared to the lump-sum tax and the other distortionary taxes. There-
after, in Section 3.4.4 below, we derive the dynamic paths of the economy in
presence of all types of taxes considered in this economy. Moreover, we evaluate
some specific tax reforms with regard to welfare, given our suggested calibration.
3.4.1 Labour Income Tax
Let us now assume that τ ct = τ
k
t = τt = 0 for all t and τ
l
t ∈ [0, 1]. The Euler
equation (3.8) is standard and forward substitution again yields (3.18). Next we
notice that the consumption leisure trade-off in this case is
nt = L¯− ηct
(1− τ lt )wt
. (3.28)
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital (3.20), the inter-temporal
budget constraint of the consumer is
ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
cpt+j(t) = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + (1− τ lt )wtnt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
[
(1− τ l,et+j(t))wet+j(t)npt+j(t)
]
.
Given (3.18) and (3.28) we can rewrite the latter as
ct
(1 + η)
(1− β) = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + (1− τ
l
t )wtL¯
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
[
(1− τ l,et+j(t))wet+j(t)L¯
]
. (3.29)
For firms, nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3. Finally, the
government now faces the constraint
gt = τ
l
twtnt (3.30)
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in each period t and the economy-wide resource constraint is given by (3.1).
We now once more consider the scenario of a credible permanent change in the
tax rate announced in period t = 1 and effective from period t = Tp onwards. In
particular, the labour income tax is changed from τ l0 to τ
l
1 at some point in time
Tp. The dynamics under perfect foresight are again standard. Under learning we
can directly follow Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.). The crucial step is to calculate
the infinite sums on the right-hand side of (3.29). That is
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
[
(1− τ l,et+j(t))wet+j(t)L¯
]
=
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯
−
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ l,et+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯
= SW1 − ST2.
Given (3.16) and (3.17), we get the term SW1 =
we(t)L¯
re(t)−δ as before in Section 3.3.
With regard to ST2, for 1 ≤ t < Tp we calculate11
ST2 = w
e(t)L¯
[
τ l0
re(t)− δ +
(
τ l1 − τ l0
) [(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1
]
(3.31)
and for t ≥ Tp we calculate
ST2 =
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ . (3.32)
Given (3.29), it follows that we have
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
[[(1− δ) + rt]kt + (1− τ l0)wtL¯+ (1− τ l0)
we(t)L¯
re(t)− δ
−we(t)L¯(τ l1 − τ l0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 ] (3.33)
for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
[
[(1− δ) + rt]kt + (1− τ l1)wtL¯+ (1− τ l1)
we(t)L¯
re(t)− δ
]
. (3.34)
11See Appendix 3.6.1.3 for details on derivations.
145
Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the Case of Distortionary Taxation
for t ≥ Tp. Given a calibration, we are then able to compute the dynamics of
consumption and other endogenous variables.
Now let us return to the numerical example. Here we calibrate the model
according to Table 3.2 below.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 8
β 0.99 γ 0.08
η 1.00 L¯ 1.00
Table 3.2: Calibration for the case with labour income tax only.
We choose the initial labour income tax rate to be τ l0 = 0.23 as in Cooley and
Hansen (1992, p.305) and assume a credible pre-announced permanent increase
by 10% to τ l1 = 0.2530. These parameter choices yield initial steady-state em-
ployment of n0 = 0.3774, which corresponds to 9.06 hours per day. Simulations
for the first 450 periods are displayed in Figures 3.4(a) to 3.4(b) below.
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Figure 3.4: Consumption (a) and capital dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed
curve). The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates
period Tp.
We find that the only qualitative difference in the dynamics compared to the
case of lump-sum taxation with elastic labour supply, is the remarkably slower
convergence. We conjecture that this is due to the different calibration of key
parameters such as β, η and γ.
146
Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the Case of Distortionary Taxation
3.4.2 Capital Income Tax
Let us now assume that τ ct = τ
l
t = τt = 0 for all t and τ
k
t ∈ [0, 1]. The Euler
equation (3.8) now changes to
c−1t = β(c
p
t+1(t))
−1[(1− δ) + (1− τ k,et+1(t))ret+1(t)]
and forward substitution of this equation yields
cpt+j(t) = β
j(Dk,et,t+j(t))ct, (3.35)
where we define Dk,et,t+j(t) ≡ Πji=1[(1 − δ) + (1 − τ k,et+i(t))ret+i(t)]. Furthermore,
notice that the consumption leisure trade-off is again given by (3.19). Given the
adequate transversality condition for capital
lim
T 7→∞
(
Dk,et,t+T (t)
)−1
kpt+T+1(t) = 0, (3.36)
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is given by
ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
cpt+j(t) = [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt (t))rt]kt + wtnt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
[wet+j(t)L¯− ηcpt+j(t)].
By the virtue of (3.35) as well as (3.19) we can rewrite the latter as
(1 + η)
(1− β)ct = [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
t (t))rt]kt + wtL¯+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯. (3.37)
For firms again nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3. Finally,
the government now faces the constraint
gt = τ
k
t rtkt (3.38)
in each period t. The economy-wide resource constraint is again given by (3.1).
We now consider the scenario of a permanent change in the capital income
tax rate. The rate is changed from τ k0 to τ
k
1 at some point in time Tp. The
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dynamics under perfect foresight are again standard. Under learning we follow
the approach of Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.). The infinite sum on the right-hand
side of (3.37) is
SW2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯. (3.39)
Given (3.16) and (3.17), for 1 ≤ t < Tp we calculate12
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(3.40)
and for t ≥ Tp we calculate
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (3.41)
From (3.37) follows that we have
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
{[(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )rt]kt + wtL¯+
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
}
(3.42)
for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )rt]kt + wtL¯+
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
]
(3.43)
for t ≥ Tp. Given a calibration, we can compute the dynamics of consumption
and other endogenous variables.
Now let’s return to the numerical example. Here we calibrate the model
12See Appendix 3.6.1.4 for details on derivations.
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according to Table 3.3 below.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 8
β 0.99 γ 0.08
η 0.85 L¯ 1.00
Table 3.3: Calibration for the case with capital income tax only.
We choose the initial capital income tax rate to be τ k0 = 0.5000 as in Cooley
and Hansen (1992, p.305) and assume a credible pre-announced permanent in-
crease by 10% to τ k1 = 0.5500. These parameter choices yield initial steady-state
employment of n0 = 0.4848, which corresponds to 11.6 hours per day.
Simulation results are displayed in Figures 3.5(a) to 3.5(b) below. The only
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Figure 3.5: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed
curve). The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates
period Tp.
qualitative difference we can find in the dynamics, is the larger size of fluctuations
and higher frequency of them. We can also observe that under learning time
paths need more periods to converge to the steady-state compared to the case of
lump-sum tax or labour income tax.
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3.4.3 Consumption Tax
Let us now assume that τ lt = τ
k
t = τt = 0 for all t and τ
c
t ∈ [0, 1]. The Euler
equation (3.8) now changes to
c−1t = β(c
p
t+1(t))
−1 (1 + τ
c
t )
(1 + τ c,et+1(t))
[(1− δ) + ret+1(t)]
and forward substitution of this expression yields
cpt+j(t) = β
jDc,et,t+j(t)ct, (3.44)
where we define Dc,et,t+j(t) ≡
[
(1+τct )
(1+τc,et+j(t))
]
Det,t+j(t). Next we notice that the con-
sumption leisure trade-off in this case is
nt = L¯− η(1 + τ
c
t )ct
wt
. (3.45)
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital (3.18), the inter-temporal
budget constraint of the consumer is given by
(1 + τ ct )ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
(1 + τ c,et+j(t))c
p
t+j(t) = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtnt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)n
p
t+j(t).
which by the virtue of (3.44) as well as (3.45) yields
(1 + η)
(1− β)(1 + τ
c
t )ct = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯+ SW1. (3.46)
For firms nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3. Finally
government now faces the constraint
gt = τ
c
t ct (3.47)
in each period t. The economy-wide resource constraint again is given by (3.1).
We now consider the scenario of a permanent change in the consumption tax
rate from τ c0 to τ
c
1 at some point in time Tp. The dynamics under perfect foresight
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are again standard. Under learning we follow again the methodology of Evans
et al. (2009, p.943ff.). The infinite sum on the right-hand side of (3.46) is equal
to SW1 =
we(t)L¯
re(t)−δ as in Section 3.3. Obviously from (3.46) follows that we have
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)(1 + τ c0)
[
[(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯+ w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ
]
(3.48)
for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)(1 + τ c1)
[
[(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯+ w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ
]
(3.49)
for t ≥ Tp. Given a calibration, we have everything at hands to compute the
dynamics of consumption and the other endogenous variables.
Note that inspection of (3.48) and (3.49) makes clear that in the case of a
consumption tax the dynamics of consumption are independent of the implemen-
tation date Tp. At least, this is true in our economy.
13 This fact may have a
major impact on the dynamics.
In order to illustrate the dynamics numerically we calibrate the model accord-
ing to Table 3.4 below.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 8
β 0.99 γ 0.08
η 1.25 L¯ 1.00
Table 3.4: Calibration for the case with consumption tax only.
Initial consumption tax rate is τ c0 = 0.0500 as in Giannitsarou (2007, p.1424)
and assume a credible pre-announced permanent increase by 10% to τ c1 = 0.0550.
These parameter choices yield initial steady-state employment of n0 = 0.3299,
which approximately corresponds to 8.0 hours per day. Simulation results are
displayed in Figures 3.6(a) to 3.6(b) below.
We observe that the dynamics of the consumption tax reform coincide for
perfect foresight and learning. It appears, that in both cases, the consumption
tax only matters in the period when it is changed, as suspected in our motivation
above. We presume that this result depends on our utility specification with
13Compare (3.42) for the case of the capital income tax or for the labour income tax.
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Figure 3.6: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed
curve). The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates
period Tp.
regard to consumption, that is log-utility. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, p.318ff.)
present results for a power utility function under perfect foresight. The different
perfect foresight dynamics therein suggest that the specification of utility may be
the source of our result.
Nevertheless it would be an interesting subject of study to check, whether one
can formally prove that the dynamics in response to a change in the consumption
tax under learning and perfect foresight are similar in general, but we leave that
to future research.
3.4.4 Policy Experiments
Let us now assume that τ ct , τ
l
t , τ
k
t ∈ [0, 1] and τt 6= 0 for all t. The Euler equation
(3.8) now changes to
c−1t = β(c
p
t+1(t))
−1
[
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ c,et+1(t))
]
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k,et+1(t))ret+1(t)]
and forward substitution of this expression yields
cpt+j(t) = β
jDk,et,t+j(t)
[
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ c,et+j(t))
]
ct. (3.50)
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Furthermore, notice that the consumption leisure trade-off is now given by (3.10).
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital (3.36), the inter-temporal
budget constraint of the consumer is
(1 + τ ct )ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
(1 + τ c,et+j(t))c
p
t+j(t) = [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt
+(1− τ lt )wtnt − τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
[(1− τ l,et+j(t))wet+j(t)npt+j(t)− τ et+j(t)],
which by the virtue of (3.50) as well as (3.10) yields
(1 + η)
(1− β)(1 + τ
c
t )ct = [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt + (1− τ lt )wtL¯− τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
[(1− τ l,et+j(t))wet+j(t)L¯− τ et+j(t)]
= [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt + (1− τ lt )wtL¯− τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
[wet+j(t)L¯− τ l,et+j(t)wet+j(t)L¯− τ et+j(t)]
= [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt + (1− τ lt )wtL¯− τt
+SW2 − ST3 − ST4. (3.51)
For firms nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3.3. Finally
government now faces the constraint (3.15) in each period t. The economy-wide
resource constraint is again given by (3.1).
We now consider the scenario of a permanent (simultaneous) change in (some
of the) taxes at some point in time Tp. The dynamics under perfect foresight are
again standard. Under learning we again follow the approach Evans et al. (2009,
p.943ff.). The infinite sum SW2 on the right-hand side of (3.51) is already known
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to be
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(3.52)
for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
(3.53)
for t ≥ Tp from Section 3.4.2. ST3 on the right-hand side of (3.51) is
ST3 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ l,et+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯. (3.54)
Given (3.16) and (3.17), for 1 ≤ t < Tp we calculate14
ST3 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
τ l1 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− τ
l
0 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(3.55)
and for t ≥ Tp we calculate
ST3 =
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (3.56)
Finally, ST4 on the right-hand side of (3.51) is
ST4 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t). (3.57)
14See appendices 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.1.6 for the details on derivations of ST3 and ST4.
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Given (3.16) and (3.17), for 1 ≤ t < Tp we calculate
ST4 =
τ0
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ [
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
τ1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
τ0 ] (3.58)
and for t ≥ Tp we calculate
ST4 =
τ1
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (3.59)
Given (3.51) we can then compute the dynamics responses for consumption and
the other endogenous variables as before. Now, we will conduct several policy
experiments numerically and compute welfare measures following the approach
of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.).15 Intuitively speaking, we compute the
increase in consumption that an individual would require to be as well off as under
the equilibrium allocation without taxes. We express that number in percentage
of output. First, we will do so for our initial choice of tax levels (see line 1 in
Table 3.6 below). Thereafter, we carry out policy reforms, where we change taxes
in a certain way and each time recalculate welfare measure both for learning and
perfect foresight. As a result we can then compare the welfare implications for a
tax change under perfect foresight against the case under learning. Note that we
use the measure of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) for the transition paths.
We do so because their measure for static comparison would lead to the same
number for perfect foresight and learning, as in both cases the initial and new
steady-states are identical.
An additional parameter needs to be chosen. That is the evaluation horizon
T . Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) choose a horizon T ≥ 2000 and give no
further detail on the motivation of that choice. Garcia-Mila` et al. (2010) use
T = 200 and give no motivation either. We will choose the latter in our welfare
evaluations. For the series of experiments in Table 3.6 below, our calibration of
the model is according to Table 3.5 below.
We choose the initial tax rates to be τ0 = 0.0000, τ
l
0 = 0.2300, τ
k
0 = 0.5000
and τ c0 = 0.0500. These non-zero tax rates lead to distortions. The first row
15We detail the computation in Appendix 3.6.2.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 8
β 0.99 γ 0.08
η 0.99 L¯ 1.00
Table 3.5: Model calibration for policy experiments 1.− 4.
in Table 3.6 reveals the welfare loss between the steady-state of the economy
without taxes and the steady-state of the economy with our initially chosen tax
rates amounts to 73.72%. This number tells us the change in consumption (in
percentage of output) which is required so that households in the economy with
initial tax levels are as well off as in the case with zero taxes is 73.72%. Be aware
that Table 3.6 also indicates that without taxes our calibration yields a first best
steady-state employment of nFB = 0.4024, which implies 9.66 hours. With the
initial taxes in place, the steady-state employment is n0 = 0.4326, which implies
10.38 hours.
Now we assume a credible pre-announced permanent tax reform that favours
capital accumulation, i.e. we lower the capital income tax to a level of τ k1 =
0.2500. As suggested by Judd (1987), Lucas (1990) and Cooley and Hansen
(1992) this is expected to reduce the welfare costs of distortionary taxation. In
each experiment reported lines 2 to 4 in Table 3.6 below, one of the other tax
instruments, τ•, τ l• or τ
c
• will be raised to a level that ensures that the periodic
tax revenue in the new steady-state is the same as in the initial steady-state.16
The second row of Table 3.6 indicates that compensating the cut in the capital
income tax to τ k1 by an increase in the labour income tax to τ
l
1 leads to a welfare
improvement under perfect foresight as well as under learning as both welfare
measures decrease. But the numbers also reveal that the magnitude of the im-
provement differs. Whereas under learning the welfare measure goes down from
16Note, that as long as the dynamics under learning and perfect foresight differ, one is
not able to equalize present values of tax revenues under learning and perfect foresight
to the present value of tax revenues in the initial steady-state by manipulating tax rates
in the same way. This approach was used in the analysis of Cooley and Hansen (1992)
for perfect foresight only, but is not feasible in our case. In addition, we believe that
keeping present values constant is not the kind of fiscal policy change that governments
conduct in reality. Moreover, we believe that our comparison of welfare costs under
learning to welfare costs under perfect foresight is valid even without equalizing present
values of the tax revenue.
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73.72% to 72.12%, under perfect foresight it decreases much more to 64.47%.17
We can also observe that the new steady-state employment n1 is lower than the
initial steady-state employment n0.
The pattern just described is also true, if we compensate the cut in τ k• by
an increase in τ c• or τ• as the third and fourth row in Table 3.6 indicate. It is
noteworthy that using the the lump-sum tax to compensate for the cut in the
capital income tax yields the largest welfare improvement and keeps steady-state
employment at the highest level independent of the assumption about expecta-
tions.
Thus, experiments 2 to 4 indicate that the resulting welfare improvements of
an anticipated tax reform might be much smaller in magnitude under learning
compared to its improvements under perfect foresight.
17We would like to emphasize that we set the rate of depreciation to δ = 0 in order
to achieve convergence for the dynamics under learning. That might be the reason,
why the scale of W both under learning and perfect foresight is approximately twice
the scale as the results in Cooley and Hansen (1992).
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3.5 Conclusion
We demonstrate that under the assumption of elastic labour supply the responses
to anticipated permanent lump-sum tax changes when agents learn are remark-
ably different compared to their counterparts under perfect foresight. The dy-
namics under learning appear to oscillate around the steady-state to which they
converge slowly. Thus, there is more volatility under learning.
However sensitivity analyses show that even under inelastic labour supply
these oscillations may be present for some choices of the gain parameter. We also
find that a smaller gain parameter leads to higher volatility in our framework.
This result is at odds with conventional wisdom about the link between the gain
parameter and the dynamic responses in the learning literature. Overall, we
detect two sources that may lead to oscillatory dynamics under learning given
an anticipated permanent lump-sum tax change. These are the assumption of
elastic labour supply and the choice of the gain parameter in the learning rule.
In the subsequent analysis we derive the dynamics for several distortionary
taxes and illustrate that the dynamics for labour income as well as capital income
tax rate changes are quite similar to changes of the lump-sum tax given elastic
labour supply. Again we observe oscillating time paths. In case of a consumption
tax, there is no oscillatory behaviour for the dynamics under learning, at least
when agents have a log-utility function.
Moreover, policy experiments in the presence of multiple tax instruments in-
dicate that the magnitude of welfare improvements due to the tax reform consid-
ered herein appears to be substantially lower under the assumption of learning
compared to the case of perfect foresight. The reason may be the oscillatory
behaviour of the dynamics under learning.
Form our point of view these results raise two major issues. First, oscilla-
tory dynamic responses to exogenous shocks are rarely found in actual economic
data. This fact questions the suitability of the model herein for policy analysis.
Second, given that this model would be suitable for policy analysis, our results
indicate that permanent tax changes may lead to lower welfare improvements
under learning compared to perfect foresight.
We believe that future research in this area needs to come up with convincing
empirical evidence on whether or how agents learn about fiscal policy. In addition,
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we also need to clarify from actual economic data, how the dynamic responses to
anticipated permanent tax changes look like. Are they smooth or oscillatory?
With regard to theoretical considerations, it would also be desirable to derive
a version of the model that allows for changing different tax rates at different
points in time and therefore allows for public debt accumulation. But this task
is beyond the focus of this paper and we aim to pursue that idea in subsequent
research.
Furthermore, we think that perfect foresight and the implied once and for all
choices of agents on the one hand and learning which implies periodic revision of
current and future choices of agents on the other hand are extreme cases. One
could also imagine agents that use adaptive learning, but infrequently and with
differing interval length update their expectations and revise their current and
future choices. Alternatively, agents randomly receive a signal to update their
expectations.
In addition, more sophisticated computational methods may allow to calibrate
the rate of depreciation different from zero or more realistic values of the elasticity
of labour supply and still ensure convergence for the dynamics under learning on
the other side. This could facilitate numerical results that are directly comparable
to the existing literature in public finance.
3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Model Derivations
3.6.1.1 Timing
We believe that the understanding of the timing is crucial to follow the deriva-
tions. For time periods indexed by t, discounting periods indexed by j, and an
implementation date Tp announced in t = 1 and T ≡ Tp− t denoting the number
of periods until Tp we got the following picture:
t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...
j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...
T ≡ Tp − t = 4, 3, 2, 1, 0,−1, ...,
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thus for the infinite sum over index j
T−1∑
j=1
{•}+
∞∑
j=T
{•} (3.60)
from period t = 1 perspective, given exemplary Tp = 5 on the line 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp−1,
until j = 3 = T − 1 we have the old tax rate. Furthermore, on the line t ≥ Tp
from j = 4 = T onwards we have the new tax rate. Equivalently for the infinite
sum
T−2∑
j=0
{•}+
∞∑
j=T−1
{•} (3.61)
from period t = 1 perspective, given exemplary Tp = 5 on the line 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp−1,
until j = 2 = T − 2 we have the old tax rate. Furthermore, on the line t ≥ Tp
from j = 3 = T − 1 onwards we have the new tax. This allows us later on to
replace T with Tp − t for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1 and T − 1 with 0 for t ≥ Tp.
3.6.1.2 Derivation of ST1
Here we want to illustrate the methodology we apply in all derivations under
learning for the example of ST1. Starting from
ST1 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t)
we split this infinite sum into
ST1 =
[
T−1∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ0 +
∞∑
j=T
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ1
]
.
Next we go back to the definition of Det,t+j(t). Given the learning rules (3.16)
and (3.17) we get
Det,t+j(t) = Π
j
i=1 [(1− δ) + re(t)] = [(1− δ) + re(t)]j . (3.62)
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Consequently we get
ST1 =
[
T−1∑
j=1
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ0 + ∞∑
j=T
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ1] ,
or
ST1 = [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 ×
[
T−2∑
j=0
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ0 + ∞∑
j=T−1
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ1] .
Given the property of a finite geometric series
∑n
j=m f
j = f
n+1−fm
f−1 for some
constant f , we get
ST1 = [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 ×
[(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T − 1
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 − 1
)
τ0 +
(
− [(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 − 1
)
τ1
]
,
which can be rewritten as
ST1 =
τ0
re(t)− δ +
(τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]
[(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 . (3.63)
Now, considering the timing outlined in Appendix 3.6.1.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp−1
we plug in Tp − t for T and get (3.24)
ST1 =
τ0
re(t)− δ + (τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 , (3.64)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (3.25)
ST1 =
τ1
re(t)− δ . (3.65)
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3.6.1.3 Derivation of ST2
Starting from
ST2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ l,et+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯
and given the learning rules (3.16) and (3.17) as well as (3.62) from above and
τ l,et+j being either τ
l
0 or τ
l
1, we may split the infinite sum above into
ST2 = w
e(t)L¯
[
T−1∑
j=1
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]j
)−1
τ l0 +
∞∑
j=T
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]j
)−1
τ l1
]
or
ST2 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− δ) + re(t)]
T−2∑
j=0
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− δ) + re(t)]
∞∑
j=T−1
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j .
Now, as above, the properties of the geometric series allow us to rewrite this as
ST2 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− δ) + re(t)]
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T − 1
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 − 1
)
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− δ) + re(t)]
(
− [(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 − 1
)
.
For the timing outlined in Appendix 3.6.1.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp− 1 we plug in
Tp − t for T and get (3.31)
ST2 = w
e(t)L¯
[
τ l0
re(t)− δ +
(
τ l1 − τ l0
) [(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1
]
(3.66)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (3.32)
ST2 =
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ . (3.67)
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3.6.1.4 Derivation of SW2
We start from (3.39)
SW2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯.
Next, we recall the definition of Dk,et,t+j(t). Given the learning rules (3.16) and
(3.17) we get
Dk,et,t+j(t) = Π
j
i=1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]
=
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j
(3.68)
for τ k,et+j(t) = τ
k
0 and
Dk,et,t+j(t) = Π
j
i=1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]
=
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j
(3.69)
for τ k,et+j(t) = τ
k
1 . Thereafter, we split this infinite sum into
SW2 = L¯
[
T−1∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
we(t) +
∞∑
j=T
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
we(t)
]
= L¯[
T−1∑
j=1
(
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j
)−1we(t) +
∞∑
j=T
(
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j
)−1we(t) ],
or
SW2 =
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1)j
+
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1)j
.
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As in Section 3.6.1.2 above, we exploit the properties of geometric series and
derive
SW2 =
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] (1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]1−T
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
)
+
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] ( [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]1−T
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
)
.
Now we get back to the timing outlined in Appendix 3.6.1.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤
Tp − 1 we plug in Tp − t for T and get (3.40)
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(3.70)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (3.41)
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (3.71)
3.6.1.5 Derivation of ST3
Starting from (3.54)
ST3 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ l,et+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯
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for (3.68) and (3.69) and τ l,et+j(t) is either given by τ
l
0 or τ
l
1, we may once more
split the infinite sum into
ST3 = w
e(t)L¯×
[
T−1∑
j=1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ l0
+
∞∑
j=T
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ l1 ],
or
ST3 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1)j
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1)j
.
Now, the properties of the geometric series allow us to rewrite this as
ST3 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] ([(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]1−T − 1[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1 − 1
)
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] (− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]1−T[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1 − 1
)
.
For the timing outlined in Appendix 3.6.1.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp− 1 we plug in
Tp − t for T and get (3.55)
ST3 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
τ l1 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− τ
l
0 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(3.72)
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and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (3.56)
ST3 =
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (3.73)
3.6.1.6 Derivation of ST4
Starting from (3.57)
ST4 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t)
given (3.68) and (3.69) are true and τ et+j(t) is either τ0 or τ1, we again split the
infinite sum into
ST4 = [
T−1∑
j=1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ0
+
∞∑
j=T
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ1 ],
or
ST4 =
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1 [T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1)j
τ0
]
+
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1 [ ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1)j
τ1
]
.
Given the properties of geometric series we can rewrite the latter as
ST4 =
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1([(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]1−T − 1[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1 − 1 τ0
)
+
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1(− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]1−T[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1 − 1τ1
)
.
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Now given the timing outlined in Appendix 3.6.1.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1 we
plug in Tp − t for T and get (3.58)
ST4 =
τ0
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
τ1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
τ0 ] (3.74)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (3.59)
ST4 =
τ1
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (3.75)
3.6.2 Computing Welfare Changes
3.6.2.1 Comparative Statics
We follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) based on Lucas
(1990). Their measure of welfare change for a given policy change is derived by
solving
U0 = log[c1(1 + x
•)] + η log[1− n1] (3.76)
for x in our case.18 U0 is the utility a household obtains in the steady-state
without any tax and c1 and n1 are the values of consumption and employment
at the new steady-state after the tax change either under perfect foresight or
learning. It follows that
x• =
exp(U0)
c1(1− n1)η − 1. (3.77)
18x• is either x under perfect foresight or x∗ under learning.
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Thus, in general, we need to solve for x for the perfect foresight dynamics and
another x∗ for the dynamics under learning.19 Given x• we can calculate
W = 4C
y1
=
x•c1
y1
, (3.78)
where 4C is the restoration value of consumption, which in our case may be
interpreted as the total change in consumption required to restore a household
to the level of utility obtained under the allocation associated with zero taxes.
y1 is the level of output at the new steady-state.
3.6.2.2 Transition Measure
Again we follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) based on
Lucas (1990). Their measure of welfare change accounting for transition given a
policy change is derived by solving
T∑
t=1
βt {log[ct(1 + x•)] + η log[1− nt]− U0} != 0 (3.79)
for x under perfect foresight and x∗ under learning. T is the terminal period, ct
is period t consumption either under perfect foresight or learning and yt is period
t output either under perfect foresight or learning.
x• =
 exp (U0 [β1 + ...+ βT ])(
cβ
1
1 ... c
βT
T
)
×
[
(1− n1)ηβ1 ... (1− nT )ηβT
]
 1[β1+...+βT ] − 1.
x• =
 exp
(
U0
∑T
t=1 β
t
)
ΠTt=1c
βt
t × ΠTt=1 (1− nt)ηβ
t

1∑T
t=1 β
t
− 1. (3.80)
Given x• we can calculate
W• =
∑T
t=1 β
t {xct}∑T
t=1 β
t {yt}
, (3.81)
19Of course we are aware that this must yield the same x = x∗ both under perfect-
foresight and under learning, but this number may be useful to compare different policy
experiments.
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which will be reported asW for the perfect foresight dynamics and asW∗ for the
dynamics under learning.
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Abstract
English Version
This dissertation is comprised of three papers concerned with monetary and fiscal
policy issues. Each paper forms one chapter of the dissertation.
The first chapter is titled “Heterogeneous Expectations and the Merit of Mone-
tary Policy Inertia.” We study a central bank’s ability to ensure price stability by
conventional policies in the recently developed New Keynesian model with het-
erogeneous expectations. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations.
We find that linear rules that mechanically react to inflation and output exhibit
similar (dis-)advantages as in the standard New Keynesian model. It is optimal
policy, which appears to be hazardous given the central bank ignores heteroge-
neous expectations. Policy inertia in the central bank’s objective can resolve this
threat. Therefore, we provide favorable arguments for nowadays central banks’
practice to adjust interest rates with notable inertia in response to shocks.
The second chapter is titled “Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a World
with Heterogeneous Expectations.” We assess the central bank’s capability to
keep prices stable in scenarios of monetary and fiscal policy interaction. We do
so in the New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations, where agents
with rational and adaptive expectations coexist. No traditional clear-cut dis-
tinctions between policy regimes that do and do not yield to price stability are
possible. Moreover, for most policy regimes explosive paths of the price level
become feasible. Consequently conventional monetary policy recommendations
can become risky. Nevertheless, price stability remains attainable.
Abstract
The third and final chapter is titled “Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the
Case of Distortionary Taxation.” This is a collaboration with my fellow student
Shoujian Zhang. We study the impact of anticipated fiscal policy changes in the
Ramsey economy when agents form expectations using adaptive learning. We
extend the existing framework by distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour
supply, which makes agents’ decisions non-predetermined but more realistic. We
detect that the dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes under learning
have oscillatory behavior. Moreover, we demonstrate that this behavior can have
important implications for the welfare consequences of fiscal reforms.
German Version
Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation umfasst drei Essays, welche sich mit
Fragestellungen der Geld- und Fiskalpolitik bescha¨ftigen. Jeder Essay stellt ein
Kapitel der Dissertation dar.
Das erste Kapitel tra¨gt den Titel “Heterogeneous Expectations and the Merit of
Monetary Policy Inertia.” Es untersucht die Fa¨higkeit einer Zentralbank, mittels
popula¨rer Zinsregeln Preisstabilita¨t in einer O¨konomie sicherzustellen. Es handelt
sich um eine Neu-Keynesianische O¨konomie mit heterogenen Erwartungen. Die
Individuen formen ihre Erwartungen entweder rational oder adaptiv. Es stellt
sich heraus das simple Zinsregeln die gleichen Sta¨rken und Schwa¨chen haben, wie
in einer O¨konomie, in welcher nur rationale Agenten pra¨sent sind. Dagegen kann
Zinspolitik, welche unter rationalen Erwartungen optimal ist, unter heterogenen
Erwartungen schwerwiegende Konsequenzen im Hinblick auf die Preisstabilita¨t
haben. Wendet eine Zentralbank jedoch ein geeignetes Wohlfahrtskriterium an,
so stellen heterogene Erwartungen keine Bedrohung fu¨r Preisstabilita¨t dar. Die
Ergebnisse liefern ein weiteres Argument dafu¨r, dass Zentralbanken heutzutage
den Leitzins in Reaktion auf o¨konomische Turbulenzen nur graduell a¨ndern.
Das zweite Kapitel tra¨gt den Titel “Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in
a World with Heterogeneous Expectations.” Ein weiteres mal ist der Unter-
suchungsgegenstand die Fa¨higkeit einer Zentralbank, mittels Zinspolitik Preissta-
bilita¨t in einer O¨konomie mit heterogenen Erwartungen sicherzustellen. Wiederum
formen Individuen ihre Erwartungen entweder rational oder adaptiv. Dabei wird
insbesondere auf die Herausforderungen durch so genannte aktive Fiskalpolitik
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fu¨r die Zentralbank eingegangen. Es zeigt sich, dass im Gegensatz zum Fall ho-
mogen rationaler Erwartungen keine Politikregime analytisch identifiziert werden
ko¨nnen, welche zu Preisstabilita¨t fu¨hren. Numerische Simulationen zeigen, dass
in den meisten Politikszenarien die Gefahr lokaler Divergenz besteht, falls kon-
ventionelle Geldpolitik zum Einsatz kommt. Trotzdem kann Preisstabilita¨t durch
geeignete Geldpolitik erreicht werden.
Das dritte Kapitel tra¨gt den Titel “Anticipation, Learning and Welfare: the Case
of Distortionary Taxation.” Es handelt sich hierbei um eine Zusammenarbeit
mit Shoujian Zhang. Im Fokus der Untersuchung stehen antizipierte Steuer-
reformen. Die Individuen in der O¨konomie haben nicht-rationale Erwartungen.
Sie verhalten sich wie empirische Wirtschaftsforscher. Die Individuen nutzen
Beobachtungen aus der Vergangenheit um Erwartungen u¨ber die Zukunft mit-
tels statistischer Verfahren zu bilden. Besonderes Augenmerk richtet die Unter-
suchung auf die A¨nderung verzerrender Steuern. Es stellt sich heraus, dass eine
Steuerreform unter nicht-rationalen Erwartungen der Individuen zu oszillierenden
Anpassungspfaden o¨konomischer Variablen wie Konsum oder Kapital fu¨hrt. Nu-
merische Simulationen zeigen, dass die durch Steuerreformen verursachten Oszil-
lationen wichtige Implikationen fu¨r die Wohlfahrt einer Volkswirtschaft, gemessen
am Nutzen der Individuen, haben.
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